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Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Knowles

Oral argument: 
January 7, 2013

After suffering property damage in a 2010 hailstorm, Greg Knowles filed a class action lawsuit in Miller County, Arkansas, against the Standard Fire Insurance Company ("Standard Fire") for failure to pay a contractor's retention fee. Standard Fire tried to remove the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”), alleging that the amount in controversy exceeded $5,000,000. Pursuant to CAFA, a federal court has jurisdiction over a class action only if the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000. The district court remanded the case to state court because Knowles's complaint stipulated that he would not seek more than $5,000,000 in damages for the class. Standard Fire argues that Knowles cannot defeat removal under CAFA by using a stipulation because it would bind absent class members before class certification and before Knowles could be declared an adequate class representative. Knowles argues that as master of his complaint, he is free to limit his claims, and that class members are not adversely affected by the stipulation. The Supreme Court will determine whether a named plaintiff in a class action, before being declared an adequate class representative, can limit the entire class's claims to $5,000,000 in damages in order to defeat an attempt to remove the case to federal court.

Questions Presented: 

When a named plaintiff attempts to defeat a defendant's right of removal under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 by filing with a class action complaint a “stipulation” that attempts to limit the damages he “seeks” for the absent putative class members to less than the $5,000,000 threshold for federal jurisdiction, and the defendant establishes that the actual amount in controversy, absent the “stipulation,” exceeds $5,000,000, is the "stipulation" binding on absent class members so as to destroy federal jurisdiction?

Issue

Whether a named plaintiff in a class action lawsuit can defeat a defendant’s attempt to remove the action to federal court, by stipulating for the named plaintiff and absent potential class members that the class will not seek damages above the $5,000,000 threshold for federal jurisdiction, even where the defendant establishe

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Amgen v. Connecticut Retirement Plans (11-1085)

Oral argument: 
November 5, 2012

In 2004, biotechnology company Amgen Inc. was selling securities of two drugs that stimulate the production of red blood cells. After the Food and Drug Administration held an advisory committee meeting in May 2004 about the safety of those drugs, the market prices of their corresponding securities dropped. On behalf of the shareowners who suffered, Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds sought to certify the class of investors who held stock in Amgen at that time to sue Amgen for fraud regarding any misrepresentations of the drugs. Amgen argues that this kind of class action requires a plaintiff to show material reliance of the class of investors as part of the question as to whether a class exists. In contrast, Connecticut Retirement argues that during this class certification stage a plaintiff need not go beyond demonstrating that investors share a common question of reliance as a class rather than as individuals. If Amgen wins, then plaintiffs of securities fraud may face an unwieldy burden of proof at an early stage in litigation. If Connecticut Retirement wins, then defendants of securities fraud may face unfair pressures to settle cases.

Questions Presented: 

1. Whether, in a misrepresentation case under SEC Rule 10b-5, the district court must require proof of materiality before certifying a plaintiff class based on the fraud-on-the-market theory.

2. Whether, in such a case, the district court must allow the defendant to present evidence rebutting the applicability of the fraud-on-the-market theory before certifying a plaintiff class based on that theory.

Issue(s)

1. To establish a class of investors in a lawsuit alleging securities fraud, must a plaintiff show that the defendant’s allegedly untrue statements materially affected the security’s price?

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ADDITIONAL SOURCES

Comcast Corp. v. Behrend

Oral argument: 
November 5, 2012

Respondent Caroline Behrend et al., cable television subscribers, brought an antitrust class action against Petitioner Comcast Corporation alleging anticompetitive activity. In order to be certified as a class, Respondents had to present evidence that they suffered damages on a class-wide basis. The evidence they submitted consisted of a damages model prepared by their expert witness. Comcast challenges the District Court’s reliance upon that evidence, claiming that it is inadmissible under standards set forth in Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U. S. 579 (1993). In this case, the Supreme Court will address whether evidence presented in support of class certification must be admissible under those standards. The decision will likely significantly impact the ability of plaintiffs to certify as a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, and it may also affect underlying commercial conduct, such as the future use of territory-swapping and clustering agreements. 

Questions Presented: 

May a district court certify a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 without resolving whether the plaintiff class has introduced admissible evidence to show that they may be awarded damages on a class-wide basis?

Issue

May a district court certify a class action without resolving “merits arguments” that bear on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23’s prerequisites for certification, including whether purportedly common issues predominate over individual ones under Rule 23(b)(3)?

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Acknowledgments: 

The authors would like to thank former Supreme Court Reporter of Decisions Frank Wagner for his assistance in editing this preview.

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AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (09-893)

Oral argument: Nov. 9, 2010

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Oct. 27, 2009)

CLASS ACTION, FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT, PREEMPTION, CONSUMER CLAIMS

Vincent and Liza Concepcion ("the Concepcions") signed a two-year service contract with AT&T Mobility for wireless phone service and received free cell phones from AT&T as a part of their contract. AT&T charged the Concepcions a sales tax on their phones, and the Concepcions subsequently sued AT&T alleging that the company had fraudulently advertised the phones as free. The District Court for the Southern District of California consolidated the Concepcions' claim with a class action suit pending in the District Court on the same issue. The service contract that the Concepcions signed contained a clause requiring that they arbitrate disputes with AT&T directly, thus prohibiting the Concepcions from participating in class action suits. After AT&T moved to compel arbitration, the District Court denied AT&T's motion, and AT&T appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals arguing that the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") expressly and impliedly preempted state law requiring the enforcement of the arbitration clause. The Ninth Circuit ruled against AT&T on the grounds that the arbitration provision represented an unconscionable exculpatory clause and could not be enforced. The United States Supreme Court will now determine whether the FAA preempts state law requiring the enforcement of the arbitration clause. This decision may affect consumers' ability to participate in class action suits and the extent to which they may arbitrate small claims.

Reed Elsevier v. Muchnick (08-103)

Oral argument: Oct. 7, 2009

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Nov. 29, 2007)

COPYRIGHT ACT, COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT, SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION, CLASS ACTION

Freelance writers, led by Letty Cotton Pogrebin, brought a class action lawsuit against publishers, led by Reed Elsevier, Inc., for copyright infringement, claiming that the publishers electronically reproduced their works without authorization. The majority of the claims in the class related to alleged infringements of unregistered copyrights. With the approval of the District Court, the parties settled the lawsuit. The Second Circuit held, pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 411(a), that the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to certify a class or to approve a settlement with respect to claims arising from unregistered copyrights. The Supreme Court’s interpretation of § 411(a) will determine whether claims relating to unregistered copyrights can be settled in class actions along with claims arising from registered work. An affirmation of the Second Circuit’s opinion may make settlements more difficult.

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