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employment discrimination

University Of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar

in
Oral argument: 
April 24, 2013
Court below: 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Eradicating unlawful discrimination and retaliation in the workplace is one of core purposes of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Respondent Dr. Naiel Nassar, a former faculty member of the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center (UTSW), alleges that his employer denied him a job in retaliation for a prior resignation letter alleging race discrimination in the workplace. Specifically, Nassar's resignation letter stated that his supervisor made derogatory comments about his Middle Eastern descent. Petitioner UTSW argues that Nassar needs to prove that retaliation was the sole motivating factor for the negative employment action. In contrast, Nassar argues that he need only show that retaliation was a motivating factor, but not necessarily the only one, for the negative employment action. A holding for UTSW may make it more difficult for victims of retaliation under Title VII to sue their employers, whereas a holding for Nassar may increase the costs borne by employers in defending against potentially meritless litigation.

Questions Presented: 

In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258, 268-69 (1989), a plurality of this Court held that the discrimination provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), requires a plaintiff to prove only that discrimination was "a motivating factor" for an adverse employment action. In contrast, Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 179-80 (2009), held that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), Pub. L. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602, requires proof that age was "the but-for cause" of an adverse employment action, such that a defendant is not liable if it would have taken the same action for other, non-discriminatory reasons. The courts of appeals have since divided 3-2 on whether Gross or Price Waterhouse establishes the general rule for other federal employment statutes, such as Title VII’s retaliation provision, that do not specifically authorize mixed-motive claims.

The question presented is:

Whether Title VII's retaliation provision and similarly worded statutes require a plaintiff to prove but-for causation (i.e., that an employer would not have taken an adverse employment action but for an improper motive), or instead require only proof that the employer had a mixed motive (i.e., that an improper motive was one of multiple reasons for the employment action).

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Issue

Does Title VII of the Civil Rights Act require a plaintiff alleging retaliation to show that retaliation was the only reason for a negative employment action?

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Written by: 
Dillon Horne
Matthew Soares
Edited by: 
Charlotte Davis
Additional Resources: 

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Vance v. Ball State University

in
Oral argument: 
November 26, 2012
Court below: 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Petitioner Maetta Vance contends that Saundra Davis, a catering specialist, had made Vance’s life at work contentious through physical acts and racial harassment.  Vance sued her employer, respondent Ball State University, for workplace harassment by a supervisor. To win a lawsuit for co-worker harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it is necessary to show that the employer is negligent in responding to complaints about harassment; however, to win a lawsuit for harassment by a supervisor, the employer does not have to be negligent because Title VII imputes the supervisor’s acts to the employer. Vance asserted that Davis was a supervisor although Ball State claimed Davis was not actually Vance’s supervisor. The District Court and Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit determined that Davis was not Vance’s supervisor because Davis did not have the power to direct the terms and conditions of Vance’s employment. Additionally, both courts found that Ball State had an adequate system in place for reporting and investigating claims of harassment under Title VII and thus the university could not be negligent. If Vance wins, the definition of supervisor under Title VII will expand to include more than just those who can hire, fire, demote, promote, or discipline an employee. If Ball State wins, the definition of supervisor under Title VII may expand; however, it would likely be limited to persons who actually control an employee’s daily activities.

 
Questions Presented: 

In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998), and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998), the Supreme Court held that under Title VII, an employer is vicariously liable for severe or pervasive workplace harassment by a supervisor of the victim. If the harasser was the victim's co-employee, however, the employer is not liable absent proof of negligence. In the decision below, the Seventh Circuit held that actionable harassment by a person whom the employer deemed a “supervisor” and who had the authority to direct and oversee the victim's daily work could not give rise to vicarious liability because the harasser did not also have the power to take formal employment actions against her. The question presented is:

Whether, as the Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits have held, the Faragher and Ellerth “supervisor” liability rule (i) applies to harassment by those whom the employer vests with authority to direct and oversee their victim's daily work, or whether, as the First, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have held, the rule (ii) is limited to those harassers who have the power to “hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline” their victims.

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Issue

Whether, for purposes of employer liability for racial harassment in the workplace, an employee must have the power to tangibly affect the employment status of the victim in order to be considered a supervisor.

