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Delia v. E.M.A.

Oral argument: 
January 8, 2013

E.M.A., a minor, suffered catastrophic injuries during her birth due to the physician's negligence during delivery. As part of its Medicaid program, North Carolina paid for E.M.A.’s medical expenses upon her mother’s agreement to reimburse the Medicaid program for any recovery gained from a third party to cover E.M.A.’s medical expenses. When E.M.A. settled her claim against the physician for a fraction of her medical costs, North Carolina attached a lien equal to one third of the total settlement. In this case, the Supreme Court will resolve a conflict between the North Carolina Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.  The Court will decide whether a North Carolina law that allows the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services (“DHHS”) to assert a lien against a Medicaid recipient's recovery from a third party, when limited to the lesser of either the total amount of medical expenses or one third of the Medicaid recipient’s total settlement amount, violates the "no-lien" provision of the Medicaid Act. DHHS argues that the North Carolina statute is consistent with the Medicaid Act’s no-lien provision because it operates as an advanced agreement to apportion one third of the settlement toward medical expenses.  E.M.A. responds that the statute violates the Medicaid Act because it allows DHHS to recover a proportion of the settlement that is greater than her medical expenses.  This case will allow the Court to balance the interest that States have in maintaining solvent Medicaid programs against the interests of Medicaid claimants who fail to recover sufficient damages from third-parties to cover their medical costs.

Questions Presented: 

Whether N.C. Gen. Stat. § 108A-57 is preempted by the Medicaid Act's anti-lien provision as it was construed in Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268 (2006), an issue on which the North Carolina Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit are in conflict.

Issue

Does N.C. Gen. Stat. §108A-57 violate the anti-lien provision of the Medicaid Act as it was interpreted in Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn?

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Edited by: 
Additional Resources: 

City of Arlington, Texas, et al. v. Federal Communications Commission, et al. (11-1545) and Cable, Telecommunications, and Technology Committee of the New Orleans City Council v. Federal Communications Commission (11-1547)

Oral argument: 
January 16, 2013

A boom in wireless communications has prompted the building of more facilities for wireless services. While necessary to manage the growing demand for wireless services, these facilities can be unpopular neighbors in a community. Although the Communications Act requires a local government to respond within a reasonable time period to requests for building these facilities, the law does not specify what exactly is a reasonable time period. In 2008, the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") set timeframes on zoning authorities for processing requests to build wireless facilities. The Petitioner Cities of Arlington, Texas, and New Orleans, Louisiana, challenged the FCC’s timeframes by arguing that the FCC overstepped its power under the Communications Act. When the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the FCC acted within its power, Arlington and New Orleans challenged that the Fifth Circuit improperly submitted its own judgment to that of the FCC on the question of the FCC’s scope of authority. Arguing to uphold the decision of the Fifth Circuit, Respondent FCC contends that Congress intended to empower the FCC to interpret the Communications Act in all its provisions. Differing from the FCC, Respondent Cellco (a partnership of four corporations) argues that although Congress did not empower the FCC to determine the limits of its own authority, the Fifth Circuit was right to defer to the FCC on these timeframes in particular. If the U.S. Supreme Court holds for Arlington and New Orleans, the uniformity in timely construction of wireless facilities may suffer. However, a holding for the FCC may allow the FCC and other agencies to expand their own powers at the expense of local governments. Further, if the U.S. Supreme Court holds for Cellco and the FCC, local governments may lose the flexibility and power to respond to local concerns. 

Questions Presented: 

This case involves a challenge to the FCC's jurisdiction to implement §332(c)(7) of the Communications Act of 1934, titled "Preservation of Local Zoning Authority." Section 332(c)(7) imposes certain limitations on State and local zoning authority over the placement of wireless service facilities, but authorizes the FCC to address only one of these limitations; it states that no other provision "in this Act" may ''limit'' or "affect" State and local authority over wireless facilities placement. The FCC concluded that other provisions "in this Act" authorize it to adopt national zoning standards to implement §332(c)(7). The Fifth Circuit deferred to the FCC's jurisdictional determination applying Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), but acknowledged that "[t]he Supreme Court has not yet conclusively resolved the question of whether Chevron applies in the context of an agency's determination of its own statutory jurisdiction, and the circuit courts of appeals have adopted different approaches to this issue."

City of Arlington, Texas, et al., v. Federal Communications Commission, et al.

