17 CFR § 240.17Ad-22 - Standards for clearing agencies.
(a) Definitions. For purposes of this section:
(1) Backtesting means an ex-post comparison of actual outcomes with expected outcomes derived from the use of margin models.
(2) Central counterparty means a clearing agency that interposes itself between the counterparties to securities transactions, acting functionally as the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer.
(3) Central securities depository means a clearing agency that is a securities depository as described in Section 3(a)(23)(A) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(23)(A)).
(4) Clearing agency involved in activities with a more complex risk profile means a clearing agency registered with the Commission under Section 17A of the Act (15 U.S.C. 78q–1) that:
(i) Provides central counterparty services for security-based swaps;
(ii) Has been determined by the Commission to be involved in activities with a more complex risk profile at the time of its initial registration; or
(iii) Is subsequently determined by the Commission to be involved in activities with a more complex risk profile pursuant to § 240.17Ab2–2(b).
(5) Covered clearing agency means a registered clearing agency that provides the services of a central counterparty or central securities depository.
(6) Designated clearing agency means a clearing agency registered with the Commission under Section 17A of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78q–1) that is designated systemically important by the Financial Stability Oversight Council pursuant to the Payment, Clearing, and Settlement Supervision Act of 2010 (12 U.S.C. 5461 et seq.) and for which the Commission is the supervisory agency as defined in Section 803(8) of the Payment, Clearing, and Settlement Supervision Act of 2010 (12 U.S.C. 5461 et seq.).
(7) Financial market utility has the same meaning as defined in Section 803(6) of the Payment, Clearing, and Settlement Supervision Act of 2010 (12 U.S.C. 5462(6)).
(8) Link means, for purposes of paragraph (e)(20) of this section, a set of contractual and operational arrangements between two or more clearing agencies, financial market utilities, or trading markets that connect them directly or indirectly for the purposes of participating in settlement, cross margining, expanding their services to additional instruments or participants, or for any other purposes material to their business.
(9) Model validation means an evaluation of the performance of each material risk management model used by a covered clearing agency (and the related parameters and assumptions associated with such models), including initial margin models, liquidity risk models, and models used to generate clearing or guaranty fund requirements, performed by a qualified person who is free from influence from the persons responsible for the development or operation of the models or policies being validated.
(10) Net capital as used in paragraph (b)(7) of this section means net capital as defined in § 240.15c3–1 for broker-dealers or any similar risk adjusted capital calculation for all other prospective clearing members.
(11) Normal market conditions as used in paragraphs (b)(1) and (2) of this section means conditions in which the expected movement of the price of cleared securities would produce changes in a clearing agency's exposures to its participants that would be expected to breach margin requirements or other risk control mechanisms only one percent of the time.
(12) Participant family means that if a participant directly, or indirectly through one or more intermediaries, controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with, another participant then the affiliated participants shall be collectively deemed to be a single participant family for purposes of paragraphs (b)(3), (d)(14), (e)(4), and (e)(7) of this section.
(13) Potential future exposure means the maximum exposure estimated to occur at a future point in time with an established single-tailed confidence level of at least 99 percent with respect to the estimated distribution of future exposure.
(14) Qualifying liquid resources means, for any covered clearing agency, the following, in each relevant currency:
(i) Cash held either at the central bank of issue or at creditworthy commercial banks;
(ii) Assets that are readily available and convertible into cash through prearranged funding arrangements, such as:
(A) Committed arrangements without material adverse change provisions, including:
(1) Lines of credit;
(2) Foreign exchange swaps; and
(3) Repurchase agreements; or
(B) Other prearranged funding arrangements determined to be highly reliable even in extreme but plausible market conditions by the board of directors of the covered clearing agency following a review conducted for this purpose not less than annually; and
(iii) Other assets that are readily available and eligible for pledging to (or conducting other appropriate forms of transactions with) a relevant central bank, if the covered clearing agency has access to routine credit at such central bank in a jurisdiction that permits said pledges or other transactions by the covered clearing agency.
(15) Security-based swap means a security-based swap as defined in Section 3(a)(68) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(68)).
