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SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey

in
Oral argument: 
March 20, 2013
Court below: 
New Hampshire Supreme Court

Robert Pelkey's car was towed from his apartment complex for failure to move it during a snowstorm. At the time, Mr. Pelkey was quite ill and eventually was sent to the hospital to have his left foot amputated. When he returned home and was made aware that his car was towed, he had his attorney track down the car at Dan’s City towing and ask for it back. When they disposed of the car, Mr. Pelkey sued for violations of New Hampshire’s consumer protection laws and common law negligence. Dan’s City claimed that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act ("FAAAA") controlled motor carriers and preempted any state law claims. The New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed the lower court and agreed with Mr. Pelkey that his state law remedies were not preempted because they dealt with the disposal of property and debt collection on a lien, rather than the "services" of the towing company. Dan's City contends these actions are incidental to their towing and storage of the vehicle and therefore are properly construed as services of their company. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split on the scope of preemption under the FAAAA. How the Court rules in this case will have great significance for both vehicle owners and the towing industry.

Questions Presented: 

Whether state statutory, common law negligence, and consumer protection act enforcement actions against a tow-motor carrier based on state law regulating the sale and disposal of a towed vehicle are related to a transportation service provided by the carrier and are thus preempted by 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1).

Issue(s)

Are state law claims of negligence and consumer fraud against a towing company for having a car towed and eventually disposed of to pay towing and storage fees preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (“FAAAA”)?

Written by: 
Dillon Horne
Matthew Soares
Edited by: 
Jenny Liu
Additional Resources: 

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Ortiz v. Jordan (09-737)

in

Oral argument: Nov. 1, 2010

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (Mar. 12, 2009)

SUMMARY JUDGMENT, QUALIFIED IMMUNITY, APPELLATE JURISDICTION, 42 U.S.C. § 1983

After being assaulted while serving time in a federal prison, Michelle Ortiz sued two prison guards for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on a defense of qualified immunity, and the case went to trial. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Ortiz, but the Sixth Circuit reversed on the basis of qualified immunity. Ortiz argues that the Sixth Circuit did not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal based on qualified immunity because the issue, originally raised on summary judgment, was not preserved for appeal after final judgment was entered at trial. Jordan argues that by filing a motion for summary judgment, the issue was preserved. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will give guidance to litigants on how to preserve for appeal an issue that was the subject of a denied summary judgment motion.

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