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equal protection

United States v. Windsor

Oral argument: 
March 27, 2013

Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer married in Toronto in 2007 where same-sex marriages were legal. At the time of Spyer’s death, the state of New York recognized the couple’s marriage. However, the IRS denied Windsor use of a spousal estate tax exception on the ground that, under the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”), the federal government did not recognize same-sex marriages for the purpose of federal benefits.
 The Supreme Court is now being asked to decide DOMA’s Constitutionality. The Obama Administration is not defending DOMA, so a Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (“BLAG”) from the House of Representatives is doing so, arguing that DOMA is rationally related to the legitimate government objective of providing a uniform definition of marriage for federal benefits purposes. The Obama administration counters that the use of sexual orientation to decide who gets benefits is a suspect classification that deserves higher scrutiny. Under that level of higher scrutiny, the Obama administration argues that DOMA is impermissible.
 This case can affect what role the federal government can play in defining marriage and who in the federal government can defend the government’s laws. Not only could this case provide large tax savings to Ms. Windsor herself, but it can also make federal benefits available to other same-sex couples who are legally married under the laws of their state.

Questions Presented: 

Section 3 of DOMA defines the term “marriage” for all purposes under federal law, including the provision of federal benefits, as “only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife.” 1 U.S.C. 7. It similarly defines the term “spouse” as “a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.” Ibid. The question presented is:

Whether Section 3 of DOMA violates the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the laws as applied to persons of the same sex who are legally married under the laws of their state. 

In addition to the question presented by the petition, the parties are directed to brief and argue the following questions: whether the executive branch’s agreement with the court below that DOMA is unconstitutional deprives this court of jurisdiction to decide this case; and whether the BLAG has Article III standing in this case. 

Issue

The substantive issue is whether Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act violates the right to equal protection of same-sex couples who are legally married under state law.

Edited by: 
Acknowledgments: 

The authors would like to thank Professor Michael C. Dorf for his insights into this case and former Supreme Court Reporter of Decisions Frank Wagner for his assistance in editing this preview.

Additional Resources: 

Hollingsworth v. Perry

Oral argument: 
March 26, 2013

In November 2008, 52.3 percent of California voters approved Proposition 8, which added language to the California Constitution that defined marriage as a union between a man and a woman. In May 2009, a California District Court ruled that Proposition 8 violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and temporarily prohibited its enforcement, and the Ninth Circuit agreed, affirming the District Court’s ruling. The United States Supreme Court will now consider whether a state can define marriage solely as the union of a man and a woman, in addition to considering whether the proponents of Proposition 8 have standing to bring suit in federal court. The Court’s ruling will implicate the rights of gay men and lesbians, the role of the government in structuring family and society, and the relationship between the institution of marriage and religion and morality.

Questions Presented: 

1. Whether the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the state of California from defining marriage as the union of a man and a woman. 

2. Whether petitioners have standing under Article III, §2 of the Constitution in this case.

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Issues

1. Does a state violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by defining marriage solely as the union of a man and a woman?

Edited by: 
Acknowledgments: 

The authors would like to thank former Supreme Court Reporter of Decisions Frank Wagner for his assistance in editing this preview.

Additional Resources: 

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State of Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona

Oral argument: 
March 18, 2013

The state of Arizona passed Proposition 200 by popular referendum. Proposition 200 requires that a person must present proof of citizenship when registering to vote and a voter must present identification when casting a ballot. Multiple parties sued the state of Arizona, arguing that Congress had preempted the states in this area of election law with the National Voter Registration Act. While the Ninth Circuit ruled that the National Voter Registration Act superseded the registration requirement, the court also held that the identification requirement at a polling place is legal. Arizona is now appealing the registration requirement to the Supreme Court, arguing that this falls within their powers and the lower courts are taking a broader view of preemption that is not in line with the past rulings of the Supreme Court. The outcome of this case will play a large role in the ability of the states to pass laws governing voter registration, and the Court’s evaluation of preemption will likely have a large effect on the balance of power between the states and federal government.

