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Federal Sentencing Guidelines

Peugh v. United States

in
Oral argument: 
February 26, 2013
Court below: 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Marvin Peugh was convicted of fraud for actions taken in 1999 and 2000. The 1998 Sentencing Guidelines recommended a 37- to 46-month sentence, while the 2009 Sentencing Guidelines recommended a 70- to 87-month sentence for Peugh’s conviction. After receiving a 70-month sentence under the 2009 Guidelines, Peugh asserts that using the 2009 Guidelines retroactively increased his punishment in violation of the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause. The United States counters that the Sentencing Guidelines are merely advisory and that sentencing ultimately rests with a judge’s discretion, deferring to their knowledge of the case and their own penal philosophy. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Peugh’s sentence; however, eight other courts of appeals would have directed the trial court to consult the 1998 Guidelines. This case is important to ensure consistent sentencing principles, even if particular sentences may vary. The notion that everyone should receive the same sentence for the same crime is a good theory, but other factors often cause a disparity in punishment.

Questions Presented: 

The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual directs a court to “use the Guidelines Manual in effect on the date that the defendant is sentenced” unless “the court determines that use of the Guidelines Manual in effect on the date that the defendant is sentenced would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution.” Eight courts of appeals have held that the Ex Post Facto Clause is violated where retroactive application of the Sentencing Guidelines creates a significant risk of a higher sentence. In the decision below, however, the Seventh Circuit has held that the Ex Post Facto Clause is never violated by retroactive application of the Sentencing Guidelines because the Guidelines are advisory, not mandatory. The question presented is:

Does a sentencing court violate the Ex Post Facto Clause by using the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing rather than the Guidelines in effect at the time of the offense, if the newer Guidelines create a significant risk that the defendant will receive a longer sentence?

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Tapia v. United States (10-5400)

in

Oral argument: Apr. 18, 2011

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Apr. 16, 2010)

SENTENCING, REHABILITATION, IMPRISONMENT, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES

Alejandra Tapia was convicted of smuggling illegal aliens and sentenced to fifty-one months in prison. At her sentencing, the district court factored in her history of substance abuse in its decision to give her a sentence beyond the minimum term so that she could enter and complete an in-custody drug rehabilitation program. Tapia appealed her sentence to the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the district court's decision. Citing a circuit split, Tapia appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari to determine whether it was proper for the district court judge to cite Tapia's rehabilitative needs in ordering a longer prison sentence. Petitioner Tapia contends that the plain meaning of the Sentencing Reform Act and the legislative history behind this Act confirm that rehabilitation is an inappropriate consideration in prison sentencing. The United States agrees with Tapia and urges vacating the lower court decision. Writing as amicus curiae by invitation of the Supreme Court, Professor Stephanos Bibas asserts that under the Sentencing Reform Act, district courts may properly consider the rehabilitative potential of in-prison targeted treatment programs when determining a prison sentence. Ultimately, this decision will impact when a district court may use incarceration to punish defendants and may also affect particular groups of defendants sentenced to incarceration.

Pepper v. United States (09-6822)

in

Oral argument: Dec. 6, 2010

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (July 2, 2009)

FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES, POST-SENTENCING REHABILITATION, LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE

After his arrest in 2003, Jason Pepper pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and cooperated with the authorities by testifying against his co-defendants. Due to his lack of prior convictions, cooperation with the authorities, and his desire to seek drug treatment, the district court judge gave Pepper a 24-months prison sentence, which was substantially below the 97 to 121 months recommended by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The Eighth Circuit reversed for resentencing, determining that the district court abused its discretion by decreasing Pepper's sentence based on the court's desire to give Pepper the shortest possible sentence. During the appeal, Pepper successfully completed his sentence, married, stayed drug-free, obtained a job, and achieved straight A's in college. Upon remand to the district court, Pepper was again sentenced to 24 months in prison, this time due to his post-sentence rehabilitation. The Eighth Circuit again reversed for resentencing, finding that the judge could not consider post-sentencing rehabilitation in choosing a sentence below the Guidelines. The district court, under a new judge, increased Pepper's sentence significantly and sent him back to prison after he had been out for several years. Pepper argued that this was improper because post-sentencing rehabilitation is an appropriate factor to consider during resentencing, and the new judge violated the "law of the case" doctrine by not following part of the previous judge's determination. In this case, the Supreme Court will determine whether post-sentence rehabilitation is a proper factor to consider in resentencing, and whether the law of the case doctrine applies to Pepper's appeal.

Dillon v. United States (09-6338)

in

Appealed from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (June 10, 2009)

Oral argument: March 30, 2010

FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES, BOOKER

In 1993, Petitioner Percy Dillon was tried and convicted in federal court for possession of crack cocaine and was sentenced to 322 months in prison under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Subsequently, the Supreme Court determined in United States v. Booker that the Guidelines were only advisory, not mandatory, and Congress retroactively reduced the Guideline range for crack cocaine offenses. Dillon filed a motion to have his sentence retroactively reduced, and argued that under Booker the Guidelines are not binding on his resentencing. The district court rejected this view, and reduced Dillon’s sentence to 277 under the new Guidelines. The Third Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue of whether the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are binding or merely advisory on retroactive sentence reductions.

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