(16) Sensitivity analysis means an analysis that involves analyzing the sensitivity of a model to its assumptions, parameters, and inputs that:
(i) Considers the impact on the model of both moderate and extreme changes in a wide range of inputs, parameters, and assumptions, including correlations of price movements or returns if relevant, which reflect a variety of historical and hypothetical market conditions;
(ii) Uses actual portfolios and, where applicable, hypothetical portfolios that reflect the characteristics of proprietary positions and customer positions;
(iii) Considers the most volatile relevant periods, where practical, that have been experienced by the markets served by the clearing agency; and
(iv) Tests the sensitivity of the model to stressed market conditions, including the market conditions that may ensue after the default of a member and other extreme but plausible conditions as defined in a covered clearing agency's risk policies.
(17) Stress testing means the estimation of credit or liquidity exposures that would result from the realization of potential stress scenarios, such as extreme price changes, multiple defaults, or changes in other valuation inputs and assumptions.
(18) Systemically important in multiple jurisdictions means, with respect to a covered clearing agency, a covered clearing agency that has been determined by the Commission to be systemically important in more than one jurisdiction pursuant to § 240.17Ab2–2.
(19) Transparent means, for the purposes of paragraphs (e)(1), (2), and (10) of this section, to the extent consistent with other statutory and Commission requirements on confidentiality and disclosure, that documentation required under paragraphs (e)(1), (2), and (10) is disclosed to the Commission and, as appropriate, to other relevant authorities, to clearing members and to customers of clearing members, to the owners of the covered clearing agency, and to the public.
(b) A registered clearing agency that performs central counterparty services shall establish, implement, maintain and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to:
(1) Measure its credit exposures to its participants at least once a day and limit its exposures to potential losses from defaults by its participants under normal market conditions so that the operations of the clearing agency would not be disrupted and non-defaulting participants would not be exposed to losses that they cannot anticipate or control.
(2) Use margin requirements to limit its credit exposures to participants under normal market conditions and use risk-based models and parameters to set margin requirements and review such margin requirements and the related risk-based models and parameters at least monthly.
(3) Maintain sufficient financial resources to withstand, at a minimum, a default by the participant family to which it has the largest exposure in extreme but plausible market conditions; provided that a registered clearing agency acting as a central counterparty for security-based swaps shall maintain additional financial resources sufficient to withstand, at a minimum, a default by the two participant families to which it has the largest exposures in extreme but plausible market conditions, in its capacity as a central counterparty for security-based swaps. Such policies and procedures may provide that the additional financial resources may be maintained by the security-based swap clearing agency generally or in separately maintained funds.
(4) Provide for an annual model validation consisting of evaluating the performance of the clearing agency's margin models and the related parameters and assumptions associated with such models by a qualified person who is free from influence from the persons responsible for the development or operation of the models being validated.
(5) Provide the opportunity for a person that does not perform any dealer or security-based swap dealer services to obtain membership on fair and reasonable terms at the clearing agency to clear securities for itself or on behalf of other persons.
(6) Have membership standards that do not require that participants maintain a portfolio of any minimum size or that participants maintain a minimum transaction volume.
(7) Provide a person that maintains net capital equal to or greater than $50 million with the ability to obtain membership at the clearing agency, provided that such persons are able to comply with other reasonable membership standards, with any net capital requirements being scalable so that they are proportional to the risks posed by the participant's activities to the clearing agency; provided, however, that the clearing agency may provide for a higher net capital requirement as a condition for membership at the clearing agency if the clearing agency demonstrates to the Commission that such a requirement is necessary to mitigate risks that could not otherwise be effectively managed by other measures and the Commission approves the higher net capital requirement as part of a rule filing or clearing agency registration application.
(c) Record of financial resources and annual audited financial statements.
(1) Each fiscal quarter (based on calculations made as of the last business day of the clearing agency's fiscal quarter), or at any time upon Commission request, a registered clearing agency that performs central counterparty services shall calculate and maintain a record, in accordance with § 240.17a–1 of this chapter, of the financial and qualifying liquid resources necessary to meet the requirements, as applicable, of paragraphs (b)(3), (e)(4), and (e)(7) of this section, and sufficient documentation to explain the methodology it uses to compute such financial resources or qualifying liquid resources requirement.
