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Sixth Amendment

Alleyne v. United States

in
Oral argument: 
January 14, 2013
Court below: 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

A jury found Allen Alleyne guilty of robbery under a federal statue, but the jury did not find him guilty of brandishing a weapon during the robbery. A federal criminal statute provides that a judge can raise the mandatory minimum sentence for robbery with a finding that it was more likely than not that the defendant brandished a firearm. Thus, a judge’s finding can raise the mandatory minimum prison sentence even when a jury was unable to come to that same conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court allowed such findings from judges in Harris v. United States. Now, the court will reconsider that position or have the opportunity to further clarify how much sentencing discretion can be given to judges under federal statutes.

Questions Presented: 

Whether this Court’s decision in Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002), should be overruled.

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Issue(s)

Should the Supreme Court overrule Harris v. United States and require that a jury find facts beyond a reasonable doubt in order to enhance a sentence beyond the ordinarily prescribed statutory maximum?

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Written by: 
Michaela Dudley
Allison Nolan
Edited by: 
Jenny Liu
Additional Resources: 

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Descamps v. United States (11-9540)

in
Oral argument: 
January 7, 2013
Court below: 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Matthew Descamps was sentenced to 262 months in prison after the Ninth Circuit found that he had committed his third violent felony, in violation of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The contested violent felony was a 1978 conviction for burglary of a California grocery store. Under the California burglary statute, one can be convicted of burglary without an explicit finding that entry into the burgled premises was itself unlawful.  The element of unlawful entry is required under the generic burglary statute described in the ACCA. The Ninth Circuit found the “unlawful entry” element to be necessarily satisfied by the plea bargain agreed to by Descamps, thus subjecting him to the mandatory fifteen-year minimum prison sentence required under the ACCA. How the Supreme Court decides this case will determine how sentencing courts use factual assertions surrounding a prior conviction in situations where a violent crime as defined under the ACCA contains elements absent from the crime for which the defendant was convicted.

Questions Presented: 

1. Whether the Ninth Circuit's ruling in United States v. Aguila-Montes De Oca, 655 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2011), (En Banc) that a state conviction for burglary where the statute is missing an element of the generic crime, may be subject to the modified categorical approach, even though most other Circuit Courts of Appeal would not allow it.

2. Whether is it time for this Court to overrule Almandez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), apply Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 224 (2000), and require an Indictment and trial on the issue of application of the Armed Career Criminal Act.

3. Whether the Ninth Circuit's ruling in the instant case was in derogation of the requirements in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) and Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005).

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Issue(s) 

1. Whether the Ninth Circuit can find a missing element to be satisfied by using a modified categorical approach.

Written by: 
Jeremy Amar-Dolan
Zachary Zemlin
Edited by: 
Jenny Liu
Additional Resources: 

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Chaidez v. United States (11-820)

in
Oral argument: 
October 30, 2012
Court below: 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

In 2003, Roselva Chaidez pleaded guilty to an “aggravated felony” under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”), but her lawyer failed to inform her that her plea made her eligible for deportation. Subsequently, the Supreme Court held in Padilla v. Kentucky that the right to effective assistance of counsel includes a duty to inform defendants of deportation consequences of a plea deal if the consequences are clear. Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Padilla did not apply retroactively to Chaidez’s conviction. Chaidez argues that the Supreme Court should hold that Padilla was dictated by precedent (and therefore not a new rule) and is retroactively applicable to her case. The United States counters that Padilla was not dictated by precedent (and therefore was a new rule) and is not retroactively applicable to Chaidez’s conviction. Chaidez argues that Padilla should be retroactively applied because to hold otherwise would undermine the obligation of prosecutors to “seek justice,” which requires using their knowledge of immigration consequences when considering to alter convictions. In response, the United States counters that retroactively applying Padilla would allow defendants to avoid the consequences of their convictions based on a minor error by a lawyer. 

