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tort

Levin v. United States

in
Oral argument: 
January 15, 2013
Court below: 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Steven A. Levin sued his military doctor and the United States for medical malpractice and medical battery for a procedure performed at the United States Naval Hospital in Guam. The United States substituted itself for the military doctor and claimed that they had sovereign immunity which barred the claim under the Gonzalez Act. Levin argues that the Gonzalez Act only removes liability from armed services medical personnel and does not create an immunity that would remove any possibility for recovery in medical battery suits against armed forces medical personnel. The United States contends that no waiver of sovereign immunity exists unless a statute’s explicit language creates a waiver. The lower courts dismissed Levin's case by stating that the United States' sovereign immunity did apply under the Gonzalez Act, therefore barring this case from continuing. Levin contends that to bar his claim because of sovereign immunity would be to prevent patients injured by military medical personnel from having an opportunity to recover for the pain and suffering caused by the medical mistake. The United States argues that to find an implied waiver of sovereign immunity in the Gonzalez Act would overturn the Supreme Court's long-standing precedent regarding waivers of sovereign immunity and create questions about when sovereign immunity is waived. 

Questions Presented: 

10 U.S.C. § 1089 concerns the defense of military medical personnel against claims for tortuous acts committed in the scope of employment. It directs that suits may be brought only against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, which waives sovereign immunity. 28 U.S.C. §2680 (h) of the FTCA excludes some suits, including battery, from its waiver. Subsection 1089(e) states, "For purposes of this section, the provisions of section 2680 (h) ... shall not apply to any cause of action arising out of a ... wrongful act ... in the performance of medical ... functions ...."

The particular question presented is whether suit may be brought against the United States for battery committed to a civilian by military medical personnel acting within the scope of employment.

The broader question raises the same issue for the same and other claims against groups of government employees whose defense would fall under similarly worded statutes.

This Court has never addressed these issues.

Issues

Did the Gonzalez Act waive sovereign immunity for medical battery claims, thus allowing suits directly against the United States for medical battery by military doctors immune from suit under the Gonzalez Act?

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Written by: 
Dean Caruvana
Claire Holton-Basaldua
Edited by: 
Brandon Bodnar
Additional Resources: 

Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America (08-1314)

in

Oral argument: Nov. 3, 2010

Appealed from: California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three (Oct. 22, 2008)

SUPREMACY CLAUSE, PREEMPTION, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, TORT, FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS

Delbert Williamson sued Mazda Motor of America after his wife died in a car accident while she was riding in their Mazda MPV minivan. Williamson claimed that Mazda was liable under state tort law for installing lap-only seatbelts, as opposed to lap-and-shoulder seatbelts, in the rear aisle seat where his wife sat during the crash. Mazda argues that Williamson’s state law claim is preempted by a federal regulation granting manufacturers the choice between lap-only and lap-and-shoulder seatbelts in rear aisle seats. The California Court of Appeal sided with Mazda and held that federal vehicle safety regulations preempted Williamson’s claim because the regulations conflicted with his state law claim. Williamson, however, contends that the Court should allow his state claim because it does not conflict with federal regulations, but rather furthers federal objectives of vehicle safety. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will address the extent of preemption of state law claims by on-point federal regulations and in turn affect manufacturer liability under state tort claims.

Public necessity

in

In tort law, a defense that can be used against charges of trespass where a defendant interferes with a plaintiff's property in an emergency situation to protect the community or society as a whole from a greater harm that would have occured if the defendant had not committed trespass. Public necessity serves as an absolute defense, and a defendant is not liable for any damages caused by his trespass.  Contrast with private necessity.  See also necessity defense.  

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