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statutory interpretation

Sekhar v. United States

in
Oral argument: 
April 23, 2013
Court below: 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Petitioner Giridhar C. Sekhar was convicted of extortion under federal law for threatening to expose an extramarital affair unless the General Counsel for the State Comptroller recommended that the state pension fund invest in a fund managed by Sekhar’s company. The Court will determine the limits of the meaning of the word “property” under federal extortion law, and whether the General Counsel's recommendation was "property" that could be subject to extortion. The Court’s decision will have implications for the scope of federal extortion law and, more generally, for the balance between enforcement of federal and state criminal law when the two overlap. Petitioner argues for a narrow definition of property, limited to something of value that is transferable. Respondent calls for a broader view of property to include the legal advice given by lawyers.

Questions Presented: 

Whether the “recommendation” of an attorney, who is a salaried employee of a governmental agency, in a single instance, is intangible property that can be the subject of an extortion attempt under 18 U.S.C. §1951(a)(the Hobbs Act) and 18 U.S.C. §875(d).

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Issue

Is the recommendation of an attorney considered "property" which can be extorted for purposes of federal anti-extortion law?

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Astrue v. Capato (11-159)

in

 Oral argument: Mar. 19, 2012

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (Jan. 4, 2011)

Posthumous Conception, Social Security Act, state Intestacy Law, Statutory Interpretation

Shortly after Robert Nicholas Capato’s death, his wife Karen Capato underwent in vitro fertilization using his frozen sperm and gave birth to twins in 2003. Karen Capato applied for Social Security benefits on behalf of her twins as survivors of a deceased wage earner. The Social Security Administration ("SSA") denied her claim. An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) affirmed, ruling that state intestacy law controls eligibility for survivor benefits for posthumously conceived children under the Social Security Act ("Act"). Therefore, the twins were ineligible for benefits under the applicable Florida law. On appeal, the district court affirmed the ALJ’s reading. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and ruled that the plain language of the Act entitles the Capato twins, whose parentage is not in dispute, to survivor benefits. Petitioner Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of the SSA, argues that the Act requires the agency to apply state intestacy law to determine whether an applicant is the child of an insured wage earner for the purpose of receiving survivor benefits. In contrast, Respondent Karen K. Capato contends that the Act unambiguously entitles undisputed biological children of married parents to survivor benefits, without referring to state intestacy laws. The Supreme Court’s decision will authoritatively interpret the Act’s mandate on the determination of survivor benefits eligibility, and possibly reflect on the balance between legislative rulemaking and unanticipated progress of science and technology.

Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S (10-844)

in

Oral argument: Dec. 5, 2011

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (April 14, 2010)

Petitioner Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, a generic drug manufacturer, sought FDA approval to market the diabetes drug repaglinide. Pursuant to the Hatch-Waxman Act's expedited FDA application process for generic drugs, Caraco certified that its drug label would not conflict with Respondent Novo Nordisk’s patented repaglinide-metformin use combination. Relying on Novo’s description of its patent, the FDA denied the certification. Caraco invoked the Act’s counterclaim provision to compel Novo to revert to a narrower patent description. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that Caraco could not assert the counterclaim. Caraco argues that the Federal Circuit’s reading of the counterclaim provision is incorrect and that the purpose of the counterclaim provision—to “correct” misleading patent descriptions—supports reversal. Novo asserts that the statute plainly permits a counterclaim only if Novo’s patent does not claim any approved method of use. The Supreme Court’s reading of the counterclaim provision may affect healthcare costs and the generic drug manufacturing industry.

Mims v. Arrow Financial Services, LLC (10-1195)

in

Oral argument: Nov. 28, 2011

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (Nov. 30, 2010)

Petitioner Marcus Mims alleges that Respondent Arrow Financial Services violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) by leaving numerous voice mail messages on his cellular phone using an automatic dialer and a prerecorded message. Mims argues that federal jurisdiction exists over private claims under the TCPA because federal courts have broad jurisdiction when questions arise under federal law. Arrow counters that Congress divested federal courts of jurisdiction for private TCPA claims based on the language of the statute. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed a district court decision to dismiss Mims's TCPA claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court will determine whether Mims may bring a private claim in federal court for alleged violations of the TCPA. The decision will impact the ways in which individuals and businesses can counter abusive telemarketing.

Pacific Operators Offshore v. Valladolid (10-507)

in

Oral argument: Oct. 11, 2011

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (May 13, 2010)

Juan Valladolid, an employee of the Petitioner, Pacific Operators Offshore, died when a forklift crushed him at Pacific's oil-processing facility on the California coast. Valladolid’s widow filed a claim for federal workers’ compensation under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”), but the claim was rejected because Valladolid died on land rather than on the outer continental shelf. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that OCSLA benefits are not limited to injuries or deaths that occur on the outer continental shelf. Rather, the court held, coverage depends on the existence of a causal nexus between the injury or death and operations on the outer continental shelf. Petitioner Pacific argues that OCSLA contains a strict “situs-of-injury” requirement, while Respondent Valladolid contends that such a requirement would defeat Congressional intent. The Supreme Court’s decision will resolve a longstanding question of statutory interpretation, and may shed light on the Court’s current approach to workers’ compensation laws.

United States v. DePierre (09-1533)

in

Oral argument: Feb. 28, 2011

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit (Mar. 17, 2010)

DRUG LAWS, MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCING, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, COCAINE

Reacting to the growing concern over “crack” cocaine, Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (ADAA), part of which imposes a 10-year mandatory minimum prison sentence for offenses involving either 5 kilograms or more of powder cocaine or coca leaves, or “50 grams or more of a substance…which contains a cocaine base.” Petitioner Frantz DePierre sold 55.1 grams of drugs to a police informant and received a sentence of 10 years in prison for distributing 50 grams or more of “cocaine base.” The court of appeals affirmed the sentence, holding that the term “cocaine base” covers all base forms of cocaine, including but not limited to crack. DePierre argues that in light of the purpose and language of the statute, “cocaine base” applies only to crack cocaine, while the United States claims that interpreting the ADAA to include all chemically-classified “base” forms of cocaine is consistent with the ADAA as a whole. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will resolve a circuit split by establishing the scope of “cocaine base” and will ultimately determine the mandatory minimum sentence lengths for offenses involving non-crack cocaine.

Dolan v. United States (09-367)

in

Appealed from the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit (June 26, 2009)

Oral argument: April 20, 2010

RESTITUTION PAYMENTS, SENTENCING DEADLINES, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

In 2007 petitioner, Brian Russell Dolan, pled guilty to assault resulting in serious bodily injury. The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico sentenced Dolan to 21 months in prison. At sentencing, the district court recognized that restitution was required by the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, but declined to issue a specific restitution order without first receiving more information regarding payments owed. Two hundred and nine days after sentencing, the district court issued a restitution order requiring Dolan to pay $104,649.78. Dolan, claiming that 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5) precludes ordering restitution more than 90 days after sentencing, argued that the district court lacked the authority to order restitution. The United States, on the other hand, insists that a district court’s failure to meet the 90-day deadline does not extinguish its authority to order restitution. Both the district court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rejected Dolan’s claim, holding instead that district courts retain permanent authority to impose restitution. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the issue of whether a district court may enter a restitution order beyond the time limit prescribed in 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5).

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