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double jeopardy

Evans v. Michigan

Oral argument: 
November 6, 2012
Court below: 
Michigan Supreme Court

A Michigan trial court granted defendant-petitioner Lamar Evans a directed verdict of not guilty after the State of Michigan charged him with burning property because the State of Michigan failed to prove that the property Evans allegedly burned was not a dwelling. Upon appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court determined that the trial court erred when it required the State of Michigan to prove that the property was not a dwelling. Furthermore, the Michigan Supreme Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause of both the Fifth Amendment and the Michigan Constitution did not bar Evans’ retrial for the same offense because the error involved an element that was added to the offense. As a result, the directed verdict did not relate to an actual factual element of the case and therefore failed to address Evans’ guilt or innocence of the charged offense. Evans now appeals to the Supreme Court of the United States, arguing that the Michigan Supreme Court erroneously carved out a novel “Extra Element” exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause. This decision will further define the outer limits of protection that the Double Jeopardy Clause offers to defendants and the types of rulings that prosecutors can appeal. 

Questions Presented: 

Does the Double Jeopardy Clause bar retrial after the trial judge erroneously holds a particular fact to be an element of the offense and then grants a mid-trial directed verdict of acquittal because the prosecution failed to prove that fact?

Issue

Does the Double Jeopardy clause bar retrial when the trial judge directs a verdict of acquittal because the prosecution failed to prove a fact that was ultimately not an element of the charged crime?

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Blueford v. Arkansas (10-1320)

Oral argument: Feb. 22, 2012

Appealed from: Arkansas Supreme Court (Jan. 20, 2011)

The State of Arkansas brought charges against Alex Blueford for the murder of 20-month-old Matthew McFadden, Jr. Initially, the forewoman told the court that the jury unanimously agreed that Blueford had not committed capital murder or first-degree murder, but that it was unable to arrive at a verdict on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter, and had not reached the lesser-included offense of negligent homicide. Ultimately, the jury announced that it was deadlocked, and the court declared a mistrial. Blueford moved to prevent retrial of the murder charges, arguing that the jury had acquitted him on those counts. Arkansas contended that there was no acquittal because the hung jury was unable to reach a verdict. The Supreme Court of Arkansas denied Blueford’s motion, and he appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. Blueford argues that allowing a retrial on all the charges would violate the Constitution’s Double Jeopardy Clause and allow the state to overreach its authority. Arkansas asserts that barring a retrial on the capital and first-degree murder charges would result in a partial verdict, which leads to jury decisions based on compromise and coercion. The Supreme Court's decision will affect the protections defendants receive from the threat of multiple trials, the pressure on juries to reach a conclusive decision, and whether a court must record a verdict before it becomes final.

Renico v. Lett (09-338)

Appealed from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (March 10, 2009)

Oral argument: March 29, 2010

AEDPA, DOUBLE JEOPARDY, HABEAS CORPUS, MISTRIAL, MANIFEST NECESSITY, FIFTH AMENDMENT

Reginald Lett was convicted of second-degree murder in a Michigan state court in his second trial for the same offense. In his first trial, the judge determined that the jury was deadlocked and declared it a mistrial. Lett then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. His petition was granted. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling on the basis that Lett’s Fifth Amendment right to be free from Double Jeopardy had been violated because the trial court had not used “sound discretion” in finding a “manifest necessity” to declare a mistrial and terminate the ongoing proceedings. This case presents the Supreme Court with the opportunity to clearly articulate what state courts must do before declaring a mistrial to avoid running afoul of the Fifth Amendment.

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