(2) Within 60 days after the end of its fiscal year, each registered clearing agency shall post on its Web site its annual audited financial statements. Such financial statements shall:
(i) Include, for the clearing agency and its subsidiaries, consolidated balance sheets as of the end of the two most recent fiscal years and statements of income, changes in stockholders' equity and other comprehensive income and cash flows for each of the two most recent fiscal years;
(ii) Be prepared in accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles, except that for a clearing agency that is a corporation or other organization incorporated or organized under the laws of any foreign country the consolidated financial statements may be prepared in accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles or International Financial Reporting Standards as issued by the International Accounting Standards Board;
(iii) Be audited in accordance with standards of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board by a registered public accounting firm that is qualified and independent in accordance with 17 CFR 210.2–01; and
(iv) Include a report of the registered public accounting firm that complies with paragraphs (a) through (d) of 17 CFR 210.2–02.
(d) Each registered clearing agency that is not a covered clearing agency shall establish, implement, maintain and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to, as applicable:
(1) Provide for a well-founded, transparent, and enforceable legal framework for each aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.
(2) Require participants to have sufficient financial resources and robust operational capacity to meet obligations arising from participation in the clearing agency; have procedures in place to monitor that participation requirements are met on an ongoing basis; and have participation requirements that are objective and publicly disclosed, and permit fair and open access.
(3) Hold assets in a manner that minimizes risk of loss or of delay in its access to them; and invest assets in instruments with minimal credit, market and liquidity risks.
(4) Identify sources of operational risk and minimize them through the development of appropriate systems, controls, and procedures; implement systems that are reliable, resilient and secure, and have adequate, scalable capacity; and have business continuity plans that allow for timely recovery of operations and fulfillment of a clearing agency's obligations.
(5) Employ money settlement arrangements that eliminate or strictly limit the clearing agency's settlement bank risks, that is, its credit and liquidity risks from the use of banks to effect money settlements with its participants; and require funds transfers to the clearing agency to be final when effected.
(6) Be cost-effective in meeting the requirements of participants while maintaining safe and secure operations.
(7) Evaluate the potential sources of risks that can arise when the clearing agency establishes links either cross-border or domestically to clear or settle trades, and ensure that the risks are managed prudently on an ongoing basis.
(8) Have governance arrangements that are clear and transparent to fulfill the public interest requirements in Section 17A of the Act (15 U.S.C. 78q–1) applicable to clearing agencies, to support the objectives of owners and participants, and to promote the effectiveness of the clearing agency's risk management procedures.
(9) Provide market participants with sufficient information for them to identify and evaluate the risks and costs associated with using its services.
(10) Immobilize or dematerialize securities certificates and transfer them by book entry to the greatest extent possible when the clearing agency provides central securities depository services.
(11) Make key aspects of the clearing agency's default procedures publicly available and establish default procedures that ensure that the clearing agency can take timely action to contain losses and liquidity pressures and to continue meeting its obligations in the event of a participant default.
(12) Ensure that final settlement occurs no later than the end of the settlement day; and require that intraday or real-time finality be provided where necessary to reduce risks.
(13) Eliminate principal risk by linking securities transfers to funds transfers in a way that achieves delivery versus payment.
(14) Institute risk controls, including collateral requirements and limits to cover the clearing agency's credit exposure to each participant family exposure fully, that ensure timely settlement in the event that the participant with the largest payment obligation is unable to settle when the clearing agency provides central securities depository services and extends intraday credit to participants.
(15) State to its participants the clearing agency's obligations with respect to physical deliveries and identify and manage the risks from these obligations.
(e) Each covered clearing agency shall establish, implement, maintain and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to, as applicable:
(1) Provide for a well-founded, clear, transparent, and enforceable legal basis for each aspect of its activities in all relevant jurisdictions.
(2) Provide for governance arrangements that:
(i) Are clear and transparent;
(ii) Clearly prioritize the safety and efficiency of the covered clearing agency;
(iii) Support the public interest requirements in Section 17A of the Act (15 U.S.C. 78q–1) applicable to clearing agencies, and the objectives of owners and participants;
(iv) Establish that the board of directors and senior management have appropriate experience and skills to discharge their duties and responsibilities;
(v) Specify clear and direct lines of responsibility; and
(vi) Consider the interests of participants' customers, securities issuers and holders, and other relevant stakeholders of the covered clearing agency.
