EQUITABLE TOLLING

Respondent Dr. Melissa Cloer ("Cloer") was vaccinated against Hepatitis-B in 1996 and 1997. Subsequently, Cloer noticed an electric shock sensation go through her body and numbness in her arm and hand, which later medical exams identified as multiple sclerosis resulting from her vaccinations. Cloer filed a petition for compensation under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986. Although her petition was dismissed due to the expiration of the statute of limitations, Cloer believes she is entitled to, at a minimum, a reward of her attorneys' fees associated with the initial filing. Cloer contends that the text, structure, and purpose of the Vaccine Act support her claim that such costs can be awarded for untimely petitions. Petitioner Sebelius, Secretary of Health and Human Services, argues however, that the text, structure, and purpose of the Vaccine Act as well as three canons of construction prove that a person who files an untimely petition should not receive compensation. The Supreme Court's decision will affect the efficiency and timely resolution of petitions for compensation and reward of attorneys’ fees for vaccine-related injury claims. Moreover, the Court’s ruling will impact the confidentiality and privacy of claimants' medical histories and personal information. 

A Michigan court convicted Lloyd Perkins of murder and sentenced him to life in prison. Nearly twenty years later, Perkins is now challenging his conviction based on new evidence supporting his innocence. The lower courts rejected Perkins’ petition for a writ of habeas corpus because of his failure to meet the statute of limitations according to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Perkins maintains that Supreme Court precedent does not require petitioners to reasonably and diligently pursue their underlying constitutional claims to invoke an actual-innocence exception. Perkins also argues that, since traditional equitable principles dictate that courts have the authority to fashion equitable remedies to fill statutory gaps, tolling AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations does not run contrary to express congressional intent. McQuiggin counters that AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations cannot be equitably tolled for petitioners who have failed to reasonably and diligently pursue their constitutional claims. Furthermore, McQuiggin argues that courts cannot equitably toll AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations in Perkins’ case because doing so would alter the express meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). This case will determine the responsibilities of federal courts in hearing habeas corpus petitions and define the avenues in which inmates can attempt to prove their innocence. 

Since 1983, hospitals have received reimbursement for treating Medicare patients with the option of receiving additional compensation for treating low-income individuals. It was recently discovered that the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) miscalculated rates in the 1990s, causing certain hospitals to receive less than they were entitled to receive. Several hospitals challenged these underpayments under 42 U.S.C. 1395oo(a)(3), arguing that the 180-day deadline for challenging payments should be "equitably tolled," or extended for reasons of fairness. Although the agency that receives these challenges, the Provider Reimbursement Review Board (PRRB), concluded that the decision to extend the filing deadline was beyond its authority, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that this deadline may be extended due to a presumption for equitable tolling. Here, Petitioner Sebelius of the Department of Health and Human Services contends that Congress intended to give her the authority to decide when to toll a statute and that this is not one of those cases. In contrast, Respondents Auburn Regional Medical Center, et al., argue that a court may extend this filing deadline. If hospitals are able to challenge underpayments beyond the 180-day deadline, the caseload of PRRB may drastically increase and so slow the process of compensating hospitals. However, allowing this extension may ensure that hospitals are properly compensated.