Questions Presented: 

In Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010), this Court held that criminal defendants receive ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment when their attorneys fail to advise them that pleading guilty to an offense will subject them to deportation.

The question presented is whether Padilla applies to persons whose convictions became final before its announcement.

Issue

Does the recent Supreme Court decision Padilla v. Kentucky, which allows an individual to contest a conviction based on a lawyer’s failure to provide information of the deportation consequences to pleading guilty, apply to individuals with convictions made final before the Court decided Padilla? 

Written by: 
Ethan Roman
Dan Youngblut
Edited by: 
Charlotte Davis
Additional Resources: 

·         Agence France-Presse, Supreme Court will rule on if deportation ruling is retroactive, The Raw Story.

·         The New York Times, Court Requires Warning about Deportation Risk, Adam Liptak.

·         Wex: Immigration Law.

Johnson v. Williams (11-465)

in
Oral argument: 
October 3, 2012
Court below: 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Tara Williams was on trial in California state court for special circumstances murder and firearm enhancement. During the trial, over Williams’s objections, the court dismissed a juror on the grounds that he was biased against the prosecution. After an alternate replaced the dismissed juror, the jury convicted Williams on both counts. Williams appealed, claiming that the juror’s dismissal had violated California state law as well as her Sixth Amendment rights. The California Court of Appeals affirmed Williams’ conviction, but only did so by addressing her state law claims, ultimately failing to explicitly discuss the Sixth Amendment issues raised. Williams then filed a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 alleging a violation of her Sixth Amendment rights. Though the federal district court denied her petition, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that Williams’ Sixth Amendment claim had not yet been “adjudicated on the merits” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Warden Deborah K. Johnson appealed, claiming that the California Court of Appeals’ prior ruling was an adjudication on the merits and therefore precluded the subsequent habeas petition.  How the Supreme Court decides the case will determine the degree of deference a federal court hearing a petition for habeas corpus will give a state court decision that does not explicitly address the federal grounds for relief.

Questions Presented: 

Whether a habeas petitioner's claim has been “adjudicated on the merits” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) where the state court denied relief in an explained decision but did not expressly acknowledge a federal-law basis for the claim.

Issue

Whether an issue not addressed in a state court opinion has been “adjudicated on the merits” for the purposes of federal habeas corpus review when the state court gave a detailed opinion mentioning other claims but apparently ignored the constitutional grounds for relief.

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Written by: 
Jeremy Amar-Dolan
Zachary Zemlin
Edited by: 
Judah Druck
Additional Resources: 

• Michael O'Hear, A Test for Richter’s Reach (Jan. 31, 2012)

Vasquez v. United States (11-199)

in

Oral argument: Mar. 21, 2012

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (Mar. 14, 2011)

HARMLESS ERROR, SIXTH AMENDMENT, OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois convicted Alexander Vasquez of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine. However, the district court had erroneously admitted statements made during recorded telephone conversations by Marina Perez into evidence for their truth. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the lower court’s error was harmless because the jury would have come to the same conclusion had there been no error. Vasquez now appeals, arguing that the Seventh Circuit misapplied the harmless-error analysis by ignoring the impact the error had on the jury. The Supreme Court will decide how courts should properly carry out harmless-error tests, as well as examine the possible constitutional questions such an error would create.

Southern Union Co. v. United States (11-94)

in

Oral argument: Mar. 19, 2012

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit (Dec. 22, 2010)

CRIMINAL FINES, FIFTH AMENDMENT, SIXTH AMENDMENT, ENVIRONMENT, CRIMINAL LAW

In 2004, local youths broke into a Southern Union storage center that was improperly storing mercury; the incident resulted in a spill and cleanup effort. Southern Union was charged with storing hazardous waste without a permit under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. After a jury found Southern Union guilty, the district court judge determined that the violation had continued for 762 days and imposed a fine of $38 million. On appeal, Southern Union argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi required that the jury determine the period of the violation, not the judge. Southern Union contends that if the determination of the period of violation is left to the judge, the court could impose a fine in excess of the actual violation, violating Southern Union’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. In contrast, the United States asserts that Apprendi is not applicable because it dealt with deprivations of life and liberty interests, not the criminal fines that are at issue here. The decision in this case has implications for consistent treatment of defendants and the efficiency of courts.

