FEDERAL PREEMPTION

Kurns v. Railroad Friction Products Corp. (10-879)

Oral argument: Nov. 9, 2011

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (Sept. 9, 2010)

From 1947 to 1974, George Corson worked as a machinist in several locomotive repair and maintenance facilities. He subsequently died of malignant mesothelioma, caused by exposure to asbestos during his employment. Corson’s widow and executrix brought state-law tort claims against Respondents Railroad Friction Products Corporation and Viad Corporation, entities responsible for the manufacture and distribution of asbestos-containing locomotive parts. The district court dismissed Corson’s case—asserting that the Locomotive Inspection Act (“LIA”) preempted the state-law claims—and the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed this determination. Corson’s representatives argue that their state claims are not preempted because the LIA only regulates those locomotives that are in actual use. The Respondents, however, contend that the state-law claims are precluded because the LIA was intended to regulate the entire field of design and construction of locomotives. The Supreme Court’s decision will determine the preemptive scope of the LIA, and will establish the appropriate boundaries between states’ traditional regulatory power over railroad safety and Congress’s power to establish national uniformity in railroad-safety standards.

Oral argument: Mar. 30, 2011

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (Nov. 27, 2009); United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (Jan. 8, 2010)

DRUGS, FAILURE-TO-WARN, FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT, FEDERAL PREEMPTION, HATCH-WAXMAN ACT

Doctors prescribed both Gladys Mensing and Julie Demahy the drug Reglan. They each had their prescriptions filled with the generic equivalent of the name brand drug. After long-term use of this generic drug, Mensing and Demahy developed severe neurologic disorders. The women separately sued Pliva and Actavis, the generic drug manufacturers, making state law failure-to-warn claims, alleging that the drug’s warning label failed to adequately warn them of the risks. Pliva and Actavis argue that the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, along with Food and Drug Administration regulations that govern the entire drug approval and labeling process, preempt Mensing and Demahy’s state law claims because it was impossible for Pliva and Actavis to comply with both federal and state law. The companies argue that they could not provide additional warnings beyond what the brand manufacturer provided on its label. In deciding this case, the Supreme Court will ultimately have to weigh the costs born by generic drug manufacturers and the public against the benefits of incentivizing manufacturers to create safer drugs with more complete warnings.