Skip to main content

CHAPTER 11

RadLAX Gateway Hotel v. Amalgamated Bank (11-166)

Oral argument: Apr. 23, 2012

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (June 28, 2011)

RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC and related entities obtained a secured $142 million loan in 2007 to construct the Radisson Hotel at Los Angeles International Airport. Substantially all of RadLAX’s assets were designated as collateral for this loan. However, still saddled with $120 million of debt, RadLAX filed for bankruptcy in August 2009. RadLAX proposed a Chapter 11 reorganization plan that called for an auction sale of all its assets, free and clear of liens. The plan prohibited secured lenders from credit bidding, i.e. using their loan amounts to offset the asset prices at the auction. Amalgamated Bank, representing the lender, objected to the plan, arguing that the plan violated Section 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) of the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy court agreed and rejected RadLAX’s plan. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on appeal. The Supreme Court’s resolution of this case may affect the balance of power between debtors and secured creditors in bankruptcy proceedings.

Stern v. Marshall (10-179)

Oral argument: Jan. 18, 2011

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Mar. 19, 2010)

BANKRUPTCY, JURISDICTION, CHAPTER 11, COUNTERCLAIMS

In 1994, J. Howard Marshall II, a very wealthy oil executive, married Vickie Lynn Marshall (“Vickie”), a model and actress who worked under the name Anna Nicole Smith. J. Howard Marshall died shortly thereafter, leaving the bulk of his estate to his son E. Pierce Marshall (“Pierce”). Vickie filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in 1996, and Pierce brought a defamation claim against her in the bankruptcy court. Vickie made a compulsory counterclaim, alleging that Pierce had tortiously interfered with J. Howard Marshall’s intent to give her part of his estate. The bankruptcy court rendered a judgment in favor of Vickie. Pierce eventually appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which reversed the bankruptcy court’s decision on the grounds that Vickie’s counterclaim was not a “core” proceeding, and therefore was improperly before the bankruptcy court. Vickie’s estate, represented by her executor Howard K. Stern, argues that the Ninth Circuit erroneously applied 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) because the provision categorically establishes compulsory counterclaims as core proceedings. The estate of Pierce Marshall asserts that the counterclaim raised in this case deals with a tort claim that arises under state law, and is therefore not part of the core proceedings. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will determine whether Congress intended for 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) to categorize all compulsory counterclaims as core proceedings and, if this was Congress’ intent, whether this intent is constitutional.

Bankruptcy

bankruptcy: an overview

Bankruptcy law provides for the development of a plan that allows a debtor, who is unable to pay his creditors, to resolve his debts by dividing his assets among his creditors. This supervised division also allows the interests of all creditors to be treated with some measure of equality. Certain bankruptcy proceedings allow a debtor to stay in business and use revenue generated to resolve his or her debts. An additional purpose of bankruptcy law is to allow certain debtors to free themselves (to be discharged) of the financial obligations they have accumulated, after their assets are distributed, even if their debts have not been paid in full.

Syndicate content