1. Whether, contrary to the decisions of at least two other circuits, and in light of this Court's guidance, a court should apply Chevron to review an agency's determination of its own jurisdiction; and

2. Whether the FCC may use its general authority under the Communications Act to limit or affect State and local zoning authority over the placement of personal wireless service facilities.

Cable, Telecommunications, and Technology Committee of the New Orleans City Council v. Federal Communications Commission

1. Should Chevron deference be afforded to an administrative agency's interpretation of its own statutory jurisdiction?

2. If it is determined that an agency's interpretation of its own statutory jurisdiction should be evaluated under Chevron, did the Fifth Circuit improperly apply Chevron?

3. Did the FCC usurp the jurisdiction and authority reserved for State and local governments by Congress in its interpretation of 47 U.S.C.A. § 332(C)(7) by creating additional limitations on state and local governments beyond those provided for in the statute?

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Issues

Should a court defer to the decision of an administrative agency when determining the limits of the agency’s power? Additionally, did the Federal Communications Commission exceed its power by setting timeframes on local governments for processing requests to build wireless service facilities?

Edited by: 

Sebelius, Sec. of Health and Human Services v. Auburn Regional Medical Center

Oral argument: 
December 4, 2012

Since 1983, hospitals have received reimbursement for treating Medicare patients with the option of receiving additional compensation for treating low-income individuals. It was recently discovered that the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) miscalculated rates in the 1990s, causing certain hospitals to receive less than they were entitled to receive. Several hospitals challenged these underpayments under 42 U.S.C. 1395oo(a)(3), arguing that the 180-day deadline for challenging payments should be "equitably tolled," or extended for reasons of fairness. Although the agency that receives these challenges, the Provider Reimbursement Review Board (PRRB), concluded that the decision to extend the filing deadline was beyond its authority, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that this deadline may be extended due to a presumption for equitable tolling. Here, Petitioner Sebelius of the Department of Health and Human Services contends that Congress intended to give her the authority to decide when to toll a statute and that this is not one of those cases. In contrast, Respondents Auburn Regional Medical Center, et al., argue that a court may extend this filing deadline. If hospitals are able to challenge underpayments beyond the 180-day deadline, the caseload of PRRB may drastically increase and so slow the process of compensating hospitals. However, allowing this extension may ensure that hospitals are properly compensated. 

Questions Presented: 

Whether the 180-day statutory time limit for filing an appeal with the Provider Reimbursement Review Board from a final Medicare payment determination made by a fiscal intermediary, 42 U.S.C. 1395oo(a)(3), is subject to equitable tolling.

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Decker, et al., v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center (11-338)l Georgia-Pacific West, et al., v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center (11-347)

Oral argument: 
December 3, 2012

The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") has interpreted the Clean Water Act ("CWA") in such a way so that certain logging activities that cause polluted water to run off of forest roads and into ditches, culverts, or pipes are exempt from the permit process. Relying on §1365 of the CWA, the Northwest Environmental Defense Center ("NEDC") brought a citizen’s lawsuit in federal district court in an attempt to eliminate the exemption from the permit process. The Petitioners argue that a citizen's lawsuit was impermissible in this case because of §1369 of the CWA. The parties also do not agree on the level of deference that the EPA should have been given in interpreting its regulations. Furthermore, the NEDC takes issue with the way EPA interprets several key phrases in the CWA, which affects the substance of the EPA’s decision. The ability of federal courts to review agency action as well as the scope of an agency’s authority are at stake in this case. Also, the Supreme Court’s decision can clarify the ability of citizens to bring an action to change the EPA’s course of action under the CWA. Finally, these procedural and administrative questions could ultimately have an effect on the environment and water quality as well as the procedures loggers must follow to ensure they comply with the CWA.

Questions Presented: 

DECKER, ET AL. V. NORTHWEST ENVTL. DEFENSE CENTER

(1) Congress has authorized citizens dissatisfied with the Environmental Protection Agency’s ("EPA") rules implementing the Clean Water Act’s ("CWA") National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permitting program to seek judicial review of those rules in the Courts of Appeals. See 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b). Congress further specified that those rules cannot be challenged in any civil or criminal enforcement proceeding. Consistent with the terms of the statute, multiple circuit courts have held that if a rule is reviewable under 33 U.S.C. § 1369, it is exclusively reviewable under that statute and cannot be challenged in another proceeding. 

Did the Ninth Circuit err when, in conflict with those circuits, it held that a citizen may bypass judicial review of an NPDES permitting rule under 33 U.S.C. § 1369, and may instead challenge the validity of the rule in a citizen suit to enforce the CWA?

