Skip to main content
search

federal courts

Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Knowles

Oral argument: 
January 7, 2013

After suffering property damage in a 2010 hailstorm, Greg Knowles filed a class action lawsuit in Miller County, Arkansas, against the Standard Fire Insurance Company ("Standard Fire") for failure to pay a contractor's retention fee. Standard Fire tried to remove the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”), alleging that the amount in controversy exceeded $5,000,000. Pursuant to CAFA, a federal court has jurisdiction over a class action only if the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000. The district court remanded the case to state court because Knowles's complaint stipulated that he would not seek more than $5,000,000 in damages for the class. Standard Fire argues that Knowles cannot defeat removal under CAFA by using a stipulation because it would bind absent class members before class certification and before Knowles could be declared an adequate class representative. Knowles argues that as master of his complaint, he is free to limit his claims, and that class members are not adversely affected by the stipulation. The Supreme Court will determine whether a named plaintiff in a class action, before being declared an adequate class representative, can limit the entire class's claims to $5,000,000 in damages in order to defeat an attempt to remove the case to federal court.

Questions Presented: 

When a named plaintiff attempts to defeat a defendant's right of removal under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 by filing with a class action complaint a “stipulation” that attempts to limit the damages he “seeks” for the absent putative class members to less than the $5,000,000 threshold for federal jurisdiction, and the defendant establishes that the actual amount in controversy, absent the “stipulation,” exceeds $5,000,000, is the "stipulation" binding on absent class members so as to destroy federal jurisdiction?

Issue

Whether a named plaintiff in a class action lawsuit can defeat a defendant’s attempt to remove the action to federal court, by stipulating for the named plaintiff and absent potential class members that the class will not seek damages above the $5,000,000 threshold for federal jurisdiction, even where the defendant establishe

Edited by: 
Additional Resources: 

Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc.

Oral argument: 
November 7, 2012

Nike, Inc., sued Already, LLC d/b/a Yums, for selling shoes that allegedly infringed on Nike’s trademark covering the Air Force 1 shoe line. Yums counterclaimed to cancel Nike’s trademark. Shortly after Yums’s counterclaim, Nike dropped its claim and promised Yums that Nike would not assert its trademark against any of Yums’s current or previous products. The district court dismissed Yums’s counterclaim and the court of appeals affirmed the dismissal. Yums argues that a controversy remains after Nike’s promise not to sue because Nike’s trademark continues to hinder Yums’s ability to compete in the athletic footwear business. Nike argues that a court cannot hear a trademark claim without a controversy, and that Nike’s promise not to sue eliminated any controversy involving the Air Force 1 trademark. The Supreme Court’s decision here may determine whether intellectual property owners can drop infringement actions without having to defend counterclaims challenging their intellectual property rights. This decision may have a significant impact on intellectual property litigation and on the risks associated with commencing an infringement action.

Questions Presented: 

Whether a federal district court is divested of Article III jurisdiction over a party's challenge to the validity of a federally registered trademark if the registrant promises not to assert its mark against the party's then-existing commercial activities?

Issue

Does a federal district court lose jurisdiction over a trademark cancellation claim after the trademark holder terminates any infringement actions and promises not to assert its trademark against the party seeking the trademark’s cancellation?

top

Edited by: 
Additional Resources: 

Tibbals v. Carter (11-218)

Oral argument: 
October 9, 2012

Sean Carter was convicted of aggravated murder, aggravated robbery, and rape, and was sentenced to death in Ohio. His counsel filed a federal habeas corpus petition challenging his conviction and requested a pre-petition competency hearing to determine whether Carter was competent to participate in the federal habeas proceeding. The district court granted both the petition and the request. Two years later, the district court determined that Carter was incompetent and dismissed his petition while also stopping the one-year statute of limitations. When the warden at the facility where Carter is imprisoned challenged the district court's decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit determined that even though the district court was justified in finding Carter incompetent, the proper course of action was to stay, rather than dismiss, the habeas proceedings until Carter was competent. Another warden now argues that a district court does not have the authority to stay federal habeas proceedings, nor does Carter have a right to competence in his own habeas proceedings. How the Supreme Court decides this case will determine the balance between recognizing the finality of state-court criminal judgments and allowing federal courts to use their discretion to implement stays in federal habeas proceedings where a capital prisoner’s competence to assist counsel is questionable.

Questions Presented: 

1. Do capital prisoners possess a "right to competence" in federal habeas proceedings under Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312 (1966)?
2. Can a federal district court order an indefinite stay of federal habeas proceeding under Rees?

top

Issues

Whether the Supreme Court's 1966 decision in Rees v.

Edited by: 
Additional Resources: 

Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Company (08-1008)

Oral argument: Nov. 2, 2009

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Nov. 19, 2008)

FEDERAL COURTS, ERIE DOCTRINE, CLASS ACTIONS, CHOICE OF LAW

Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates filed a class action lawsuit in federal court, arguing that Allstate Insurance Company violated New York law in failing to pay interest to policyholders. The district court dismissed the case on the grounds that New York law prevented a class action lawsuit in this context, and the Second Circuit affirmed. This case concerns the application of state law in federal court under the Erie Doctrine, particularly whether New York class action law applies in federal court and whether it conflicts with Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Shady Grove argues that Rule 23 is the comprehensive class action rule for federal courts, and that New York law cannot undermine federal court procedure. Allstate claims that state law applies because plaintiffs would have different rights in state and federal court. The case will address Rule 23 and the ability of states to restrict class action lawsuits.

United States district courts

The trial courts of the federal court system. Congress and the Constitution limit these courts and within these limits, the district courts have jurisdiction to hear nearly all categories of federal cases.  This includes both civil and criminal matters. There are 94 federal judicial districts including at least one district in each state, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.

Administrative Office of the United States Courts

The Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AO) is an administrative agency that is the central support entity for the judicial branch providing a wide range of administrative, legal, financial, management, program, and information technology services to the federal courts. It is directly supervised by the Judicial Conference of the United States, which sets the national and legislative policy of the federal judiciary.

Syndicate content