Williams v. Illinois (10-8505)

in

Oral argument: December 6, 2011

Appealed from: The Supreme Court of Illinois (July 15, 2010)

Petitioner, Sandy Williams, was charged with sexual assault on 22-year-old L.J in 2000. At trial, the prosecution called an expert witness to testify about DNA test results that identified Williams as the assailant. He moved to strike the evidence under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause because the testifying witness had not performed the DNA tests. The court denied his motion and convicted Williams of sexual assault, kidnapping, and robbery. He contends that allowing an expert witness to testify regarding forensic reports when the witness did not prepare the reports violates the Confrontation Clause. Williams insists that he must have the opportunity to cross-examine the analysts that prepared the reports, particularly because DNA test results are prone to error or manipulation. Respondent, the State of Illinois, argues that allowing the expert witness to testify does not violate the Confrontation Clause because the witness was applying her own independent analysis and opinions concerning the report.

Missouri v. Frye (10-444)

in

Oral argument: Oct. 31, 2011

Appealed from: Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District (Sept. 27, 2010)

After being charged with a felony for driving with a revoked license, Respondent Galin E. Frye was offered two plea bargain options: one, plead guilty to the felony with a recommended three years of imprisonment, or two, plead guilty to a misdemeanor with a recommended 90 days in jail. However, Frye’s counsel never informed him of the plea options, and he subsequently pled guilty to the original felony charge. Frye now appeals, arguing that his counsel’s failure to inform him of the plea bargain violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. The State of Missouri, as Petitioner, argues that Frye’s situation falls outside of Sixth Amendment protections, and that, even if he was wronged, there is no available remedy. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will determine whether courts can relieve defendants convicted pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures if their lawyer made an error during plea negotiations.

Lafler v. Cooper (10-209)

in

Oral argument: Oct. 31, 2011

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (May 11, 2010)

In 2003, Respondent Anthony Cooper faced trial for assault with intent to murder. Prosecutors offered Cooper two plea deals carrying lesser sentences than he would have received under the sentencing guidelines. Pursuant to the advice of his trial counsel, Cooper rejected both offers and received a sentence demonstrably longer than either plea offer. Cooper claims that the Sixth Amendment guarantees effective assistance of counsel at all critical stages of a criminal proceeding, including the plea bargaining process. Cooper argues that his trial counsel’s ineffective assistance prejudiced his trial, and that he is entitled to reinstatement of the plea offer. Petitioner Blaine Lafler argues that rejection of a plea bargain is not a critical stage. Lafler contends that Cooper is not entitled to relief because Cooper received a fair trial and no Sixth Amendment violation occurred. This case will determine the availability of habeas relief to a defendant who may have received constitutionally defective advice from counsel during plea bargaining negotiations.

Gonzalez v. Thaler (10-895)

in

Oral argument: Nov. 2, 2011

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (Oct. 6, 2010)

Petitioner Rafael Arriaza Gonzalez alleged that his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated when he was charged with murder ten years after an alleged shooting occurred. Although Gonzalez did not appeal his case to the Texas state court of last resort, he later petitioned for federal habeas review. The district court held that Gonzalez’s petition was time-barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) because it was filed more than one year after the period to appeal to the highest Texas state court expired. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability, but did not indicate which underlying constitutional claim was at issue in the certificate of appealability. The parties now disagree on whether the Fifth Circuit had jurisdiction over Gonzalez’s case after issuing the certificate of appealability, and which event starts the one-year clock for federal habeas review. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will affect petitioners’ ability to seek federal habeas review; it will also affect the allocation of judicial resources in reviewing certificates of appealability and federal habeas claims.

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