Skip to main content

ineffective assistance of counsel

Trevino v. Thaler

Oral argument: 
February 25, 2013

Carlos Trevino was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death by a Texas jury in 1997. During sentencing, Trevino’s state-appointed trial counsel failed to introduce potentially mitigating evidence of Trevino’s history of extreme childhood abuse and neglect, which might have persuaded the jury to sentence him to life in prison instead of death. His state-appointed habeas corpus counsel also failed to uncover evidence of Trevino’s background, and therefore failed to realize that he might have a colorable ineffective assistance of counsel claim. This failure to assert the claim barred raising the claim on federal habeas corpus review. However, the U.S. Supreme Court in Martinez v. Ryan, No. 10-1001, slip op. at 15 (March 20, 2012), had recognized a narrow exception to the procedural default rule, whereby ineffective assistance of counsel in an initial-review collateral proceeding—here, the state habeas proceeding—may excuse such a default. In Martinez, Arizona made state habeas proceedings the exclusive forum for addressing ineffective assistance of counsel claims.Trevino argues that the Martinez exception should apply here because this case implicates the same equitable considerations in post-conviction systems similar to Arizona’s.  In response, Rick Thaler, Director of the Correctional Institutions Division at the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, contends that Texas’s post-conviction system already provides fair opportunity for such claims to be heard, both in state habeas proceedings and on direct appeal, and thus the Martinez fairness concerns do not apply.  This decision may affect the legitimacy of the state post-conviction process and the balance of victims’ rights and the rights of capital inmates in the post-conviction setting.

Questions Presented: 

Whether the U.S. Supreme Court should grant certiorari, vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and remand the case to that court for consideration of Trevino’s argument under Martinez v. Ryan?

Issue(s)

Edited by: 
Acknowledgments: 

The authors would like to thank former Supreme Court Reporter of Decisions Frank Wagner for his assistance in editing this preview.

Additional Resources: 

Debra Cassens Weiss, ABA Journal: Supreme Court to Hear New Case on Competence in Habeas Representation (Oct. 30, 2012).

Wex, Habeas Corpus.

Missouri v. Frye (10-444)

Oral argument: Oct. 31, 2011

Appealed from: Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District (Sept. 27, 2010)

After being charged with a felony for driving with a revoked license, Respondent Galin E. Frye was offered two plea bargain options: one, plead guilty to the felony with a recommended three years of imprisonment, or two, plead guilty to a misdemeanor with a recommended 90 days in jail. However, Frye’s counsel never informed him of the plea options, and he subsequently pled guilty to the original felony charge. Frye now appeals, arguing that his counsel’s failure to inform him of the plea bargain violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. The State of Missouri, as Petitioner, argues that Frye’s situation falls outside of Sixth Amendment protections, and that, even if he was wronged, there is no available remedy. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will determine whether courts can relieve defendants convicted pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures if their lawyer made an error during plea negotiations.

Lafler v. Cooper (10-209)

Oral argument: Oct. 31, 2011

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (May 11, 2010)

In 2003, Respondent Anthony Cooper faced trial for assault with intent to murder. Prosecutors offered Cooper two plea deals carrying lesser sentences than he would have received under the sentencing guidelines. Pursuant to the advice of his trial counsel, Cooper rejected both offers and received a sentence demonstrably longer than either plea offer. Cooper claims that the Sixth Amendment guarantees effective assistance of counsel at all critical stages of a criminal proceeding, including the plea bargaining process. Cooper argues that his trial counsel’s ineffective assistance prejudiced his trial, and that he is entitled to reinstatement of the plea offer. Petitioner Blaine Lafler argues that rejection of a plea bargain is not a critical stage. Lafler contends that Cooper is not entitled to relief because Cooper received a fair trial and no Sixth Amendment violation occurred. This case will determine the availability of habeas relief to a defendant who may have received constitutionally defective advice from counsel during plea bargaining negotiations.

Martinez v. Ryan (10-1001)

Oral argument: Oct. 4, 2010

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Jan. 11, 2010)

Petitioner Luis Mariano Martinez, a convicted felon serving consecutive terms of 35 years to life, filed a writ of habeas corpus seeking relief in federal court. Martinez alleges that his trial counsel provided him with ineffective assistance. Because his appellate counsel failed to raise that ineffective-assistance claim in the first state post-conviction proceeding, an Arizona court precluded the claim on procedural grounds. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that Martinez did not have the right to counsel during his post-conviction proceeding, and concluded that he may not claim ineffective assistance at that stage in order to overcome his procedural default. Consequently, Martinez is barred from raising his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim, regardless of whether his post-conviction counsel rendered him ineffective assistance and caused the procedural default that precluded his trial-level claim. Martinez argues that he has a constitutional right to effective assistance of post-conviction counsel in raising his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim; he concludes that ineffective post-conviction counsel should negate the procedural default with respect to his ineffective-trial-counsel claim in this federal habeas proceeding. Respondent Charles L. Ryan, Director of the Arizona Department of Corrections, asserts that defendants do not have a right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings, concluding from this that the ineffective assistance of Martinez’s post-conviction counsel cannot negate his procedural default. In this decision, the Supreme Court will have to weigh the possibility that poorly-represented defendants will lose ineffective-assistance claims due to procedural defaults against the benefits of efficient state criminal proceedings.

Cullen v. Pinholster

Oral argument: Nov. 9, 2010

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Dec. 9, 2009)

HABEAS CORPUS, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, EVIDENTIARY HEARING

After receiving a death sentence in state court, Scott Pinholster submitted a habeas corpus petition in California federal district court claiming that his attorney’s deficient performance at trial violated his Sixth Amendment right to fair representation. Though the state court had dismissed Pinholster’s petition on the merits, the federal district court agreed to conduct an evidentiary hearing on new facts regarding Pinholster’s medical and family history that were available but not presented during the sentencing phase of Pinholster’s state trial. The federal district court eventually granted habeas relief, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, ordering a new sentencing proceeding. Now, the Warden at San Quentin State Prison argues that the new facts presented during the federal evidentiary hearing violated Section 2254 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 because these facts were not first presented in state court. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will affect the circumstances under which a federal habeas court may allow for evidentiary hearings that introduce facts not considered by state courts below.

Wood v. Allen (08-9156)

Oral argument: Nov. 4, 2009

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (Sept. 16, 2008)

HABEAS CORPUS, DEATH PENALTY, ANTI-TERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT, AEDPA, SIXTH AMENDMENT, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

In 1994, Petitioner Holly Wood was convicted of capital murder for sneaking into his ex-girlfriend’s bedroom and shooting her in the head with a shotgun. The judge imposed the death penalty, as recommended by the jury. Wood claims that, during sentencing, he did not receive effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. He argues that defense counsel failed to further investigate or present evidence of his mental disabilities. According to Wood, the state court’s rejection of this argument was an unreasonable application of federal law. He also argues that the Eleventh Circuit’s standard of review in habeas corpus proceedings abdicates the court’s judicial review function under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). The State of Alabama counters that the Eleventh Circuit properly deferred to the reasonable determinations of the state courts as required by the AEDPA. This decision will better define the appropriate level of deference due to state court factual determinations during federal habeas corpus proceedings.

House v. Bell (04-8990)


Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit

Oral argument: January 11, 2006

Syndicate content