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self-incrimination

Salinas v. Texas

in
Oral argument: 
April 17, 2013
Court below: 
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Police in Houston, Texas questioned Genovevo Salinas in 1992 during a murder investigation. Salinas answered all of their questions until the police asked whether he thought that casings found at the murder scene would match the shotgun the police found in his house. In response, Salinas remained silent. Later, he was charged with murder, tried, and convicted partially on the basis of evidence that he had remained silent during police questioning before he was arrested and given his Miranda warnings. Salinas claims that the Texas trial court should not have admitted evidence of his silence because of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. He argues that allowing evidence of his silence would violate the Fifth Amendment by forcing him to speak or have his silence used against him. The State of Texas argues that the evidence was appropriately admitted and outside the protection of Fifth Amendment privilege because Salinas’s silence was non-testimonial and the police questioning was non-coercive. The Supreme Court’s decision will determine the scope of the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination and, more specifically, whether it extends to the protection of a defendant’s pre-arrest, pre-Miranda statements to the police.

Questions Presented: 

Whether or under what circumstances the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause protects a defendant’s refusal to answer law enforcement questioning before he has been arrested or read his Miranda rights.

Issue

Do prosecutors violate an accused criminal’s Fifth Amendment’s right against forced self-incrimination when they use evidence of his silence against him even when the evidence comes from questioning conducted before he was taken into police custody?

Written by: 
Alexandra Cowen
Chanwoo Park
Edited by: 
Lisa Schmidt
Additional Resources: 

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Florida v. Powell (08-1175)

in

Oral argument: Dec. 7, 2009

Appealed from: Supreme Court of Florida (Sept. 29, 2008)

FIFTH AMENDMENT, RIGHT TO COUNSEL, MIRANDA WARNINGS, SELF-INCRIMINATION

Kevin Powell was arrested on suspicion of illegally owning a firearm and, after allegedly waiving his rights to counsel as required by Miranda v. Arizona, confessed during questioning. Powell was convicted on the basis of that confession. On appeal, Powell's conviction was overturned on the ground that the warnings read to Powell failed to adequately inform him of his right to have an attorney present during questioning. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a suspect must be expressly advised of his or her right to have an attorney present while he or she is being questioned. The Supreme Court's decision will clarify Miranda’s requirements regarding advising a suspect of his or her right to counsel during questioning. This case will resolve a circuit split on the issue and affect law enforcement practices during interrogations.

Maryland v. Shatzer (08-680)

in

Oral argument: October 5, 2009

Appealed from: Court of Appeals of Maryland (Aug. 26, 2008)

FIFTH AMENDMENT, MIRANDA RIGHTS, POLICE INTERROGATION, SELF-INCRIMINATION

In 2003, Michael Shatzer (“Shatzer”), an inmate at the Maryland Correctional Institution, invoked his Miranda rights, refusing to speak about alleged sexual child abuse without an attorney present. The investigation into Shatzer’s alleged sexual child abuse was closed later that year. In 2006, upon further evidence, the police opened a new investigation on the same matter and re-interrogated Shatzer, who had remained incarcerated for an unrelated offense during the entire interval. Shatzer waived his Miranda rights and made certain admissions. At trial, Shatzer moved to suppress the statements he made in 2006, arguing that the police’s re-interrogation violated the Supreme Court’s decision in Edwards v. Arizona, which held that, once a suspect requests counsel, the police and/or prosecutor may not subject that suspect to further interrogations until counsel is made available. Maryland argues that this presumption does not apply here due to (1) a break in police custody and (2) a substantial passage of time between Shatzer’s request for counsel and the subsequent interrogation. The Court of Appeals of Maryland agreed with Shatzer, holding that the Circuit Court for Washington County erred by admitting Shatzer’s statements. The Supreme Court’s decision will likely impact the manner in which the police and prosecutors approach and interview suspects who have invoked their right to counsel.

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