federalism

Oral argument: Apr. 25, 2012

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Apr. 11, 2011)

In 2010, Arizona enacted the Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, which creates state immigration offenses and expands local police officers’ immigration law enforcement authority. The United States sued Arizona in federal district court, arguing the state law was preempted by federal law, and sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the state law from taking effect. The district court granted a preliminary injunction with respect to four provisions of the Arizona law and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Petitioners, the State of Arizona and the Governor of Arizona, Janice K. Brewer, argue that federal law does not preempt its statute because Arizona’s statute merely creates a formal cooperative relationship between federal and state officers to implement federal laws. Respondent, the United States, asserts that implementation of the statute would infringe upon the Executive Branch’s exclusive authority to regulate immigration, and is therefore invalid.

Oral argument: Dec. 7, 2011

Appealed from: Montana Supreme Court (Mar. 30, 2010)

After a lawsuit against hydroelectric company PPL Montana was dismissed in federal court, PPL Montana sought a declaratory judgment in state court to determine the ownership of riverbeds along three Montana rivers. The State of Montana asserted that it owned the riverbeds under the equal footing doctrine, and sought compensation for PPL Montana’s use of the land. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment to Montana, holding that the State of Montana owned the riverbeds and that PPL Montana owed the State of Montana $40,956,180. The issue of title largely turns upon whether the river is “navigable.” PPL Montana argues that navigability for title purposes should be determined by looking at individual segments of rivers and the actual commercial use of rivers at the time statehood was obtained. Montana contends that the proper navigability test is the susceptibility of travel through longer river stretches, which can be informed by current uses. The Supreme Court’s decision may affect rivers’ public benefits and the reliance interests of riverbed owners.

Oral argument: Mar. 29, 2011

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (Apr. 14, 2010)

FEDERAL TAMPERING LAW, FEDERALISM, CRIMINAL LAW, FEDERAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

Petitioner Charles Fowler murdered a local police officer after the officer approached him and his associates, who were preparing to rob a bank. Fowler was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C), which makes it a federal crime to murder a witness to a federal crime with the intent of preventing that witness from communicating with federal law enforcement officials. Fowler challenged his conviction, arguing that the government did not show with sufficient certainty that the officer he murdered was reasonably likely to communicate with federal authorities, had he not been killed. Fowler asserts that failing to require the government to show at least a reasonable likelihood of such communication is inconsistent with the statutory language, and would disrupt the balance between state and federal criminal jurisdiction. The United States responds that requiring such a standard would undermine the statute’s purpose of maintaining the integrity of the federal justice system, and that allowing a lower standard will not disrupt the state-federal balance. The Supreme Court’s decision will clarify the standard the government must meet in prosecuting Section 1512(a)(1)(C) violations, and resolve uncertainty among the circuit courts on this point.

Oral argument: Dec. 1, 2010

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (June 2, 2009)

FEDERALISM, SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY, EX PARTE YOUNG, DISABILITY RIGHTS

The Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy ("VOPA"), an independent state agency, advocates for individuals with mental illnesses and developmental disabilities. In accordance with federal funding requirements, Virginia law authorizes VOPA to access an individual's records if VOPA believes an individual was abused. During an investigation, a state facility denied VOPA access to the records of three individuals, and VOPA sued three state officials alleging that they violated federal law. The Eleventh Amendment provides that states cannot be sued in federal court by residents of one of the United States or of a foreign state. However, the Supreme Court, in Ex parte Young, recognized an exception to the Eleventh Amendment allowing a party to sue state officials for injunctive or declaratory relief to correct an ongoing violation of federal law. The Fourth Circuit held that, because the plaintiff in this suit was a state-created agency rather than a private individual, the suit could not proceed under the Ex parte Young exception and that allowing it to proceed in federal court would be a violation of Virginia’s sovereign immunity. This decision may affect the ability of independent agencies to protect vulnerable individuals from neglect and has the potential to increase legal conflict between state agencies.

