separation of powers

Zivotofsky v. Clinton (10-699)

in

Oral argument: Nov. 7, 2011

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (July 10, 2009)

The U.S. Embassy refused to record the place of birth of Petitioner Menachem Zivotofsky as “Jerusalem, Israel” in accordance with U.S. foreign policy to refrain from expressing an official view on whether Jerusalem is part of Israel. His parents filed suit on his behalf, demanding that the State Department comply with Section 214 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, which requires the State Department to record the place of birth of a U.S. citizen born in Jerusalem as Israel, if the child’s legal guardians so request. The district court held that the judiciary has no authority to order the executive branch to change its foreign policy under the political question doctrine; the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed this holding. Petitioner Zivotofsky (through his parents) argues that the political question doctrine does not apply because the case involves a question of statutory interpretation. Secretary of State Clinton contends that Section 214 is unconstitutional because Congress has no authority to recognize foreign sovereigns. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will clarify the political question doctrine, and may shed light on the issue of separation of powers among the judicial, legislative, and executive branches.

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Robertson v. United States, ex rel. Watson (08-6261)

in

Appealed from the District of Columbia Court of Appeals (Jan. 24, 2008)

Oral argument: March 31, 2010

CRIMINAL CONTEMPT, CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS, SEPARATION OF POWERS

In March of 1999, Respondent Wykenna Watson obtained a civil protection order (“CPO”) against Petitioner John Robertson, alleging Robertson attacked her in March 1999. In June of 1999, Robertson violated his CPO when he attacked Watson again. In a plea bargain with the United States Attorney’s Office, Robertson agreed to plead guilty to attempted aggravated assault for the March incident in return for the United States’ agreement not to pursue two other charges arising from the June incident. Afterwards, Watson brought a criminal contempt action against Robertson, alleging that the June incident violated the CPO. The trial court convicted Robertson of three violations of his CPO, and Robertson subsequently petitioned to have his convictions vacated. Robertson argued that Watson’s criminal contempt action violated his plea bargain with the United States because criminal contempt proceedings are necessarily brought on behalf of the United States. In this case, the Supreme Court’s decision may alter criminal contempt proceedings in the face of plea bargains and affect the balance of power between the branches of government.