CRS Annotated Constitution
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Development and Scope
Source of this clause was the maxim “nemo tenetur seipsum accusare,” that “no man is bound to accuse himself.” The maxim is but one aspect of two different systems of law enforcement which competed in England for acceptance; the accusatorial and the inquisitorial. In the accusatorial system, which predated the reign of Henry II but was expanded and extended by him, first the community and then the state by grand and petit juries proceeded against alleged wrongdoers through the examination of others, and in the early years through examination of the defendant as well. The inquisitorial system, which developed in the ecclesiastical courts, compelled the alleged wrongdoer to affirm his culpability through the use of the oath ex officio. Under the oath, an official had the power to make a person before him take an oath to tell the truth to the full extent of his knowledge as to all matters about which he would be questioned; before administration of the oath the person was not advised of the nature of the charges against him, or whether he was accused of crime, and was also not informed of the nature of the questions to be asked.161
The use of this oath in Star Chamber proceedings, especially to root out political heresies, combined with opposition to the ecclesiastical oath ex officio, led over a long period of time to general acceptance of the principle that a person could not be required to accuse himself under oath in any proceeding before an official tribunal seeking information looking to a criminal prosecution, or before a magistrate investigating an accusation against him with or[p.1303]without oath, or under oath in a court of equity or a court of common law.162 The precedents in the colonies are few in number, but following the Revolution six states had embodied the privilege against self–incrimination in their constitutions,163 and the privilege was one of those recommended by several state ratifying conventions for inclusion in a federal bill of rights.164 Madison’s version of the clause read “nor shall be compelled to be a witness against himself,”165 but upon consideration by the House an amendment was agreed to insert “in any criminal case” in the provision.166
The historical studies cited demonstrate that in England and the colonies the privilege was narrower than the interpretation now prevailing, a common situation reflecting the gradual expansion, or occasional contracting, of constitutional guarantees based on the judicial application of the policies underlying the guarantees in the context of new factual patterns and practices. The difficulty is that the Court has generally failed to articulate the policy objectives underlying the privilege, usually citing a “complex of values” when it has attempted to state the interests served by it.167 Commonly mentioned in numerous cases was the assertion that the[p.1304]privilege was designed to protect the innocent and to further the search for truth.168 It appears now, however, that the Court has rejected both of these as inapplicable and has settled upon the principle that the clause serves two interrelated interests: the preservation of an accusatorial system of criminal justice, which goes to the integrity of the judicial system, and the preservation of personal privacy from unwarranted governmental intrusion.169 In order to protect these interests and to preserve these values, the privilege “is not to be interpreted literally.” Rather, the “sole concern [of the privilege] is, as its name indicates, with the danger to a witness forced to give testimony leading to the infliction of penalties affixed to the criminal acts.”170
“The privilege afforded not only extends to answers that would in themselves support a conviction . . . but likewise embraces those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute . . . . [I]f the witness, upon interposing his claim, were required to prove the hazard . . . he would be compelled to surrender the very protection which the privilege is designed to guarantee. To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.”171 Thus, a judge who would deny a claim of the privilege must be “‘perfectly clear, from a careful consideration of all the circumstances in the case, that the witness is mistaken, and that the[p.1305]answer[s] cannot possibly have such tendency’ to incriminate.”172 The witness must have reasonable cause to apprehend danger from an answer, but he may not be the sole judge of the validity of his claim. While the trial judge may not require a witness to disclose so much of the danger as to render the privilege nugatory, he must determine whether there is a reasonable apprehension of incrimination by considering the circumstances of the case, his knowledge of matters surrounding the inquiry, and the nature of the evidence which is demanded from the witness.173 One must explicitly claim his privilege or he will be deemed to have waived it, and waiver may be found where the witness has answered some preliminary questions but desires to stop at a certain point.174
The privilege against self–incrimination is a personal one and cannot be utilized by or on behalf of any organization, such as a corporation. Thus, a corporation cannot object on self–incrimination grounds to a subpoena of its records and books or to the compelled testimony of those corporate agents who have been given personal immunity from criminal prosecution.175 Neither may a corporate official with custody of corporate documents which incriminate him personally resist their compelled production on the assertion of his personal privilege.176
[p.1306]A witness has traditionally been able to claim the privilege in any proceeding whatsoever in which testimony is legally required when his answer might be used against him in that proceeding or in a future criminal proceeding or when it might be exploited to uncover other evidence against him.177
Supplement: [P. 1306, add to text following n.177:]
Incrimination is not complete once guilt has been adjudicated, and hence the privilege may be asserted during the sentencing phase of trial.8
The protection is against “compulsory” incrimination, and traditionally the Court has treated within the clause only those compulsions which arise from legally enforceable obligations, culminating in imprisonment for refusal to testify or to produce documents.182 But the compulsion need not be imprisonment; it can as[p.1308]well be termination of public employment183 or disbarment of a lawyer184 as a legal consequence of a refusal to make incriminating admissions. In extending the concept of coercion, however, the Court has not developed a clear doctrinal explanation to identify the differences between permissible and impermissible coercion. As a general rule, it may be said that all of these cases involve the ordering of some feature of a trial in such a way that a defendant must choose between or among rights, with one choice being to risk or to submit to self–incriminating disclosures by his actions.