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Written by: 
Jonathan Goddard
Zachary Glantz
Edited by: 
Lisa Schmidt
Acknowledgments: 

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Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting (09-115)

in

Oral argument: Dec. 8, 2010

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Sept. 17, 2008)

PREEMPTION, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, IRCA, LEGAL ARIZONA WORKERS ACT

The state of Arizona passed the Legal Arizona Workers Act in 2007 (“LAWA”). The law authorizes the Arizona Attorney General and county attorneys to sue employers who knowingly or intentionally employed unauthorized workers such as illegal aliens as a means of combating illegal immigration. Congress, however, previously enacted the Immigration Reform and Control Act, which imposes different sanctions on employers for hiring illegal immigrants. The Chamber of Commerce of the United States, along with various business and civil rights organizations, claimed that federal law preempts LAWA, thus making it invalid. In addition, the Chamber of Commerce argued that LAWA fostered employment discrimination against “foreign-looking” individuals and unduly harmed businesses. However, those in support of LAWA claimed that the state has the authority under its “police powers” to enforce the statute and that it was not preempted by federal law. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will shed light on the extent to which a state may enforce its own laws in an area that is also covered by federal law. Additionally, the Court’s ruling will affect the ability of states to use certain measures to deter employers from hiring illegal immigrants.

Thompson v. North American Stainless (09-291)

in

Oral argument: Dec. 7, 2010

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (June 5, 2009)

TITLE VII, RETALIATION, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, THIRD-PARTY STANDING

Petitioner Eric L. Thompson, a metallurgical engineer formerly employed by Respondent North American Stainless (“Stainless”), sued Stainless under Section 704(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging that Stainless fired him in retaliation for a gender discrimination complaint his then-fiancée (and now wife) Miriam Regalado filed against Stainless with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). The Sixth Circuit found that Thompson did not have standing to sue Stainless and dismissed his complaint. Thompson argues that Title VII not only prohibits third-party retaliation but also gives third-party victims standing to sue, primarily because this furthers Title VII’s goal of eliminating discrimination and is consistent with the EEOC’s longstanding interpretation of Title VII. In opposition, Stainless argues that Section 704(a) does not give those third parties standing to sue the allegedly retaliating employer because permitting such an action would contradict congressional intent and unnecessarily curtail employers’ ability to manage their workforces.

Lewis v. City of Chicago, IL (08-974)

in

Appealed from the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (June 4, 2008)

Oral argument: Feb. 22, 2010

CIVIL RIGHTS ACT, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, TIMELY FILING OF CLAIM

Petitioners, Arthur L. Lewis, Jr., et al. (“Lewis”), a group of African Americans who applied to become firefighters in Chicago sued the city under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, claiming Chicago’s use of an eligibility test had a disparate racial impact on African Americans, effectively resulting in employment discrimination. The plaintiffs won their discrimination lawsuit in the federal district court, but the Seventh Circuit reversed on the basis that the claim had not been filed within the 300-day filing period for employment discrimination claims. The Court held that the filing period began at the time that the applicants were informed of the results of the test. This case presents the Court with the opportunity to determine whether the subsequent use of the results of an eligibility test with disparate racial impact qualifies as a discretely new violation of the Civil Rights Act that would begin anew another 300-day filing period.

CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries (06-1431)

in

Oral argument: February 20, 2008

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit (Jan. 10, 2007)

THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, RETALIATION, SECTION 1981, CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("Section 1981") provides that any “person within the jurisdiction of the United States” has the same right to "make and enforce" contracts, regardless of their skin color. Section 1981 protects parties from discriminatory treatment both at the time when contracts are formed, and in post-formation conduct. Section 1981 applies to many aspects of the employment relationship because that relationship is considered contractual; however, the extent of this protection is unclear. This case addresses the question of whether an employee can bring a claim for retaliation under Section 1981. Retaliation does not clearly come under the scope of Section 1981 because often it is based not on an employee's characteristic, such as race, but instead on an action taken by the employee, such as complaining about work conditions or discriminatory treatment. However, retaliation claims often overlap with, and are difficult to separate from, claims of discrimination. Should the Supreme Court decide that Section 1981 protects an employee from race-based retaliation, it will give employees greater flexibility in filing claims of retaliation, because they will not be subject to the filing deadlines and limits on damages found in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, an alternate provision which does encompass retaliation claims.

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