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section 1983

Messerschmidt v. Millender (10-704)

Oral argument: Dec. 5, 2011

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit (Dec. 30, 2010)

Petitioner, detective Curt Messerschmidt, obtained and executed a warrant to search Respondent Augusta Millender’s residence. Millender sued Messerschmidt and other law enforcement officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Messerschmidt and other officers violated her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by executing an invalid search warrant and unreasonably searching her home. The court determined that the warrant was unconstitutionally overbroad. Messerschmidt contends that he is nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity from civil liability because he relied on a warrant and acted in good faith. Millender, on the other hand, maintains that the officers’ reliance on the warrant was unreasonable, and therefore, they are not entitled to qualified immunity. The decision will determine the scope of qualified immunity for officers who have, in good faith, relied on warrants later determined to be invalid.

Rehberg v. Paulk (10-788)

Oral argument: Nov. 1, 2011

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (June 9, 2011)

Relying on false testimony, three grand juries indicted Petitioner Charles Rehberg for varying charges. After the indictments were dismissed, Rehberg brought a private suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several parties, including Respondent James Paulk, who had testified before all three grand juries. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that Paulk, an investigator in the district attorney’s office, was entitled to absolute immunity for his testimony. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to determine whether a government official who acts as a “complaining witness” is entitled to absolute immunity under Section 1983. Rehberg argues that complaining witnesses were never given absolute immunity under common law, and that a lesser grant of qualified immunity is more appropriate under the circumstances. Paulk, on the other hand, contends that a decision to withhold absolute immunity will discourage public officials from giving complete and objective testimony before grand juries.

Ortiz v. Jordan (09-737)

Oral argument: Nov. 1, 2010

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (Mar. 12, 2009)

SUMMARY JUDGMENT, QUALIFIED IMMUNITY, APPELLATE JURISDICTION, 42 U.S.C. § 1983

After being assaulted while serving time in a federal prison, Michelle Ortiz sued two prison guards for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on a defense of qualified immunity, and the case went to trial. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Ortiz, but the Sixth Circuit reversed on the basis of qualified immunity. Ortiz argues that the Sixth Circuit did not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal based on qualified immunity because the issue, originally raised on summary judgment, was not preserved for appeal after final judgment was entered at trial. Jordan argues that by filing a motion for summary judgment, the issue was preserved. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will give guidance to litigants on how to preserve for appeal an issue that was the subject of a denied summary judgment motion.

Connick v. Thompson (09-571)

Oral argument: Oct. 6, 2010

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (Aug. 10, 2009)

42 U.S.C. § 1983, BRADY VIOLATION, MUNICIPAL LIABILITY, FAILURE-TO-TRAIN LIABILITY

John Thompson was wrongfully imprisoned for 18 years following a trial during which the prosecutor withheld exculpatory evidence, in violation of Brady v. Maryland. Thompson brought suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the district attorney's office is liable for failing to properly train its employees on the requirements of Brady. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found in favor of assigning liability to the district attorney's office. Petitioners, including District Attorney Harry Connick, appealed to the Supreme Court. Connick claims that there was no obvious need to train prosecutors regarding Brady standards and that liability should not attach to the office when there was no notice that the training program needed reform. Respondent Thompson contends that the prosecutors’ lack of training amounted to a deliberate indifference to preserving constitutional rights and that liability may properly attach to the district attorney's office without a past history of violations. This decision will determine the extent to which a municipality may be liable for a single action by one of its employees.

Los Angeles County, CA v. Humphries (09-350)

Oral argument: Oct. 5, 2010

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit (Nov. 5, 2008)

FEDERALISM, PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS, DECLARATORY RELIEF, 42 U.S.C. § 1983

In 2001, Craig and Wendy Humphries were arrested on child abuse charges and listed in California's Child Abuse Central Index ("CACI"), which is organized under the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act ("CANRA"). All charges against the Humphrieses were dismissed, and the Humphrieses obtained an order declaring them factually innocent. However, the Humphrieses were unable to contest their listing in the CACI. The Humphrieses sued Los Angeles County pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking declaratory relief establishing that CANRA and policies related to the CACI are unconstitutional because of the lack of procedures to challenge an individual's inclusion based on a substantiated claim. Los Angeles County argued that as a local government it had no control over CACI procedures because the state government created these policies. The Ninth Circuit sided with the Humphrieses and held that Los Angeles County's liability should be determined according the requirements established in Monell v. Department of Social Services. The Supreme Court must now decide whether claims for declaratory relief against a public entity are subject to the requirements of Monell.

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