JUVENILES

Oral argument: March 20, 2012

Appealed from: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals (Aug. 27, 2010)

Petitioner, 14-year-old Evan Miller, was convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced by an Alabama state court to life in prison without parole. Miller appealed his conviction arguing that it violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Miller points to the Supreme Court cases Roper v. Simmons and Graham v. Florida, which held that a minor cannot be sentenced to death and that a minor cannot be imprisoned for life for a non-homicidal crime, respectively, as evidence that his conviction contravenes nationally held standards of decency. In response, the state of Alabama argues that Roper and Graham are factually distinct from this case and that national standards of decency support sentencing a minor to life imprisonment without parole for certain extreme crimes. The Supreme Court in this case will address moral and doctrinal questions about where the American legal system draws the line in punishing adolescents.

Oral argument: Mar. 20, 2012

Appealed from: Supreme Court of Arkansas (Oct. 7, 2004)

At age fourteen, Petitioner Kuntrell Jackson was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for felony-murder when his cousin killed a shop attendant during a robbery. Arkansas law made a life-without-parole sentence mandatory, so neither Jackson’s age nor the fact that he was not the triggerman entered into the sentencing consideration. After the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed Jackson’s conviction, a state court denied Jackson’s petition for habeas corpus in which he argued that a life-without-parole sentence on a fourteen-year-old constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Respondent, Arkansas Department of Corrections Director Ray Hobbs, asserts that such a sentence is constitutionally permissible and in line with national standards. The Supreme Court’s decision will help delineate the bounds of Eighth Amendment protection with respect to life-without-parole sentences for young juveniles convicted of homicide, particularly when they were not the triggermen.

Oral argument: Mar. 23, 2011

Appealed from: Supreme Court of North Carolina (Dec. 11, 2009)

MIRANDA WARNINGS, CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION, JUVENILES

Petitioner J.D.B. was a thirteen-year-old boy suspected of being involved in two break-ins. The police questioned him while he was at school without giving him a Miranda warning, and J.D.B. made incriminating statements. At his trial, J.D.B. moved to suppress those statements, arguing that he had been subjected to custodial interrogation under Miranda v. Arizona. Specifically, J.D.B. argued that a court should take account of his age when determining whether he was in custody. The North Carolina trial court and appellate courts all held that J.D.B. was not in custody for purposes of Miranda and allowed the statements into evidence. J.D.B. was convicted, placed on 12 months’ probation, and ordered to pay restitution. J.D.B. appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that age should be a factor in determining whether he was in custody for Miranda purposes. North Carolina contends that age is a subjective factor and should not be part of the objective custody inquiry. This case will determine what personal characteristics should be considered when determining whether a subject is in custody, and, therefore, whether a Miranda warning is necessary prior to questioning.