skip navigation
search
 
CRS Annotated Constitution

CRS Annotated Constitution

Article I -- Table of ContentsPrev | Next
[p.243]
CONCURRENT FEDERAL AND STATE JURISDICTION

The General Issue: Preemption

In Gibbons v. Ogden,1011 the Court, speaking by Chief Justice Marshall, held that New York legislation that excluded from the navigable waters of that State steam vessels enrolled and licensed under an act of Congress to engage in the coasting trade was in conflict with the federal law and hence void.1012 The result, said the Chief Justice, was required by the supremacy clause, which proclaimed not only that the Constitution itself but statutes enacted pursuant to it and treaties superseded state laws that “interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of Congress . . . . In every such case, the act of Congress, or the treaty, is supreme; and the law of the State, though enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted, must yield to it.”1013

Since the turn of the century, federal legislation, primarily but not exclusively under the commerce clause, has penetrated deeper and deeper into areas once occupied by the regulatory power of the States. One result is that state laws on subjects about which Congress has legislated have been more and more frequently attacked as being incompatible with the acts of Congress and invalid under the supremacy clause.1014

[p.244]

“The constitutional principles of preemption, in whatever particular field of law they operate, are designed with a common end in view: to avoid conflicting regulation of conduct by various official bodies which might have some authority over the subject matter.”1015 As Justice Black once explained in a much quoted exposition of the matter: “There is not—and from the very nature of the problem there cannot be—any rigid formula or rule which can be used as a universal pattern to determine the meaning and purpose of every act of Congress. This Court, in considering the validity of state laws in the light of treaties or federal laws touching the same subject, has made use of the following expressions: conflicting; contrary to; occupying the field; repugnance; difference; irreconcilability; inconsistency; violation; curtailment; and interference. But none of these expressions provides an infallible constitutional test or an exclusive constitutional yardstick. In the final analysis, there can be no one crystal clear distinctly marked formula. Our primary function is to determine whether, under the circumstances of this particular case, Pennsylvania’s law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”1016

Before setting out in their various forms the standards and canons to which the Court formally adheres, one must still recognize the highly subjective nature of their application. As an astute observer long ago observed, “the use or non–use of particular tests, as well as their content, is influenced more by judicial reaction to the desirability of the state legislation brought into question than by metaphorical sign–language of ‘occupation of the field.’ And it would seem that this is largely unavoidable. The Court, in order to determine an unexpressed congressional intent, has undertaken the task of making the independent judgment of social values that Congress has failed to make. In making this determination, the Court’s evaluation of the desirability of overlapping regulatory schemes or overlapping criminal sanctions cannot but be a substantial factor.”1017

[p.245]

Preemption Standards.—Until roughly the New Deal, as recited above, the Supreme Court applied a doctrine of “dual federalism,” under which the Federal Government and the States were separate sovereigns, each preeminent in its own fields but not overlapping. This conception affected preemption cases, with the Court taking the view, largely, that any congressional regulation of a subject effectively preempted the field and ousted the States.1018 Thus, when Congress entered the field of railroad regulation, the result was invalidation of many previously enacted state measures. Even here, however, safety measures tended to survive, and health and safety legislation in other areas were protected from the effects of federal regulatory actions.

In the 1940s, the Court began to develop modern standards for determining when preemption occurred, which are still recited and relied on.1019 All modern cases recite some variation of the basic standards. “[T]he question whether a certain state action is pre–empted by federal law is one of congressional intent. The purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone. To discern Congress’ intent we examine the explicit statutory language and the structure and purpose of the statute.”1020 Congress’ intent to supplant state authority in a particular field may be express in the terms of the statute.1021 Since preemption cases, when the statute contains no express provision, theoretically turn on statutory construction, generalizations about them can carry one only so far. Each case must construe a different federal statute with a distinct legislative history. If the statute and the legislative history are silent or unclear, the Supreme Court has developed over time general criteria which[p.246]it purports to utilize in determining the preemptive effect of federal legislation.