Oral argument: Oct. 5, 2010

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit (Nov. 5, 2008)

FEDERALISM, PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS, DECLARATORY RELIEF, 42 U.S.C. § 1983

In 2001, Craig and Wendy Humphries were arrested on child abuse charges and listed in California's Child Abuse Central Index ("CACI"), which is organized under the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act ("CANRA"). All charges against the Humphrieses were dismissed, and the Humphrieses obtained an order declaring them factually innocent. However, the Humphrieses were unable to contest their listing in the CACI. The Humphrieses sued Los Angeles County pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking declaratory relief establishing that CANRA and policies related to the CACI are unconstitutional because of the lack of procedures to challenge an individual's inclusion based on a substantiated claim. Los Angeles County argued that as a local government it had no control over CACI procedures because the state government created these policies. The Ninth Circuit sided with the Humphrieses and held that Los Angeles County's liability should be determined according the requirements established in Monell v. Department of Social Services. The Supreme Court must now decide whether claims for declaratory relief against a public entity are subject to the requirements of Monell.

Appealed from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (Feb. 4, 2009)

Oral argument: March 22, 1010

TAX INJUNCTION ACT, COMITY, SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION, FEDERALISM

Respondent, Commerce Energy, Inc., sued the Ohio Tax Commissioner, Petitioner, Richard Levin, alleging Ohio's tax scheme violates the Commerce Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Commerce contends that four Ohio companies benefit from certain tax exemptions that Commerce is not eligible for as an out-of-state company. Levin argues that the Tax Injunction Act and principles of comity bar Commerce's suit from proceeding in a federal court. Commerce counters that a federal court has jurisdiction to hear their suit. In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court will clarify the scope of the federal judiciary's authority to hear lawsuits regarding state tax law.

Oral argument: Jan. 12, 2009

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (Jan. 8, 2009).

ADAM WALSH CHILD PROTECTION AND SAFETY ACT, FEDERALISM, DUE PROCESS, NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE, COMMERCE CLAUSE

Petitioner, the United States, argues that 18 U.S.C § 4248, which authorizes the civil commitment of “sexually dangerous” persons, is a constitutional exercise of Congressional power. Respondents, Graydon Earl Comstock Jr., et al. (“Comstock”), counter that civil commitment of an individual after the completion of a federal prison sentence exceeds Congressional power, because it (1) encroaches on states’ authority and (2) is neither necessary nor proper to operating a valid federal regulation. The Fourth Circuit rejected the United States’ argument that § 4248 is necessary and proper to its ability to maintain the federal penal system. The Supreme Court must now decide (1) whether § 4248 is incidental to Congress’ Article I powers and (2) whether civil commitment of individuals labeled “sexually dangerous” and already in federal custody or incompetent to stand trial is an encroachment on state power.

Oral argument: Dec. 8, 2009

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Aug. 4, 2008)

MAIL-FRAUD STATUTE, HONEST SERVICES, FEDERALISM, DISCLOSURE DUTY

Petitioner, Bruce Weyhrauch ("Weyhrauch"), a member of the Alaska House of Representatives, was charged with honest services mail fraud for intending to devise a scheme to deprive the State of Alaska of its intangible right to his honest services in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1346. Respondent, the United States of America ("United States"), asserts that Weyhrauch should have disclosed his attempts to procure future employment from VECO, an oil company, before voting for legislation that would benefit the company. Weyhrauch claims that he cannot be convicted of honest services fraud because Alaska only requires the disclosure of actual conflicts of interest, not possible ones. The United States believes a violation of § 1346 does not require a concurrent violation of state law in order to convict Weyhrauch of honest services fraud. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will determine whether § 1346 mandates the creation of a federal common law extending the federal government’s authority over criminal matters usually handled by the states. The Court’s decision will also settle a circuit split and decide what type of conduct constitutes honest services fraud.