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justiciability

Genesis HealthCare Corp. v. Symczyk (11-1059)

in
Oral argument: 
December 3, 2012
Court below: 
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

In a putative collective action, Laura Symczyk alleged that Genesis HealthCare Corporation violated the Fair Labor Standards Act by automatically deducting break time from her and other employees’ pay, regardless of whether they performed compensable work during their breaks. Before any other plaintiffs joined the action, Genesis made an offer of judgment for full relief of Symczyk’s claims. Symczyk did not accept the offer, but the district court dismissed the case because the offer of judgment left Symczyk without a personal stake in the litigation. Symczyk argues that she continues to have a personal stake and that the interests of plaintiffs yet to join the action creates jurisdiction. Genesis argues that a complete offer to satisfy a lone plaintiff’s claim renders the case moot. In resolving the question presented, the Supreme Court will decide whether an unaccepted offer of judgment can render a case moot and whether courts may consider the interests of unnamed, hypothetical parties in determining whether the parties have a personal stake in the litigation. The decision will affect collective-action trial practices for both plaintiffs and defendants, including plaintiffs’ use of the discovery process to join class members and defendants’ use of individual offers of judgment to forestall or avoid collective actions.

Questions Presented: 

Whether a case becomes moot, and thus beyond the judicial power of Article III, when the lone plaintiff receives an offer from the defendants to satisfy all of the plaintiff’s claims.

Issue

Does a purported collective action become moot, and thus beyond the judicial power of Article III, when the lone plaintiff in the case receives a complete offer of judgment from the defendants and all other potential plaintiffs have not yet joined the case?

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Written by: 
Thomas Santoro
Stephen Wirth
Edited by: 
Brandon Bodnar
Additional Resources: 

Zivotofsky v. Clinton (10-699)

in

Oral argument: Nov. 7, 2011

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (July 10, 2009)

The U.S. Embassy refused to record the place of birth of Petitioner Menachem Zivotofsky as “Jerusalem, Israel” in accordance with U.S. foreign policy to refrain from expressing an official view on whether Jerusalem is part of Israel. His parents filed suit on his behalf, demanding that the State Department comply with Section 214 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, which requires the State Department to record the place of birth of a U.S. citizen born in Jerusalem as Israel, if the child’s legal guardians so request. The district court held that the judiciary has no authority to order the executive branch to change its foreign policy under the political question doctrine; the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed this holding. Petitioner Zivotofsky (through his parents) argues that the political question doctrine does not apply because the case involves a question of statutory interpretation. Secretary of State Clinton contends that Section 214 is unconstitutional because Congress has no authority to recognize foreign sovereigns. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will clarify the political question doctrine, and may shed light on the issue of separation of powers among the judicial, legislative, and executive branches.

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