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Alleyne v. United States

in
Oral argument: 
January 14, 2013
Court below: 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

A jury found Allen Alleyne guilty of robbery under a federal statue, but the jury did not find him guilty of brandishing a weapon during the robbery. A federal criminal statute provides that a judge can raise the mandatory minimum sentence for robbery with a finding that it was more likely than not that the defendant brandished a firearm. Thus, a judge’s finding can raise the mandatory minimum prison sentence even when a jury was unable to come to that same conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court allowed such findings from judges in Harris v. United States. Now, the court will reconsider that position or have the opportunity to further clarify how much sentencing discretion can be given to judges under federal statutes.

Questions Presented: 

Whether this Court’s decision in Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002), should be overruled.

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Issue(s)

Should the Supreme Court overrule Harris v. United States and require that a jury find facts beyond a reasonable doubt in order to enhance a sentence beyond the ordinarily prescribed statutory maximum?

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Written by: 
Michaela Dudley
Allison Nolan
Edited by: 
Jenny Liu
Additional Resources: 

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Descamps v. United States (11-9540)

in
Oral argument: 
January 7, 2013
Court below: 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Matthew Descamps was sentenced to 262 months in prison after the Ninth Circuit found that he had committed his third violent felony, in violation of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The contested violent felony was a 1978 conviction for burglary of a California grocery store. Under the California burglary statute, one can be convicted of burglary without an explicit finding that entry into the burgled premises was itself unlawful.  The element of unlawful entry is required under the generic burglary statute described in the ACCA. The Ninth Circuit found the “unlawful entry” element to be necessarily satisfied by the plea bargain agreed to by Descamps, thus subjecting him to the mandatory fifteen-year minimum prison sentence required under the ACCA. How the Supreme Court decides this case will determine how sentencing courts use factual assertions surrounding a prior conviction in situations where a violent crime as defined under the ACCA contains elements absent from the crime for which the defendant was convicted.

Questions Presented: 

1. Whether the Ninth Circuit's ruling in United States v. Aguila-Montes De Oca, 655 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2011), (En Banc) that a state conviction for burglary where the statute is missing an element of the generic crime, may be subject to the modified categorical approach, even though most other Circuit Courts of Appeal would not allow it.

2. Whether is it time for this Court to overrule Almandez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), apply Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 224 (2000), and require an Indictment and trial on the issue of application of the Armed Career Criminal Act.

3. Whether the Ninth Circuit's ruling in the instant case was in derogation of the requirements in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) and Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005).

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Issue(s) 

1. Whether the Ninth Circuit can find a missing element to be satisfied by using a modified categorical approach.

Written by: 
Jeremy Amar-Dolan
Zachary Zemlin
Edited by: 
Jenny Liu
Additional Resources: 

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Smith, et al., v. United States

in
Oral argument: 
November 6, 2012
Court below: 
United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit

Petitioner Calvin Smith was involved in a criminal drug distribution organization and imprisoned for a related murder in 1994. In 2000, a grand jury brought indictments against him. Smith defended his two conspiracy charges on the grounds that the statute of limitations barred his conviction because he had withdrawn from the conspiracy more than five years ago. The trial court directed the jury that the burden of proof was on Smith as defendant to prove withdrawal by a preponderance of the evidence. Smith claims his participation in the conspiracy during the statutory period is a necessary element of his crime that the government must prove. Additionally, since withdrawal and participation are mutually exclusive, his withdrawal would negate an essential element of the government's case against him. The United States argues that withdrawal is an affirmative defense, and the burden of proof lies with the defendant. This case will define the boundaries of Due Process Protection in conspiracy cases and similar cases involving amorphous and on-going criminal activity.

Questions Presented: 

Whether withdrawing from a conspiracy prior to the statute of limitations period negates an element of a conspiracy charge such that, once a defendant meets his burden of production that he did so withdraw, the burden of persuasion rests with the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was a member of the conspiracy during the relevant period -- a fundamental due process question that is the subject of a well-developed circuit split.

Issue(s)

Whether requiring the defendant to bear the burden of proving withdrawal from a conspiracy as an affirmative defense violates Due Process.

