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discrimination

Shelby County v. Holder

in
Oral argument: 
February 27, 2013
Court below: 
United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit

In 2006, Congress reauthorized the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”) for 25 years. Section 5 of the VRA requires certain “covered” jurisdictions to obtain federal preclearance before making any alterations to their election laws. Section 4(b) sets forth a formula for determining if a jurisdiction is covered. Petitioner Shelby County, Alabama, a covered jurisdiction, asserts that the preclearance regime exceeds Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and violates the Tenth Amendment and Article IV. Other covered jurisdictions, amicihere, complain that the VRA’s restrictions subject them to a double standard and infringe on their state sovereignty rights. Attorney General Holder, the Respondent, contends that these restrictions are necessary to fight regression among states with a history of voting rights abuses. Shelby County argues that current conditions no longer justify preclearance at all, and that the coverage formula is antiquated in any case. Holder argues that preclearance remains a valid exercise of congressional power and that the formula, in combination with the VRA’s “bailout” provision, creates a coverage regime that meets the requirements of the Constitution.

Questions Presented: 

Whether Congress’s decision in 2006 to reauthorize Section 5 of the VRA under the pre-existing coverage formula of Section 4(b) exceeded its authority under the Fifteenth Amendment and thus violated the Tenth Amendment and Article IV of the United States Constitution.

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Issue

Whether Congress’s twenty-five year extension of the Voting Rights Act exceeded its power to enforce the protections of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.

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Written by: 
Jeremy Amar-Dolan
Zachary Zemlin
Edited by: 
Brooks Kaufman
Acknowledgments: 

The authors would like to thank former Supreme Court Reporter of Decisions Frank Wagner for his assistance in editing this preview.

Additional Resources: 

Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin (11-345)

in
Oral argument: 
October 10, 2012
Court below: 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Petitioner Abigail Fisher, a white Texan, was denied admission to the University of Texas at Austin for the Fall 2008 entering class. Fisher sued the university, arguing that the denial violated her Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection because she was denied admission to the public university in favor of minority applicants with lesser credentials. Fisher contends that the university’s admission policy cannot survive strict scrutiny as required by Grutter v. Bollinger. The university argues that its admissions policy is essentially identical to the policy upheld in Grutter. It asserts that its use of a holistic admissions process, considering race as one factor for admission, creates a diverse student body that benefits the entire university. This case allows the Supreme Court to reexamine Grutter, and it will have far-reaching implications for university admissions policies and racial demographics in schools throughout the United States.

Questions Presented: 

May the University of Texas at Austin consider race in undergraduate admissions decisions under the Fourteenth Amendment?

Issue

Does a public university violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when it considers race in admissions decisions?

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Written by: 
Thomas Santoro
Stephen Wirth
Edited by: 
Lisa Schmidt
Additional Resources: 

Kloeckner v. Solis (11-184)

in
Oral argument: 
October 2, 2012
Court below: 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

In 2005, Carolyn M. Kloeckner (“Kloeckner”) left her job as a Senior Investigator for the Department of Labor’s (DOL) Employee Benefits Security Administration in the St. Louis office. Soon after, she filed an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging sex and age discrimination and a hostile work environment. The DOL charged her with being “absent without leave” and fired her a year later. The dismissal, coupled with the discrimination complaint, result in what is known as a "mixed" case, and is therefore subject to certain forum restrictions.  After an unsuccessful outcome with her EEO complaint, Kloeckner appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) which dismissed her claims as untimely. Kloeckner tried to challenge this MSPB decision in federal district court, but the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court, holding that only federal circuit courts had jurisdiction over mixed cases that were dismissed on a procedural ground. The federal circuit courts disagree on this issue, and so the Supreme Court’s decision in this case will determine whether a federal district court or a federal appellate-level court can hear an appeal of an MSPB decision to dismiss a mixed claim for being untimely.

Questions Presented: 

The Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) is authorized to hear appeals by federal employees regarding certain adverse actions, such as dismissals. If in such an appeal the employee asserts that the challenged action was the result of unlawful discrimination, that claim is referred to as a "mixed case."

The Question Presented is:

If the MSPB decides a mixed case without determining the merits of the discrimination claim, is the court with jurisdiction over that claim the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or a district court?

Issue

Can a federal district court hear an appeal of a decision by the Merit System Protection Board (MSPB) if the MSPB decided on a procedural ground and the case was “mixed” and so involved both unlawful employment termination and discrimination claims?

