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burden of proof

Smith, et al., v. United States

Oral argument: 
November 6, 2012

Petitioner Calvin Smith was involved in a criminal drug distribution organization and imprisoned for a related murder in 1994. In 2000, a grand jury brought indictments against him. Smith defended his two conspiracy charges on the grounds that the statute of limitations barred his conviction because he had withdrawn from the conspiracy more than five years ago. The trial court directed the jury that the burden of proof was on Smith as defendant to prove withdrawal by a preponderance of the evidence. Smith claims his participation in the conspiracy during the statutory period is a necessary element of his crime that the government must prove. Additionally, since withdrawal and participation are mutually exclusive, his withdrawal would negate an essential element of the government's case against him. The United States argues that withdrawal is an affirmative defense, and the burden of proof lies with the defendant. This case will define the boundaries of Due Process Protection in conspiracy cases and similar cases involving amorphous and on-going criminal activity.

Questions Presented: 

Whether withdrawing from a conspiracy prior to the statute of limitations period negates an element of a conspiracy charge such that, once a defendant meets his burden of production that he did so withdraw, the burden of persuasion rests with the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was a member of the conspiracy during the relevant period -- a fundamental due process question that is the subject of a well-developed circuit split.

Issue(s)

Whether requiring the defendant to bear the burden of proving withdrawal from a conspiracy as an affirmative defense violates Due Process.

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Edited by: 

Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Limited Partnership and Infrastructures for Information, Inc. (10-290)

Oral argument: Apr. 18, 2011

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Mar. 10, 2010)

Intellectual Property, Patent INFRINGEMENT, Presumption of Validity, Burden of Proof

The software entity i4i Limited Partnership and Infrastructures for Information, Inc. (“i4i”) sued Microsoft, alleging that Microsoft Word's XML processing and editing capabilities infringed on i4i’s patent. Microsoft counterclaimed, contending that i4i's patent was invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)'s on-sale bar. At trial, the jury was instructed that Microsoft must prove the patent's invalidity by clear and convincing evidence, even though the evidence Microsoft presented had never been reviewed by the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO"). Microsoft argues that this high standard, which longstanding Federal Circuit precedents support, is contrary to congressional intent, at least where the PTO never reviewed the "prior art" on which the alleged invalid patent was based. On the other hand, i4i contends that the Federal Circuit's caselaw, combined with Congress's enduring failure to legislatively overrule it, reveals that Congress intended a higher standard to apply to the presumption of validity. Amici in support of the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard argue that strong patent protection is essential to encourage innovation. Others, however, encourage the Supreme Court to overturn the Federal Circuit's precedent and require only a preponderance of the evidence. The Supreme Court's decision in this case is likely to affect the certainty of all patents, and consequently is likely to affect the calculus faced by all patent-law litigants when deciding whether to settle or litigate a suit.

Peake v. Sanders (07-1209)

Oral argument: Dec. 8, 2008

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit (May 16, 2007)

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, BURDEN OF PROOF, NOTICE, VETERANS CLAIMS ASSISTANCE ACT OF 2000

Woodrow Sanders and Patricia Simmons are U.S. military veterans who did not receive notice regarding who was responsible for obtaining evidence for their disability claims as is required by the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000. At issue in this consolidated case is whether the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) presumptively bears the burden of proving that a notice error in such benefits claims was harmless. The veterans argue that the language of 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(2) and the pro-claimant structure of the veterans benefits system create a presumptive burden on the VA. The VA argues that the Supreme Court should interpret the statute according to the prejudicial error rule of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706; this interpretation would require a claimant to prove that a VA notice error actually harmed the outcome of his or her claim. A Supreme Court ruling in favor of the veterans would bolster the pro-claimant system, making it easier for veterans to successfully bring claims. A decision for the veterans, however, could slow down the processing of deserving claims because the VA would have to defend its denial of claims where there was a notice error, but where the claimant did not suffer any harm from the error.

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