Questions Presented: 

Did the court of appeals err 1) in creating a new, heightened preemption test under Article I, Section 4, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution ("the Elections Clause") that is contrary to this Court's authority and conflicts with other circuit court decisions, and 2) in holding that under that test the National Voter Registration Act preempts an Arizona law that requests persons who are registering to vote to show evidence that they are eligible to vote?

Issue

Does the National Voter Registration Act preempt state law to the level that lower courts should afford Congress greater deference under the Elections Clause?

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Edited by: 
Additional Resources: 

Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin (11-345)

Oral argument: 
October 10, 2012

Petitioner Abigail Fisher, a white Texan, was denied admission to the University of Texas at Austin for the Fall 2008 entering class. Fisher sued the university, arguing that the denial violated her Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection because she was denied admission to the public university in favor of minority applicants with lesser credentials. Fisher contends that the university’s admission policy cannot survive strict scrutiny as required by Grutter v. Bollinger. The university argues that its admissions policy is essentially identical to the policy upheld in Grutter. It asserts that its use of a holistic admissions process, considering race as one factor for admission, creates a diverse student body that benefits the entire university. This case allows the Supreme Court to reexamine Grutter, and it will have far-reaching implications for university admissions policies and racial demographics in schools throughout the United States.

Questions Presented: 

May the University of Texas at Austin consider race in undergraduate admissions decisions under the Fourteenth Amendment?

Issue

Does a public university violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when it considers race in admissions decisions?

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Edited by: 
Additional Resources: 

Armour v. City of Indianapolis (11-161)

Oral argument: Feb. 29, 2012

Appealed from: Indiana Supreme Court (May 10, 2011)

EQUAL PROTECTION, RATIONAL BASIS, SPECIAL ASSESSMENT, TAXPAYER, BARRETT LAW

The Supreme Court will resolve whether a local taxing authority violated the Equal Protection Clause when it forgave the outstanding debt of taxpayers who elected to pay a special assessment over the course of several years while refusing to refund similarly situated taxpayers who paid in full. The Indiana Supreme Court determined that Indianapolis did not violate the Equal Protection Clause despite the large disparity in tax obligations of identically situated taxpayers. Petitioners Christine Armour and other taxpayers argue that where a state has made a determination to treat a group of properties as the same class, it must treat the taxpayers of those properties with rough equality. They assert that forgiving the outstanding debt of some taxpayers without issuing refunds to those who made a single full payment violates the Equal Protection Clause. Respondent City of Indianapolis maintains that the differing treatment is based on legitimate governmental interests and is constitutionally valid.

Flores-Villar v. United States (09-5801)

Oral argument: Nov. 10, 2010

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Aug. 6, 2008)

EQUAL PROTECTION, GENDER DISCRIMINATION, CITIZENSHIP, IMMIGRATION

After his conviction for importing marijuana in 1997, Ruben Flores-Villar was deported to Mexico. Flores-Villar subsequently reentered the United States on several occasions, leading to his conviction under 8 U.S.C. § 1325 for being a deported alien found in the United States. Flores-Villar was born in Mexico, out of wedlock, to a United States citizen father and foreign mother. Under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401 and 1409, United States citizen fathers of non-marital children born abroad may only transmit United States citizenship if the father had resided in the United States continuously for at least five years after age fourteen. On the other hand, United States citizen mothers with foreign-born non-marital children are only required to have one year residence in the United States to transmit citizenship. Flores-Villar challenged his Section 1325 conviction on the grounds that the differential residency requirements of 1401 and 1409 make an impermissible classification based on gender that resulted in his alien status. The appeals court affirmed Flores-Villar's conviction and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the gender-based differentiation in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401 and 1409 is constitutionally permissible.

Plyler v. Doe (1982)

Plyler v. Doe is a U.S. Supreme Court case in which the Court struck down a Texas statute that denied funding to local school districts for the education of children who were not "legally admitted" into the United States, and which authorized local school districts to deny enrollment to such children.

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