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Written by: 
Dillon Horne
Matthew Soares
Edited by: 
Jenny Liu

Johnson v. Williams (11-465)

in
Oral argument: 
October 3, 2012
Court below: 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Tara Williams was on trial in California state court for special circumstances murder and firearm enhancement. During the trial, over Williams’s objections, the court dismissed a juror on the grounds that he was biased against the prosecution. After an alternate replaced the dismissed juror, the jury convicted Williams on both counts. Williams appealed, claiming that the juror’s dismissal had violated California state law as well as her Sixth Amendment rights. The California Court of Appeals affirmed Williams’ conviction, but only did so by addressing her state law claims, ultimately failing to explicitly discuss the Sixth Amendment issues raised. Williams then filed a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 alleging a violation of her Sixth Amendment rights. Though the federal district court denied her petition, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that Williams’ Sixth Amendment claim had not yet been “adjudicated on the merits” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Warden Deborah K. Johnson appealed, claiming that the California Court of Appeals’ prior ruling was an adjudication on the merits and therefore precluded the subsequent habeas petition.  How the Supreme Court decides the case will determine the degree of deference a federal court hearing a petition for habeas corpus will give a state court decision that does not explicitly address the federal grounds for relief.

Questions Presented: 

Whether a habeas petitioner's claim has been “adjudicated on the merits” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) where the state court denied relief in an explained decision but did not expressly acknowledge a federal-law basis for the claim.

Issue

Whether an issue not addressed in a state court opinion has been “adjudicated on the merits” for the purposes of federal habeas corpus review when the state court gave a detailed opinion mentioning other claims but apparently ignored the constitutional grounds for relief.

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Written by: 
Jeremy Amar-Dolan
Zachary Zemlin
Edited by: 
Judah Druck
Additional Resources: 

• Michael O'Hear, A Test for Richter’s Reach (Jan. 31, 2012)

Dorsey v. United States (11-5683); Hill v. United States (11-5721)

in

Oral argument: April 17, 2012

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (Nov. 28, 2011)

On August 3, 2010, President Obama signed the Fair Sentencing Act (“FSA”), which reduced the disparity between the amounts of crack and powder cocaine required to trigger certain minimum mandatory sentences under the federal Sentencing Guidelines. Petitioners Edward Dorsey and Corey Hill were both arrested for possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute prior to the FSA’s passage, but were both sentenced after the FSA was enacted. Under the pre-FSA guidelines, they received ten-year prison sentences, but under the new FSA guidelines, both would have received substantially shorter prison sentences. Dorsey, Hill, and the United States government all argue that Congress intended for the FSA to apply immediately, and therefore, all prisoners sentenced after August 3, 2010, including Dorsey and Hill, should have been sentenced according to the FSA. Miguel Estrada, a court-appointed amicus curiae writing in support of the judgments below, argues that nothing indicates that Congress intended for immediate effectiveness and that the federal Saving Statute prevents retroactive application of new statutes that would eliminate previously incurred penalties. The decision in these cases will have implications for the consistent application of the FSA to prisoners falling within this particular sentencing window, as well as potential social costs and burdens on the justice system.

Southern Union Co. v. United States (11-94)

in

Oral argument: Mar. 19, 2012

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit (Dec. 22, 2010)

CRIMINAL FINES, FIFTH AMENDMENT, SIXTH AMENDMENT, ENVIRONMENT, CRIMINAL LAW

In 2004, local youths broke into a Southern Union storage center that was improperly storing mercury; the incident resulted in a spill and cleanup effort. Southern Union was charged with storing hazardous waste without a permit under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. After a jury found Southern Union guilty, the district court judge determined that the violation had continued for 762 days and imposed a fine of $38 million. On appeal, Southern Union argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi required that the jury determine the period of the violation, not the judge. Southern Union contends that if the determination of the period of violation is left to the judge, the court could impose a fine in excess of the actual violation, violating Southern Union’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. In contrast, the United States asserts that Apprendi is not applicable because it dealt with deprivations of life and liberty interests, not the criminal fines that are at issue here. The decision in this case has implications for consistent treatment of defendants and the efficiency of courts.

