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sovereign immunity

Millbrook v. United States

in
Oral argument: 
February 19, 2013
Court below: 
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Kim Millbrook, a federal inmate at the United States Penitentiary in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") for the alleged sexual assault and battery he suffered from three correctional officers at the prison. The important issue in the case is how to understand the sovereign immunity provisions of the FTCA, and when federal correctional officers can be sued for their tortious conduct. Millbrook contends that while the FTCA generally provides sovereign immunity to the Government for torts committed by their employees while at work, the FTCA waives sovereign immunity for specific intentional torts committed by law enforcement officers during the scope of the officers’ employment. The Third Circuit has limited this waiver of sovereign immunity to instances where the enforcement agent is executing a search, seizing evidence, or making an arrest for violations of federal law. The Supreme Court will resolve a circuit split over how narrowly the waiver of sovereign immunity should be read. How the Court decides this case will determine when a federal correctional officer can be sued for his tortious conduct, and has significant implications for the protection of vulnerable prisoners against assault and abuse.

Questions Presented: 

Whether 28 U.S.C §§1346(b) and 2680(h) waive the sovereign immunity of the United States for the intentional torts of prison guards when they are acting within the scope of their employment but are not exercising authority to “execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of federal law."

Levin v. United States

in
Oral argument: 
January 15, 2013
Court below: 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Steven A. Levin sued his military doctor and the United States for medical malpractice and medical battery for a procedure performed at the United States Naval Hospital in Guam. The United States substituted itself for the military doctor and claimed that they had sovereign immunity which barred the claim under the Gonzalez Act. Levin argues that the Gonzalez Act only removes liability from armed services medical personnel and does not create an immunity that would remove any possibility for recovery in medical battery suits against armed forces medical personnel. The United States contends that no waiver of sovereign immunity exists unless a statute’s explicit language creates a waiver. The lower courts dismissed Levin's case by stating that the United States' sovereign immunity did apply under the Gonzalez Act, therefore barring this case from continuing. Levin contends that to bar his claim because of sovereign immunity would be to prevent patients injured by military medical personnel from having an opportunity to recover for the pain and suffering caused by the medical mistake. The United States argues that to find an implied waiver of sovereign immunity in the Gonzalez Act would overturn the Supreme Court's long-standing precedent regarding waivers of sovereign immunity and create questions about when sovereign immunity is waived. 

Questions Presented: 

10 U.S.C. § 1089 concerns the defense of military medical personnel against claims for tortuous acts committed in the scope of employment. It directs that suits may be brought only against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, which waives sovereign immunity. 28 U.S.C. §2680 (h) of the FTCA excludes some suits, including battery, from its waiver. Subsection 1089(e) states, "For purposes of this section, the provisions of section 2680 (h) ... shall not apply to any cause of action arising out of a ... wrongful act ... in the performance of medical ... functions ...."

The particular question presented is whether suit may be brought against the United States for battery committed to a civilian by military medical personnel acting within the scope of employment.

The broader question raises the same issue for the same and other claims against groups of government employees whose defense would fall under similarly worded statutes.

This Court has never addressed these issues.

Issues

Did the Gonzalez Act waive sovereign immunity for medical battery claims, thus allowing suits directly against the United States for medical battery by military doctors immune from suit under the Gonzalez Act?

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Written by: 
Dean Caruvana
Claire Holton-Basaldua
Edited by: 
Brandon Bodnar
Additional Resources: 

United States v. Bormes (11-192)

in
Oral argument: 
October 2, 2012
Court below: 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Respondent James Bormes used the U.S. government’s online pay system to pay for a lawsuit that he had filed electronically. Following the transaction, the website displayed the last four digits of his credit card and the card’s expiration date. Bormes then sued the government, alleging that it had violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA") by displaying the expiration date. The United States argued that it had sovereign immunity with respect to claims under the FCRA because the Act did not explicitly apply to the U.S. government. When Bormes countered that he could sue the government under the Little Tucker Act, which provides a remedy for those with claims against the government of less than $10,000, the government contended that the Little Tucker Act applied only in situations where parties could not otherwise recover. In deciding this case, the Supreme Court must first determine the scope of the Tucker Acts' waiver of the United States’ sovereign immunity regarding claims brought under the Little Tucker Act for suits based on violations of the FCRA. As the country’s largest employer, creditor, and lender, the U.S. government could see a massive increase in litigation and potential liability as a result of this decision. Additionally, the Supreme Court may address how explicit Congress must act in order to exempt the federal government from liability.