“Absent explicit pre–emptive language, we have recognized at least two types of implied pre–emption: field pre–emption, where the scheme of federal regulation is so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it, . . . and conflict pre–emption, where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility, . . . or where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”1022 “Preemption of state law by federal statute or regulation is not favored ‘in the absence of persuasive reasons—either that the nature of the regulated subject matters permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress has unmistakably so ordained.”1023 However, “[t]he relative importance to the State of its own law is not material when there is a conflict with a valid federal law, for the Framers of our Constitution provided that the federal law must prevail.”1024

In the final conclusion, “the generalities” that may be drawn from the cases do not decide them. Rather, “the fate of state legislation in these cases has not been determined by these generalities but by the weight of the circumstances and the practical and experienced judgment in applying these generalities to the particular instances.”1025

Footnotes
1011 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 1 (1824).
1012 A modern application of Gibbons v. Ogden is Douglas v. Seacoast Products, 431 U.S. 265 (1977), in which the Court, in reliance on the present version of the licensing statute utilized by Chief Justice Marshall, struck down state laws curtailing the operations of federally licensed vessels. In the course of the Douglas opinion, the Court observed that “[a]lthough it is true that the Court’s view in Gibbons of the intent of the Second Congress in passing the Enrollment and Licensing Act is considered incorrect by commentators, its provisions have been repeatedly re–enacted in substantially the same form. We can safely assume that Congress was aware of the holding, as well as the criticism, of a case so renowned as Gibbons. We have no doubt that Congress has ratified the statutory interpretation of Gibbons and its progeny.” Id., 278–279.
1013 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 1, 211 (1824). See also McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 316, 436 (1819). Although preemption is basically constitutional in nature, deriving its forcefulness from the supremacy clause, it is much more like statutory decisionmaking, inasmuch as it depends upon an interpretation of an act of Congress in determining whether a state law is ousted. E.g., Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 271–272 (1977). See also Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111 (1965). “Any such pre–emption or conflict claim is of course grounded in the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution: if a state measure conflicts with a federal requirement, the state provision must give way. The basic question involved in these cases, however, is never one of interpretation of the Federal Constitution but inevitably one of comparing two statutes.” Id., 120.
1014 Cases considered under this heading are overwhelmingly about federal legislation based on the commerce clause, but the principles enunciated are identical whatever source of power Congress utilizes. Therefore, cases arising under legislation based on other powers are cited and treated interchangeably.
1015 Amalgamated Assn. of Street, Electric Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 285–286 (1971).
1016 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). This case arose under the immigration power of cl. 4.
1017 Cramton, Pennsylvania v. Nelson: A Case Study in Federal Preemption, 26 U. Chi. L. Rev. 85, 87–88 (1956). “The [Court] appears to use essentially the same reasoning process in a case nominally hinging on preemption as it has in past cases in which the question was whether the state law regulated or burdened interstate commerce. [The] Court has adopted the same weighing of interests approach in preemption cases that it uses to determine whether a state law unjustifiably burdens interstate commerce. In a number of situations the Court has invalidated statutes on the preemption ground when it appeared that the state laws sought to favor local economic interests at the expense of the interstate market. On the other hand, when the Court has been satisfied that valid local interests, such as those in safety or in the reputable operation of local business, outweigh the restrictive effect on interstate commerce, the Court has rejected the preemption argument and allowed state regulation to stand.” Note, Preemption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12Stan. L. Rev.208,217 (1959) (quoted approvingly as a “thoughtful student comment” in G. Gunther, Constitutional Law (12th ed. 1991), 297).
1018 E.g., Charleston & W. Car. Ry. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597, 604 (1915). But see Corn Products Refining Co. v. Eddy, 249 U.S. 427, 438 (1919).
1019 E.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941); Cloverleaf Butter v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Co., 331 U.S. 218 (1947); California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949).
1020 Gade v. National Solid Wastes Mgmt. Assn., 112 S.Ct. 2374, 2381–2382 (1992) (internal quotation marks and case citations omitted). Recourse to legislative history as one means of ascertaining congressional intent, although contested, is permissible. Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 606–612 & n. 4 (1991).
1021 Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 56–57 (1991); Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 604–605 (1991).
1022 Gade v. National Solid Wastes Mgmt. Assn., 112S.Ct.2374,2383 (1992) (internal quotation marks and case citations omitted). The same or similar language is used throughout the preemption cases. E.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc, 112S.Ct.2608,2617 (1992); id., 2625– 2626 (Justice Blackmun concurring and dissenting); id., 2632–2634 (Justice Scalia concurring and dissenting); Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 604–605 (1991); English v. General Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78–80 (1990); Silkwood v. Kerr–McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm., 461 U.S. 190, 203–204 (1983); Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
1023 Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963); Chicago & Northwestern Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 317 (1981). Where Congress legislates in a field traditionally occupied by the States, courts should “start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm., 461 U.S. 190, 206 (1983) ((quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
1024 Free v. Brand, 369 U.S. 633, 666 (1962).
1025 Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U.S. 202, 211 (1944) (per Justice Frankfurter).
Article I -- Table of ContentsPrev | Next