(3) Maintain a sound risk management framework for comprehensively managing legal, credit, liquidity, operational, general business, investment, custody, and other risks that arise in or are borne by the covered clearing agency, which:
(i) Includes risk management policies, procedures, and systems designed to identify, measure, monitor, and manage the range of risks that arise in or are borne by the covered clearing agency, that are subject to review on a specified periodic basis and approved by the board of directors annually;
(ii) Includes plans for the recovery and orderly wind-down of the covered clearing agency necessitated by credit losses, liquidity shortfalls, losses from general business risk, or any other losses;
(iii) Provides risk management and internal audit personnel with sufficient authority, resources, independence from management, and access to the board of directors;
(iv) Provides risk management and internal audit personnel with a direct reporting line to, and oversight by, a risk management committee and an independent audit committee of the board of directors, respectively; and
(v) Provides for an independent audit committee.
(4) Effectively identify, measure, monitor, and manage its credit exposures to participants and those arising from its payment, clearing, and settlement processes, including by:
(i) Maintaining sufficient financial resources to cover its credit exposure to each participant fully with a high degree of confidence;
(ii) To the extent not already maintained pursuant to paragraph (e)(4)(i) of this section, for a covered clearing agency providing central counterparty services that is either systemically important in multiple jurisdictions or a clearing agency involved in activities with a more complex risk profile, maintaining additional financial resources at the minimum to enable it to cover a wide range of foreseeable stress scenarios that include, but are not limited to, the default of the two participant families that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure for the covered clearing agency in extreme but plausible market conditions;
(iii) To the extent not already maintained pursuant to paragraph (e)(4)(i) of this section, for a covered clearing agency not subject to paragraph (e)(4)(ii) of this section, maintaining additional financial resources at the minimum to enable it to cover a wide range of foreseeable stress scenarios that include, but are not limited to, the default of the participant family that would potentially cause the largest aggregate credit exposure for the covered clearing agency in extreme but plausible market conditions;
(iv) Including prefunded financial resources, exclusive of assessments for additional guaranty fund contributions or other resources that are not prefunded, when calculating the financial resources available to meet the standards under paragraphs (e)(4)(i) through (iii) of this section, as applicable;
(v) Maintaining the financial resources required under paragraphs (e)(4)(ii) and (iii) of this section, as applicable, in combined or separately maintained clearing or guaranty funds;
(vi) Testing the sufficiency of its total financial resources available to meet the minimum financial resource requirements under paragraphs (e)(4)(i) through (iii) of this section, as applicable, by:
(A) Conducting stress testing of its total financial resources once each day using standard predetermined parameters and assumptions;
(B) Conducting a comprehensive analysis on at least a monthly basis of the existing stress testing scenarios, models, and underlying parameters and assumptions, and considering modifications to ensure they are appropriate for determining the covered clearing agency's required level of default protection in light of current and evolving market conditions;
(C) Conducting a comprehensive analysis of stress testing scenarios, models, and underlying parameters and assumptions more frequently than monthly when the products cleared or markets served display high volatility or become less liquid, or when the size or concentration of positions held by the covered clearing agency's participants increases significantly; and
(D) Reporting the results of its analyses under paragraphs (e)(4)(vi)(B) and (C) of this section to appropriate decision makers at the covered clearing agency, including but not limited to, its risk management committee or board of directors, and using these results to evaluate the adequacy of and adjust its margin methodology, model parameters, models used to generate clearing or guaranty fund requirements, and any other relevant aspects of its credit risk management framework, in supporting compliance with the minimum financial resources requirements set forth in paragraphs (e)(4)(i) through (iii) of this section;
(vii) Performing a model validation for its credit risk models not less than annually or more frequently as may be contemplated by the covered clearing agency's risk management framework established pursuant to paragraph (e)(3) of this section;
(viii) Addressing allocation of credit losses the covered clearing agency may face if its collateral and other resources are insufficient to fully cover its credit exposures, including the repayment of any funds the covered clearing agency may borrow from liquidity providers; and
(ix) Describing the covered clearing agency's process to replenish any financial resources it may use following a default or other event in which use of such resources is contemplated.
(5) Limit the assets it accepts as collateral to those with low credit, liquidity, and market risks, and set and enforce appropriately conservative haircuts and concentration limits if the covered clearing agency requires collateral to manage its or its participants' credit exposure; and require a review of the sufficiency of its collateral haircuts and concentration limits to be performed not less than annually.