Questions Presented: 

Whether the Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(2), waives the sovereign immunity of the United States with respect to damages actions for violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.

Issue(s)

Whether the Little Tucker Act enables plaintiffs to sue the United States for damages arising from violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act.

Written by: 
Zachary Glantz
Jonathan Goddard
Edited by: 
Brooks Kaufman
Additional Resources: 

Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland (10-1016)

in

Oral argument:  Jan. 11, 2012

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (Nov. 10, 2010)

After respondent Maryland Court of Appeals denied petitioner Daniel Coleman’s request for medical leave and terminated his employment, Coleman filed this suit against the State of Maryland under the self-care provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), which provides that “an eligible employee shall be entitled to a total of 12 workweeks of leave during any 12-month period . . . [b]ecause of a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position,” 29 U. S. C. §2612(a)(1) (D). Coleman argues that the Act’s medical leave provisions should be considered as a unified effort against gender discrimination that permits state employees to sue state employers under the self-care provision, and that the purpose of preventing gender discrimination abrogates state immunity. The state responds that the FMLA’s provisions address discrete forms of discrimination that should be examined individually and that the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity bars lawsuits against a state employer under the self-care provision. By deciding whether a state employee has legal recourse for a violation of the self-care provision, this case will clarify the scope of state exposure to employment lawsuits seeking money damages under the FMLA.

Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy v. Stewart (09-529)

in

Oral argument: Dec. 1, 2010

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (June 2, 2009)

FEDERALISM, SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY, EX PARTE YOUNG, DISABILITY RIGHTS

The Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy ("VOPA"), an independent state agency, advocates for individuals with mental illnesses and developmental disabilities. In accordance with federal funding requirements, Virginia law authorizes VOPA to access an individual's records if VOPA believes an individual was abused. During an investigation, a state facility denied VOPA access to the records of three individuals, and VOPA sued three state officials alleging that they violated federal law. The Eleventh Amendment provides that states cannot be sued in federal court by residents of one of the United States or of a foreign state. However, the Supreme Court, in Ex parte Young, recognized an exception to the Eleventh Amendment allowing a party to sue state officials for injunctive or declaratory relief to correct an ongoing violation of federal law. The Fourth Circuit held that, because the plaintiff in this suit was a state-created agency rather than a private individual, the suit could not proceed under the Ex parte Young exception and that allowing it to proceed in federal court would be a violation of Virginia’s sovereign immunity. This decision may affect the ability of independent agencies to protect vulnerable individuals from neglect and has the potential to increase legal conflict between state agencies.

United States v. Tohono O’odham Nation (09-846)

in

Oral argument: Nov. 1, 2010

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Mar. 16, 2009)

28 U.S.C. § 1500, INDIAN LAND TRUST, INDIAN TUCKER ACT, SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

Tohono O’odham Nation, an Indian Tribe from Southern Arizona, filed suit against the United States in the District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that the United States had breached its fiduciary duties to the Tribe by poorly managing the Tribe’s trust assets. The Tribe asked for an accounting and other equitable relief. The Tribe subsequently filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims seeking monetary damages for the earnings shortfall in the Tribe’s trust accounts. The United States argued that 28 U.S.C. § 1500 barred the Court of Federal Claims from hearing the case because the same claim was already before the District Court for the District of Columbia. The Court of Federal Claims agreed with the United States and dismissed the Tribe’s second suit. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, however, held that separate claims for equitable and monetary relief would not be barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1500. The Supreme Court’s decision will determine the extent to which parallel claims must be related before 28 U.S.C. § 1500 bars jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims, and in so doing, will establish what separation exists between claims for monetary and equitable relief against the United States.

Sossamon v. Texas (08-1438)

in

Oral argument: November 2, 2010

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (Feb. 7, 2009)

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY, RLUIPA, MONETARY RELIEF, FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION

Harvey Leroy Sossamon, III is an inmate at a Texas state prison. The prison warden refused to allow cell-restricted inmates to attend religious services and denied all inmates use of the prison chapel for religious purposes. In 2006, Sossamon filed suit against the State of Texas and various state and prison officials, alleging that the Texas prison violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"). Sossamon sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Texas, holding that Texas has sovereign immunity under the 11th Amendment and is not liable for damages. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. Sossamon argues here that the words “appropriate relief,” as provided by RLUIPA, unambiguously waives the state's immunity from damages. Texas counters that “appropriate relief” does not amount to clear notice which is required before a state may waive its sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will determine the protection afforded to states under RLUIPA and may deter states from implementing policies which violate the Act.

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