retroactivity

Oral argument: April 17, 2012

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (Nov. 28, 2011)

On August 3, 2010, President Obama signed the Fair Sentencing Act (“FSA”), which reduced the disparity between the amounts of crack and powder cocaine required to trigger certain minimum mandatory sentences under the federal Sentencing Guidelines. Petitioners Edward Dorsey and Corey Hill were both arrested for possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute prior to the FSA’s passage, but were both sentenced after the FSA was enacted. Under the pre-FSA guidelines, they received ten-year prison sentences, but under the new FSA guidelines, both would have received substantially shorter prison sentences. Dorsey, Hill, and the United States government all argue that Congress intended for the FSA to apply immediately, and therefore, all prisoners sentenced after August 3, 2010, including Dorsey and Hill, should have been sentenced according to the FSA. Miguel Estrada, a court-appointed amicus curiae writing in support of the judgments below, argues that nothing indicates that Congress intended for immediate effectiveness and that the federal Saving Statute prevents retroactive application of new statutes that would eliminate previously incurred penalties. The decision in these cases will have implications for the consistent application of the FSA to prisoners falling within this particular sentencing window, as well as potential social costs and burdens on the justice system.

Oral argument: Jan. 18, 2012

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Sept. 9, 2010)

Petitioner Panagis Vartelas, a Greek citizen and lawful permanent resident of the United States, pleaded guilty to counterfeiting and was convicted in 1994. In 2003, following a brief trip to Greece, Vartelas received notice to appear for removal proceedings. The immigration judge ordered Vartelas’s deportation, after deeming Vartelas inadmissible under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. Vartelas argues that application of this 1996 Act to his 1994 crime violates the presumption against retroactivity and the reasonable expectations he had when entering his guilty plea. Respondent Attorney General Eric Holder argues that Vartelas’s case does not have a retroactive effect because it penalizes acts conducted after the statute’s enactment: Vartelas’s decision to leave and re-enter the United States. This case affects lawful permanent residents who were convicted of crimes prior to the Act’s enactment. The Supreme Court’s decision could restrict their ability to travel internationally, which in turn could damage their ability to maintain family ties or fulfill religious obligations.

Oral argument: Oct. 12, 2011

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Sept. 17, 2007)

After Petitioner Joel Judulang, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was convicted of a deportable offense, the Board of Immigration Appeals determined that he was not eligible for a discretionary waiver of deportability under Section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. On its face, Section 212(c) applies only to lawful permanent residents who are excludable when they attempt to enter the country, rather than to residents convicted of deportable offenses while already in the country. However, the Board of Immigration Appeals has previously allowed some permanent residents convicted of deportable offenses to apply for the Section 212(c) discretionary waiver. Petitioner Judulang asserts that he should be allowed to take advantage of the waiver, since his deportable offenses would render him excludable if he tried to re-enter the country. Judulang further argues that the Board of Immigration Appeals' change in Section 212(c) policy regarding deportable and excludable offenses is impermissibly retroactive and facially unconstitutional. The Department of Justice argues that the Board of Immigration Appeals has good reason to require a close textual similarity between a charged ground of deportability and a waivable ground of excludability, and that its policy is not impermissibly retroactive because it does not reflect a change in previous law. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will mean the difference between amnesty and deportation for many lawful permanent residents convicted of deportable offenses.

Oral argument: Mar. 21, 2010

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (Mar. 11, 2010)

FOURTH AMENDMENT, EXCLUSIONARY RULE, GOOD-FAITH EXCEPTION, RETROACTIVITY

Officer Curtis Miller arrested Petitioner Willie Davis for using a false name during a routine traffic stop. Incident to the arrest, Officer Miller searched the vehicle and discovered a gun. Davis was subsequently charged with being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. At trial, Davis made a motion to suppress the gun as evidence, but the district court denied the motion and let the evidence come in. While Davis’s appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Arizona v. Gant, holding that searches like the one conducted in Davis’s case violate the Fourth Amendment. Davis argued on appeal that the retroactive application of Gant to his case should result in exclusion of the gun as evidence. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Davis, who now appeals to the Supreme Court. The United States maintains that the evidence of the gun should not be suppressed because Officer Miller, in objectively reasonable good faith, believed his search was proper when it was conducted. This case will determine whether retroactive application of the rule in Arizona v. Gant requires exclusion of evidence acquired under a prior rule, or whether a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule should apply.

Oral argument: Feb. 22, 2011

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (Nov. 20, 2009)

FAIR SENTENCING ACT, SENTENCING GUIDELINES, PLEA AGREEMENTS, RETROACTIVITY

In 2005, Petitioner William Freeman was indicted on multiple charges, including the possession of crack cocaine. Freeman pled guilty to all charges and received a 106-month sentence under a plea agreement. Following Freeman's sentencing, the United States Sentencing Commission amended the Sentencing Guidelines, reducing the sentencing range for crack cocaine possession to eliminate disparities between crack and powder cocaine offenses. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), a court may alter a sentence after its imposition if the Sentencing Commission lowers the sentencing range. Both the District Court and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Freeman's request for a sentence reduction. The Sixth Circuit held that Freeman was ineligible for a reduction because his sentence was imposed under a plea agreement, and was not calculated under the Sentencing Guidelines. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether an individual whose sentence is imposed under a plea agreement may seek a sentence reduction following amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines.

Oral argument: October 31, 2007

Appealed from: Supreme Court of Minnesota (December 12, 2006)