(2) In 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p), Congress required NPDES permits for stormwater discharges “associated with industrial activity,” and delegated to the EPA the responsibility to determine what activities qualified as “industrial” for purposes of the permitting program. The EPA determined that stormwater from logging roads and other specified silvicultural activities is non-industrial stormwater that does not require an NPDES permit. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14).

Did the Ninth Circuit err when it held that stormwater from logging roads is industrial stormwater under the CWA and EPS’s rules, even though EPA has determined that it is not industrial stormwater? 

GEORGIA-PACIFIC WEST, ET AL. V. NORTHWEST ENVTL. DEFENSE CENTER 

Since passage of the Clean Water Act, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") has considered runoff of rain from forest roads--whether channeled or not--to fall outside the scope of its National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) and thus not to require a permit as a point source discharge of pollutants. Under a rule first promulgated in 1976, the EPA consistently has defined as non-point source activities forest road construction and maintenance from which natural runoff results. And in regulating stormwater discharges under 1987 amendments to the Act, the EPA again expressly excluded runoff from forest roads. In consequence, forest road runoff long has been regulated as a nonpoint source using best management practices, like those imposed by the State of Oregon on the roads at issue here.

The EPA’s consistent interpretation of more than 35 years has survived proposed regulatory revision and legal challenge, and repeatedly has been endorsed by the United States in briefs and agency publications.

The Ninth Circuit--in conflict with other circuits, contrary to the position of the United States as amicus, and with no deference to the EPA--rejected the EPA’s longstanding interpretation. Instead, it directed the EPA to regulate channeled forest road runoff under a statutory category of stormwater discharges “associated with industrial activity,” for which a permit is required. The question presented is:

Whether the Ninth Circuit should have deferred to the EPA’s longstanding position that channeled runoff from forest roads does not require a permit, and erred when it mandated that the EPA regulate such runoff as industrial stormwater subject to NPDES.

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Issue(s)

Whether citizens can file a lawsuit to challenge the validity of the EPA granting an exception to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit requirement.

Edited by: 

Quasi-legislative

Definition

A legislative-like act undertaken by an entity other than a legislature. For example, rulemaking undertaken by an administrative agency is a quasi-legislative act.

Illustrative caselaw

See, e.g. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 

See also

Quasi-judicial

Definition

1) A proceeding conducted by an administrative or executive official that is similar to a court proceeding, e.g. a hearing. A court may review a decision arising from a quasi-judicial proceeding.

2) A judicial act performed by an official who is either not a judge or not acting in his or her capacity as a judge. 

Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Oversight Bd. (08-861)

Oral argument: Dec. 7, 2009

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (Aug. 22, 2008)

AGENCIES, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, SEPARATION OF POWER, APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE, SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In 2002, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in reaction to the perceived failures of the self-regulatory system for accounting procedures that led to the infamous Enron and WorldCom scandals. The Act established the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board to supervise the audit of public companies. Although the Board is under the authority of the Securities and Exchange Commission, its members are not subject to direct removal or appointment by the President and it retains the power to set and raise its own budget. In this case, the Supreme Court will determine whether the Act’s establishment of the Board is an unconstitutional violation of separation of power principles and whether the Board’s structure violates the Appointments Clause. Petitioners argue that the Act violates separation of powers by diminishing the President’s ability to control or supervise Board members. Respondents argue that the Act does not violate separation of powers because Congress can grant exclusive appointment and removal authority to the Heads of Departments. Petitioners additionally argue that the Board’s structure violates the Appointment Clause because Board members are Principal Officers and, even if they were to be construed as Inferior Officers, their appointment is still unconstitutional, because the SEC is not a “Department” and its Commissioners are not the SEC’s “Head,” as required by the Clause. In response, Respondents argue that Board members are inferior officers because they are controlled directly by the SEC, and that the SEC is in fact a “Department” over which the President can exercise broad control and the Commission is its “Head” because it exercises the SEC’s collective powers. The case will ultimately determine the permissibility of the scheme currently in place that regulates US financial markets.

Rulemaking

The process that administrative agencies use to create or promulgate regulations.

Federal Trade Commission

The Federal Trade Commission is an independent federal agency established by Congress.  The FTC is led by five appointed commissioners, and is separated into two different bureaus: the bureau of consumer protection, which focuses on consumer fraud and false advertising, and the bureau of competition, which deals with antitrust matters.

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