It has long been the rule that a defendant who takes the stand in his own behalf cannot then claim the privilege to defeat cross– examination on matters reasonably related to the subject matter of his direct examination,185 and that such a defendant may be impeached by proof of prior convictions.186 But in Griffin v. California,187 the Court refused to permit prosecutorial or judicial comment to the jury upon a defendant’s refusal to take the stand in his own behalf, because such comment was a “penalty imposed by courts for exercising a constitutional privilege” and “[i]t cuts down[p.1309]on the privilege by making its assertion costly.”188 Prosecutors’ comments violating the Griffin rule can nonetheless constitute harmless error.189 Neither may a prosecutor impeach a defendant’s trial testimony through use of the fact that upon his arrest and receipt of a Miranda warning he remained silent and did not give the police the exculpatory story he told at trial.190 But where the defendant took the stand and testified, the Court permitted the impeachment use of his pre–arrest silence when that silence had in no way been officially encouraged, through a Miranda warning or otherwise.191
Further, the Court held inadmissible at the subsequent trial a defendant’s testimony at a hearing to suppress evidence wrongfully seized, since use of the testimony would put the defendant to an impermissible choice between asserting his right to remain silent and invoking his right to be free of illegal searches and seizures.192 The Court also proscribed the introduction at a second trial of the defendant’s testimony at his first trial, given to rebut a confession which was subsequently held inadmissible, since the testimony was in effect “fruit of the poisonous tree,” and had been “coerced” from the defendant through use of the confession.193 Most potentially far– reaching was a holding that invalidated the penalty structure of a statute under which defendants could escape a possible death sentence by entering a guilty plea; the statute “needlessly encourage[d]” waivers of defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to plead not guilty and his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.194
While this “needless encouragement” test assessed the nature of the choice required to be made by defendants against the[p.1310]strength of the governmental interest in the system requiring the choice, the Court soon devolved another test stressing the voluntariness of the choice. A guilty plea entered by a defendant who correctly understands the consequences of the plea is voluntary unless coerced or obtained under false pretenses; moreover, there is no impermissible coercion where the defendant has the effective assistance of counsel.195 The Court in an opinion by Justice Harlan then formulated still another test in holding that a defendant in a capital case in which the jury in one process decides both guilt and sentence could be put to a choice between remaining silent on guilt or admitting guilt and being able to put on evidence designed to mitigate the possible sentence. The pressure to take the stand in response to the sentencing issue, said the Court, was not so great as to impair the policies underlying the self–incrimination clause, policies described in this instance as proscription of coercion and of cruelty in putting the defendant to an undeniably “hard” choice.196 Similarly, it has been held that requiring a defendant to give notice to the prosecution before trial of his intention to rely on an alibi defense and to give the names and addresses of witnesses who will support it does not violate the clause.197 Neither does it violate a defendant’s self–incrimination privilege to create a presumption upon the establishment of certain basic facts which the jury may utilize to infer defendant’s guilt unless he rebuts the presumption.198
[p.1311]The obligation to testify is not relieved by this clause, if, regardless of whether incriminating answers are given, a prosecution is precluded,199 or if the result of the answers is not incrimination, but rather harm to reputation or exposure to infamy or disgrace.200 The clause does not prevent a public employer from discharging an employee who, in an investigation specifically and narrowly directed at the performance of the employee’s official duties, refuses to cooperate and to provide the employer with the desired information on grounds of self–incrimination.201 But it is unclear under what other circumstances a public employer may discharge an employee who has claimed his privilege before another investigating agency.202
Finally, the rules established by the clause and the judicial interpretations are applicable against the States to the same degree that they apply to the Federal Government,203 and neither sovereign can compel discriminatory admissions which would incriminate the person in the other jurisdiction.204
Supplement: [P. 1311, add to text at end of section:]
There is no “cooperative internationalism” that parallels the cooperative federalism and cooperative prosecution on which application against States is premised, and consequently concern with foreign prosecution is beyond the scope of the Self–Incrimination Clause.12
Supplement: [P. 1307, add to n.180:]
Two Justices recently challenged the interpretation limiting application to “testimonial” disclosures, claiming that the original understanding of the word “witness” was not limited to someone who gives testimony, but included someone who gives any kind of evidence. United States v. Hubbell, 120S. Ct. 2037, 2050 (2000) (Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, concurring).
Supplement: [P. 1307, delete n.181 and add to text following sentence that contained n.181:]
A person may be compelled to produce specific documents even though they contain incriminating information.9 If, however, the existence of specific documents is not known to the government, and the act of production informs the government about the existence, custody, or authenticity of the documents, then the privilege is implicated.10 Application of these principles resulted in a holding that the Independent Counsel could not base a prosecution on incriminating evidence identified and produced as the result of compliance with a broad subpoena for all information relating to the individual’s income, employment, and professional relationships.11
Supplement: [P. 1309, add to n.190:]
In determining whether a state prisoner is entitled to federal habeas corpus relief because the prosecution violated due process by using his post–Miranda silence for impeachment purposes at trial, the proper standard for harmless–error review is that announced in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946) —whether the due process error “had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict—not the stricter “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) , applicable on direct review. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) .
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