Gonzalez v. Thaler (10-895)

in

Oral argument: Nov. 2, 2011

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (Oct. 6, 2010)

Petitioner Rafael Arriaza Gonzalez alleged that his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated when he was charged with murder ten years after an alleged shooting occurred. Although Gonzalez did not appeal his case to the Texas state court of last resort, he later petitioned for federal habeas review. The district court held that Gonzalez’s petition was time-barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) because it was filed more than one year after the period to appeal to the highest Texas state court expired. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability, but did not indicate which underlying constitutional claim was at issue in the certificate of appealability. The parties now disagree on whether the Fifth Circuit had jurisdiction over Gonzalez’s case after issuing the certificate of appealability, and which event starts the one-year clock for federal habeas review. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will affect petitioners’ ability to seek federal habeas review; it will also affect the allocation of judicial resources in reviewing certificates of appealability and federal habeas claims.

Martinez v. Ryan (10-1001)

in

Oral argument: Oct. 4, 2010

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Jan. 11, 2010)

Petitioner Luis Mariano Martinez, a convicted felon serving consecutive terms of 35 years to life, filed a writ of habeas corpus seeking relief in federal court. Martinez alleges that his trial counsel provided him with ineffective assistance. Because his appellate counsel failed to raise that ineffective-assistance claim in the first state post-conviction proceeding, an Arizona court precluded the claim on procedural grounds. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that Martinez did not have the right to counsel during his post-conviction proceeding, and concluded that he may not claim ineffective assistance at that stage in order to overcome his procedural default. Consequently, Martinez is barred from raising his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim, regardless of whether his post-conviction counsel rendered him ineffective assistance and caused the procedural default that precluded his trial-level claim. Martinez argues that he has a constitutional right to effective assistance of post-conviction counsel in raising his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim; he concludes that ineffective post-conviction counsel should negate the procedural default with respect to his ineffective-trial-counsel claim in this federal habeas proceeding. Respondent Charles L. Ryan, Director of the Arizona Department of Corrections, asserts that defendants do not have a right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings, concluding from this that the ineffective assistance of Martinez’s post-conviction counsel cannot negate his procedural default. In this decision, the Supreme Court will have to weigh the possibility that poorly-represented defendants will lose ineffective-assistance claims due to procedural defaults against the benefits of efficient state criminal proceedings.

Fowler v. United States (10-5443)

in

Oral argument: Mar. 29, 2011

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (Apr. 14, 2010)

FEDERAL TAMPERING LAW, FEDERALISM, CRIMINAL LAW, FEDERAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

Petitioner Charles Fowler murdered a local police officer after the officer approached him and his associates, who were preparing to rob a bank. Fowler was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C), which makes it a federal crime to murder a witness to a federal crime with the intent of preventing that witness from communicating with federal law enforcement officials. Fowler challenged his conviction, arguing that the government did not show with sufficient certainty that the officer he murdered was reasonably likely to communicate with federal authorities, had he not been killed. Fowler asserts that failing to require the government to show at least a reasonable likelihood of such communication is inconsistent with the statutory language, and would disrupt the balance between state and federal criminal jurisdiction. The United States responds that requiring such a standard would undermine the statute’s purpose of maintaining the integrity of the federal justice system, and that allowing a lower standard will not disrupt the state-federal balance. The Supreme Court’s decision will clarify the standard the government must meet in prosecuting Section 1512(a)(1)(C) violations, and resolve uncertainty among the circuit courts on this point.

Wall v. Kholi (09-868)

in

Oral argument: Nov. 29, 2010

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit (Sept. 23, 2009)

CRIMINAL LAW, HABEAS CORPUS, ANTI-TERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT

In December 1993, Khalil Kholi was convicted of sexual assault in the first degree and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Three years later, Kholi filed a motion to reduce his sentence, seeking discretionary leniency in state court. In 2007, Kholi filed a habeas corpus petition in federal court. The federal district court denied Kholi's petition on the grounds that it was not timely filed under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA”). The First Circuit reversed, holding that a discretionary post-conviction motion to reduce a sentence constitutes collateral review under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) and tolls AEDPA's one-year limitation period. Petitioner A.T. Wall appealed, arguing that a discretionary sentence-reduction motion does not constitute collateral review because it does not challenge the validity of a conviction or sentence. Kholi counters that collateral review includes motions seeking equitable, discretionary relief, and argues that his motion seeking a discretionary reduction of an imposed sentence tolls AEDPA's statute of limitations. The Supreme Court's decision will affect the finality of state court judgments, as well as the state court remedies a prisoner can pursue before filing a petition for federal habeas corpus relief.

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