PRIVACY

Maracich v. Spears (12-25)

Oral argument:

January 9, 2013

Court below:

United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

In 2006, several individuals who had bought cars contacted a group of lawyers in South Carolina claiming various car dealerships overcharged them. To investigate this claim, the lawyers requested from the state department of motor vehicles the disclosure of the personal information of thousands of people who had bought from dealerships in Spartanburg County. Under the Driver's Privacy Protection Act ("DPPA"), this information is normally protected from disclosure. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found that although the lawyers engaged in mass solicitation without the consent of the person whose information was disclosed, the litigation exception of the DPPA nonetheless protected the lawyers' activity. Petitioner Maracich argues that the DPPA provision requiring the consent of individuals to disclose their personal information imposes a consent requirement onto requests to solicit potential clients for the purpose of litigation. In contrast, Respondent Spears argues that the DPPA exception for litigation waives the consent requirement for solicitation specifically related to litigation. The Supreme Court accepted certiorari on September 25, 2012 to examine the merits of the Fourth Circuit's decision. The outcome of this case may help determine how far lawyers can go to obtain personal information and how far Congress can go to reach into an area traditionally regulated by the States.

Questions Presented:

The Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994 ("DPPA" or "Act"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721- 2725, prohibits the obtainment, use, or disclosure of "personal information" maintained in state motor vehicle department ("DMV") databases, unless the use of such information falls within one of several discrete enumerated exceptions.

This case presents an opportunity for this Court to resolve a conflict among the circuits and even state courts as to the circumstances under which the litigation exception to the Act permits lawyers special rights of access to DPPA protected information.

In this case, the Fourth Circuit became the first court to hold that the acquisition and use by lawyers of confidential information from a DPPA-protected database solely for the purpose of soliciting clients, as opposed to searching for evidence or witnesses, qualified as a use "in connection with" litigation, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(4).

The Eleventh Circuit, the Third Circuit, and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, on the other hand, have held that the litigation exception does not permit lawyers to obtain or use DPPA-protected information to find or solicit clients. Instead, these courts have made clear that the litigation exception permits use of private information only when the information is relevant or likely to lead to discovery of evidence or witnesses. The Fourth Circuit has crossed that line, thereby inserting into the DPPA what amounts to a "for use by lawyers" exception, as opposed to a "for use in litigation" exception, and further muddling an already confusing and conflicted area of the law.

This petition asks the Court to consider two questions:

1. Whether the Fourth Circuit erred in holding, contrary to every other court heretofore to have considered the issue, that lawyers who obtain, disclose, or use personal information solely to find clients to represent in an incipient lawsuit—as opposed to evidence for use in existing or potential litigation—may seek solace under the litigation exception of the Act.

2. Whether the Fourth Circuit erred in reaching the conclusion (in conflict with prior precedent) that a lawyer who files an action that effectively amounts to a "place holder" lawsuit may thereafter use DPPA-protected personal information to solicit plaintiffs for that action through a direct mail advertising campaign on the grounds that such use is "inextricably intertwined" with "use in litigation."

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[Question Presented]
[Issue]
[Facts]
[Discussion]
[Analysis]

Issue

May an attorney obtain an individual's personal information from a state's department of motor vehicles to find plaintiffs for a lawsuit that has already started?

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Written by:

Dillon Horne

Matthew Soares

Edited by:

Charlotte Davis

Additional Resources:

Thomson Reuters: Supreme Court to decide if driver info is fair game for lawyers (Sep. 25, 2012)
Electronic Privacy Information Center: Maracich v. Spears, Concerning the Scope of the ‘Litigation’ Exception to the Drivers' Privacy Protection Act

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FAA v. Cooper (10-1024)

Oral argument: Nov. 30, 2011

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (June 20, 2011)

A joint criminal investigation carried out by the Department of Transportation and the Social Security Administration revealed that Respondent Stanmore Cawthon Cooper failed to disclose that he had HIV to one agency, while simultaneously collecting medical benefits from the other. Upon being convicted for making these misrepresentations, Cooper brought suit against the Federal Aviation Administration, the Department of Transportation, and the Social Security Administration under the Privacy Act of 1974, arguing that the Government had unlawfully disclosed his HIV status. The district court dismissed the suit, holding that the Privacy Act’s language, which imposes liability on federal agencies only in cases where an individual suffered “actual damages,” does not cover Cooper’s allegations of emotional harm. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the term “actual damages” encompasses mental or emotional harm suffered. The FAA now appeals, arguing that the term “actual damages” is ambiguous and must be construed in favor of the federal government to exclude noneconomic damages. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will address whether emotional and other noneconomic damages are “actual damages,” raising broad implications for future suits under the Privacy Act.

Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders (10-945)

Oral argument: October 12, 2011

Appealed from: United State Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (April 15, 2010)

Petitioner Albert Florence was arrested on an outdated bench warrant for a non-indictable offense and was subjected to “strip searches” in two separate prison facilities. Florence sued both facilities, alleging that their blanket policies of strip searching all detainees, regardless of their offense, violates the Fourth Amendment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed a District Court opinion, holding that the policies in this case did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Florence argues that the Fourth Amendment protects detainees from suspicionless strip searches when less intrusive alternatives better serve penological interests. The Respondents contend that the prison context diminishes the Fourth Amendment’s privacy expectation, and that the privacy expectation is outweighed by the security interest promoted by blanket strip searches. The decision in this case could affect prison security, the psychological wellbeing of detainees, and the future volume of prison litigation.

Snyder v. Phelps (09-751)

Oral argument: Oct. 6, 2010

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (Sept. 24, 2009)

FIRST AMENDMENT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, PRIVACY, STATE TORT REMEDIES

Respondents Fred W. Phelps, Shirley L. Phelps-Roper, and Rebekah A. Phelps-Davis (“the Phelpses”) protested at the military funeral of Petitioner Albert Snyder’s son, holding signs saying "God Hates the USA," "Thank God for 9/11," and other phrases. Snyder successfully sued the Phelpses for intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy by intrusion upon seclusion, and conspiracy, and the jury awarded Snyder $2.9 million in compensatory damages and $8 million in punitive damages. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the jury verdict, holding that the Phelpses’ statements were protected under the First Amendment and thus could not be subject to a civil lawsuit. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the statements should be protected because they are rhetorical hyperbole, as opposed to verifiable fact, and because the statements address matters of public concern. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will implicate individuals’ free speech and privacy interests and the states’ interest in protecting their citizens through tort law.

City of Ontario, CA v. Quon (08-1332)

Appealed from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (June 18, 2008)

Oral argument: Apr.19, 2010

FOURTH AMENDMENT, STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT, PRIVACY

Officer Jeff Quon, a City of Ontario, California SWAT team member, was given a pager by his Department for communication. Although Quon was told that the pager communications were not private, a supervisor allowed Quon to use the pager for personal use so long as Quon reimbursed the department for overage charges, which Quon did. After determining the current payment system was not efficient, the Department ordered a review of the content of the text messages, ostensibly for the purpose of determining how many of the text messages were for business purposes. The search revealed Quon had sent personal messages to friends, as well as sexually explicit texts to both his wife and mistress. Quon sued the City of Ontario for violating his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the City of Ontario, but the Ninth Circuit reversed and granted summary judgment in favor of Quon. The Ninth Circuit found the search to be unreasonable in light of Quon’s legitimate expectation of privacy. The Supreme Court will address a government worker’s Fourth Amendment rights, while also potentially addressing the Constitutional protection afforded to newer forms of communication, such as text messages.