sentencing

Oral argument: March 20, 2012

Appealed from: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals (Aug. 27, 2010)

Petitioner, 14-year-old Evan Miller, was convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced by an Alabama state court to life in prison without parole. Miller appealed his conviction arguing that it violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Miller points to the Supreme Court cases Roper v. Simmons and Graham v. Florida, which held that a minor cannot be sentenced to death and that a minor cannot be imprisoned for life for a non-homicidal crime, respectively, as evidence that his conviction contravenes nationally held standards of decency. In response, the state of Alabama argues that Roper and Graham are factually distinct from this case and that national standards of decency support sentencing a minor to life imprisonment without parole for certain extreme crimes. The Supreme Court in this case will address moral and doctrinal questions about where the American legal system draws the line in punishing adolescents.

Oral argument: Mar. 20, 2012

Appealed from: Supreme Court of Arkansas (Oct. 7, 2004)

At age fourteen, Petitioner Kuntrell Jackson was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for felony-murder when his cousin killed a shop attendant during a robbery. Arkansas law made a life-without-parole sentence mandatory, so neither Jackson’s age nor the fact that he was not the triggerman entered into the sentencing consideration. After the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed Jackson’s conviction, a state court denied Jackson’s petition for habeas corpus in which he argued that a life-without-parole sentence on a fourteen-year-old constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Respondent, Arkansas Department of Corrections Director Ray Hobbs, asserts that such a sentence is constitutionally permissible and in line with national standards. The Supreme Court’s decision will help delineate the bounds of Eighth Amendment protection with respect to life-without-parole sentences for young juveniles convicted of homicide, particularly when they were not the triggermen.

Oral argument: Apr. 18, 2011

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Apr. 16, 2010)

SENTENCING, REHABILITATION, IMPRISONMENT, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES

Alejandra Tapia was convicted of smuggling illegal aliens and sentenced to fifty-one months in prison. At her sentencing, the district court factored in her history of substance abuse in its decision to give her a sentence beyond the minimum term so that she could enter and complete an in-custody drug rehabilitation program. Tapia appealed her sentence to the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the district court's decision. Citing a circuit split, Tapia appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari to determine whether it was proper for the district court judge to cite Tapia's rehabilitative needs in ordering a longer prison sentence. Petitioner Tapia contends that the plain meaning of the Sentencing Reform Act and the legislative history behind this Act confirm that rehabilitation is an inappropriate consideration in prison sentencing. The United States agrees with Tapia and urges vacating the lower court decision. Writing as amicus curiae by invitation of the Supreme Court, Professor Stephanos Bibas asserts that under the Sentencing Reform Act, district courts may properly consider the rehabilitative potential of in-prison targeted treatment programs when determining a prison sentence. Ultimately, this decision will impact when a district court may use incarceration to punish defendants and may also affect particular groups of defendants sentenced to incarceration.

Appealed from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Oral argument: March 30, 2010

SENTENCING, PRISON TERM, BUREAU OF PRISONS, LENITY, DEFERENCE

Petitioners Michael Barber and Tahir Jihad-Black are serving sentences in federal prison for various gun and drug charges. The Ninth Circuit allowed Petitioners to consolidate their cases with several earlier cases in order to petition the Supreme Court for certiorari. Petitioners are challenging the Bureau of Prisons’ (“BOP”) interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b), which allows well-behaved and compliant federal-prisoners to receive up to 54 days off their sentences for “each year of the prisoner’s term of imprisonment.” Petitioners argue that “term of imprisonment” means the total sentence imposed by the court. Respondent contends that it refers to the prisoners’ actual time served. The standard of computation ends up differing because under Petitioners’ method, a prisoner receives good behavior credit for years they do not end up serving. Petitioners argue that the courts do not owe the BOP’s interpretation deference, because the statute is unambiguous and the record does not contain any reason for the BOP’s interpretation. Even if the statute is ambiguous, Petitioners argue that the rule of lenity should apply. The rule of lenity holds that when considering penal statutes, the courts should resolve any ambiguity in the defendant’s favor. Respondent agrees that the statute is unambiguous, but counters that it instead requires computation of good time credit on the basis of time served. Respondent also argues that even if the statute is ambiguous, the rule of lenity does not apply because the statute is civil rather than penal.

Oral argument: January 14, 2009

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals, 5th Circuit (Oct. 23. 2007)

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit

Oral argument: October 11, 2005

Oral argument: Nov. 10, 2008

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals, 7th Circuit (Jan. 9, 2007)

Oral argument: October 30, 2007

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals, 7th Circuit (July 6, 2006)