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Written by: 
Michaela Dudley
Allison Nolan
Edited by: 
Charlotte Davis
Additional Resources: 

• http://www.dcemploymentlawfirmblog.com/2012/01/news-from-the-supreme-court-high-court-to-decide-where-some-appeals-of-mspb-decisions-get-filed.shtml

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Betty Dukes (10-277)

in

Oral argument: Mar. 29, 2011

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Apr. 26, 2010)

PROCEDURE, CLASS ACTIONS, DISCRIMINATION, MONETARY RELIEF

Respondent Betty Dukes and other women have brought a Title VII employment discrimination case against Petitioner Wal-Mart Stores. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California certified a class action comprised of all women employed at any Wal-Mart store since December 26, 1998 who may have been or will be subjected to Wal-Mart’s allegedly discriminatory practices and policies. Wal-Mart appealed, challenging the class certification, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. Wal-Mart now appeals to the Supreme Court, arguing that the class certification does not meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a). Wal-Mart also claims that class certification was improper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) because the employees primarily seek monetary compensation in the form of back pay, and Rule 23(b)(2) does not authorize certification of claims seeking monetary relief. On the other hand, the employees assert that they meet the requirements for class certification under Rule 23(a) because all female employees face the same Wal-Mart policies and share the common issue of discriminatory treatment under those policies. The employees further argue that class actions certified under Rule 23(b)(2) are not precluded from seeking monetary relief, and deny that back pay is a form of monetary compensation. The Supreme Court’s decision will affect the evidence required to bring an employment discrimination class action suit, the relief available to plaintiffs in a class action, and employers’ willingness to settle to avoid liability in class actions.

CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Alabama Dep’t of Revenue (09-520)

in

Oral argument: Nov. 10, 2010

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (Sep. 1, 2009)

RAILROADS, DISCRIMINATION, RAILROAD REVITALIZATION AND REGULATORY REFORM ACT, STATE TAXATION

Due to findings of tax discrimination against interstate railroads, Congress enacted the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (“4-R Act”). The 4-R Act describes four forbidden taxation schemes, the last of which acts as a catch-all for discriminatory statutes not prohibited by the first three categories. Under this catch-all provision, CSX Transportation challenges an Alabama tax that applies to interstate railroads but exempts its motor and water-carrier competitors. CSX Transportation argues that the plain meaning of the 4-R Act and Congress's clear intention to protect railroads permits its challenge. In contrast, the Alabama Department of Revenue argues that the plain meaning of the statute as well as Supreme Court precedent preclude challenges to tax exemptions under the 4-R Act. The circuit courts are currently split on the issue. In this case, the Supreme Court will resolve the circuit split, address issues of federalism, consider the impacts of the decision on Alabama's public schools, and ultimately determine if non-property tax exemptions may be challenged as discriminatory under the 4-R Act.

Staub v. Proctor Hospital (09-400)

in

Oral argument: Nov. 2, 2010

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (Mar. 25, 2009)

DISCRIMINATION, EMPLOYER LIABILITY, CAT’S PAW THEORY, USERRA

In 2008, Vincent Staub received a favorable jury verdict in an employment discrimination trial against his former employer, Proctor Hospital. Proctor Hospital appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals which reversed the verdict based on the "cat's paw" theory of employer liability. The court held that unless the ultimate decision maker was under the "singular influence" of another employee, only the decision maker's unlawful reasons for adverse employment decisions are actionable. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the motivations of other employees who influence employment actions, but do not make the ultimate decision, may be taken into consideration in employment discrimination suits.

Christian Legal Society Chapter v. Martinez (08-1371)

in

Appealed from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Mar. 17, 2009)

Oral argument: Apr. 19, 2010

FIRST AMENDMENT, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, DISCRIMINATION

The Hastings Christian Legal Society (“CLS”) required that members agree with its core religious beliefs and pledge to live accordingly. Due to this requirement, the University of California-Hastings College of Law refused to recognize CLS as a registered student organization. Specifically, CLS’s membership requirement violated a nondiscrimination policy prohibiting registered student organizations from discriminating on the basis of religion or sexual orientation. CLS argued that Hastings violated its First Amendment right to free association and free exercise of religion by denying it an exemption from the nondiscrimination policy. The Ninth Circuit rejected CLS’s claims, holding that the school’s policy was viewpoint-neutral and reasonable in light of the school’s educational mission. The Supreme Court’s decision will settle a circuit split over whether a public school can require a religious student organization to open its membership to all students, regardless of their beliefs.

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