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COMMERCE CLAUSE

Tarrant Regional Water District v. Herrmann

Oral argument: 
April 23, 2013

Tarrant Regional Water District ("Tarrant") seeks to export water to Texas from multiple sources within Oklahoma which are covered by the Red River Compact ("Compact"), a congressionally approved water apportionment agreement between Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas.  In 2007, Tarrant sued members of the Oklahoma Water Resources Board ("OWRB"), including Herrmann, in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma.  Tarrant sought a declaratory judgment that certain Oklahoma statutes dealing with water apportionment are unconstitutional and an injunction preventing the OWRB from applying the statutes to Tarrant's application for water.  Tarrant argued that the Oklahoma statutes violate the dormant Commerce Clause by burdening interstate commerce and that the statutes are preempted insofar as they conflict with the Compact's language. Tarrant argues that the Compact provides Texas with cross-border rights to access water located in Oklahoma and that Oklahoma’s water permitting statutes violate the dormant Commerce Clause by discriminating against out-of-state water users. OWRB argues that the signatory states to the Compact did not surrender their sovereignty by signing the Compact and that the Commerce Clause does not apply in this case because the Compact shelters Oklahoma’s water laws from scrutiny under the Commerce Clause.  Both parties fear that this decision, if decided for the opposing party, will cause severe social, economic, and environmental harm to their states.

Questions Presented: 

1. Whether Congress's approval of an interstate water compact that grants the contracting States "equal rights" to certain surface water and - using language present in almost all such compacts - provides that the compact shall not "be deemed … to interfere" with each State's "appropriation, use, and control of water … not inconsistent with its obligations under this Compact," manifests unmistakably clear congressional consent to state laws that expressly burden interstate commerce in water.

2. Whether a provision of a congressionally approved multi-state compact that is designed to ensure an equal share of water among the contracting states preempts protectionist state laws that obstruct other states from accessing the water to which they are entitled by the compact.

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Issue(s)

Whether signatories to a multi-state compact agree to give up their sovereign rights to exclusive use within their borders and to the licensing of permits for the use of water within their borders when the compact provides signatory states with equal rights to use of water in areas where the distribution of water is allo

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United States v. Kebodeaux

Oral argument: 
April 17, 2013

While serving in the Air Force in 1999, a military tribunal convicted twenty-one-year-old Anthony Kebodeaux of statutory rape for having consensual sex with a fifteen-year-old girl.  Following a three-month sentence and bad-conduct discharge, Kebodeaux moved to Texas, where he became subject to strict lifetime registration requirements that include annual in-person registration and registration updates upon intrastate movement.  Seven years later, in 2006, Congress enacted the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”), which imposes registration requirements on sex offenders convicted under state or federal law, and additionally prescribes penalties for failure to register. After failing to update his registration following an intrastate move in 2008, Kebodeaux was convicted under SORNA in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas and sentenced to one year and one day in prison, plus five years of supervised release. Kebodeaux appealed this conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, arguing that Congress did not have jurisdiction to criminalize his intrastate movements. The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed the District Court’s conviction, holding that as applied to Kebodeaux, SORNA’s registration requirements were unconstitutional as exceeding Congress’s Article I powers. On appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, the United States argues that SORNA did not constitute overreaching by the federal government because Kebodeaux was consistently subject to federal jurisdiction, having committed a federal offense under military law. In response, Kebodeaux contends that his release from prison pre-SORNA was unconditional, meaning that he is bound only by state registration requirements and any reassertion of federal jurisdiction over him through SORNA would be unconstitutional.  This case will also examine the balance between the benefits of uniformity in a comprehensive registration system against considerations of state sovereignty.

Questions Presented: 

1. Whether the court of appeals erred in conducting its constitutional analysis on the premise that respondent was not under a federal registration obligation until SORNA was enacted, when pre-SORNA federal law obligated him to register as a sex offender.

2. Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that Congress lacks the Article I authority to provide for criminal penalties under 18 U.S.C. 2250(a)(2)(A), as applied to a person who was convicted of a sex offense under federal law and completed his criminal sentence before SORNA was enacted.

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Issue(s)

Whether the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act with its accompanying regulations requiring all past sex offenders to notify the federal government of intrastate moves is unconstitutional as applied to an individual li

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McBurney v. Young

Oral argument: 
February 20, 2013

The Virginia Freedom of Information Act (“VFOIA”) states that “all public records shall be open to inspection and copying by any citizen of the Commonwealth.” Va.Code Ann. § 2.2-3704(A). Petitioners Mark McBurney and Roger Hurlbert made VFOIA requests and were denied because they are not citizens of Virginia. After being denied, Petitioners filed a complaint against the respondents, the agencies which denied their VFOIA requests, with the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Petitioners argued that the VFOIA’s citizens-only provision violated their rights under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and Hurlbert’s rights under the dormant Commerce Clause. The District Court granted summary judgment for the agencies, which was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Petitioners now appeal, arguing that Virginia’s citizens-only restriction violates the dormant Commerce Clause because it discriminates against out-of state economic interests both facially and in effect, and also violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause because it creates an inequality in access to information. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will impact whether a state is required allow all United States citizens to access their public records. 

Questions Presented: 

Whether, under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of  Article IV and the dormant Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, a state my preclude citizens of other states from enjoying the same right of access to public records that the state affords its own citizens?

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United States v. Comstock (08-1224)

Oral argument: Jan. 12, 2009

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (Jan. 8, 2009).

ADAM WALSH CHILD PROTECTION AND SAFETY ACT, FEDERALISM, DUE PROCESS, NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE, COMMERCE CLAUSE

Petitioner, the United States, argues that 18 U.S.C § 4248, which authorizes the civil commitment of “sexually dangerous” persons, is a constitutional exercise of Congressional power. Respondents, Graydon Earl Comstock Jr., et al. (“Comstock”), counter that civil commitment of an individual after the completion of a federal prison sentence exceeds Congressional power, because it (1) encroaches on states’ authority and (2) is neither necessary nor proper to operating a valid federal regulation. The Fourth Circuit rejected the United States’ argument that § 4248 is necessary and proper to its ability to maintain the federal penal system. The Supreme Court must now decide (1) whether § 4248 is incidental to Congress’ Article I powers and (2) whether civil commitment of individuals labeled “sexually dangerous” and already in federal custody or incompetent to stand trial is an encroachment on state power.

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