(6) Cover, if the covered clearing agency provides central counterparty services, its credit exposures to its participants by establishing a risk-based margin system that, at a minimum:
(i) Considers, and produces margin levels commensurate with, the risks and particular attributes of each relevant product, portfolio, and market;
(ii) Marks participant positions to market and collects margin, including variation margin or equivalent charges if relevant, at least daily and includes the authority and operational capacity to make intraday margin calls in defined circumstances;
(iii) Calculates margin sufficient to cover its potential future exposure to participants in the interval between the last margin collection and the close out of positions following a participant default;
(iv) Uses reliable sources of timely price data and uses procedures and sound valuation models for addressing circumstances in which pricing data are not readily available or reliable;
(v) Uses an appropriate method for measuring credit exposure that accounts for relevant product risk factors and portfolio effects across products;
(vi) Is monitored by management on an ongoing basis and is regularly reviewed, tested, and verified by:
(A) Conducting backtests of its margin model at least once each day using standard predetermined parameters and assumptions;
(B) Conducting a sensitivity analysis of its margin model and a review of its parameters and assumptions for backtesting on at least a monthly basis, and considering modifications to ensure the backtesting practices are appropriate for determining the adequacy of the covered clearing agency's margin resources;
(C) Conducting a sensitivity analysis of its margin model and a review of its parameters and assumptions for backtesting more frequently than monthly during periods of time when the products cleared or markets served display high volatility or become less liquid, or when the size or concentration of positions held by the covered clearing agency's participants increases or decreases significantly; and
(D) Reporting the results of its analyses under paragraphs (e)(6)(vi)(B) and (C) of this section to appropriate decision makers at the covered clearing agency, including but not limited to, its risk management committee or board of directors, and using these results to evaluate the adequacy of and adjust its margin methodology, model parameters, and any other relevant aspects of its credit risk management framework; and
(vii) Requires a model validation for the covered clearing agency's margin system and related models to be performed not less than annually, or more frequently as may be contemplated by the covered clearing agency's risk management framework established pursuant to paragraph (e)(3) of this section.
(7) Effectively measure, monitor, and manage the liquidity risk that arises in or is borne by the covered clearing agency, including measuring, monitoring, and managing its settlement and funding flows on an ongoing and timely basis, and its use of intraday liquidity by, at a minimum, doing the following:
(i) Maintaining sufficient liquid resources at the minimum in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of foreseeable stress scenarios that includes, but is not limited to, the default of the participant family that would generate the largest aggregate payment obligation for the covered clearing agency in extreme but plausible market conditions;
(ii) Holding qualifying liquid resources sufficient to meet the minimum liquidity resource requirement under paragraph (e)(7)(i) of this section in each relevant currency for which the covered clearing agency has payment obligations owed to clearing members;
(iii) Using the access to accounts and services at a Federal Reserve Bank, pursuant to Section 806(a) of the Payment, Clearing, and Settlement Supervision Act of 2010 (12 U.S.C. 5465(a)), or other relevant central bank, when available and where determined to be practical by the board of directors of the covered clearing agency, to enhance its management of liquidity risk;
(iv) Undertaking due diligence to confirm that it has a reasonable basis to believe each of its liquidity providers, whether or not such liquidity provider is a clearing member, has:
(A) Sufficient information to understand and manage the liquidity provider's liquidity risks; and
(B) The capacity to perform as required under its commitments to provide liquidity to the covered clearing agency;
(v) Maintaining and testing with each liquidity provider, to the extent practicable, the covered clearing agency's procedures and operational capacity for accessing each type of relevant liquidity resource under paragraph (e)(7)(i) of this section at least annually;
(vi) Determining the amount and regularly testing the sufficiency of the liquid resources held for purposes of meeting the minimum liquid resource requirement under paragraph (e)(7)(i) of this section by, at a minimum:
(A) Conducting stress testing of its liquidity resources at least once each day using standard and predetermined parameters and assumptions;
(B) Conducting a comprehensive analysis on at least a monthly basis of the existing stress testing scenarios, models, and underlying parameters and assumptions used in evaluating liquidity needs and resources, and considering modifications to ensure they are appropriate for determining the clearing agency's identified liquidity needs and resources in light of current and evolving market conditions;
(C) Conducting a comprehensive analysis of the scenarios, models, and underlying parameters and assumptions used in evaluating liquidity needs and resources more frequently than monthly when the products cleared or markets served display high volatility or become less liquid, when the size or concentration of positions held by the clearing agency's participants increases significantly, or in other appropriate circumstances described in such policies and procedures; and
(D) Reporting the results of its analyses under paragraphs (e)(7)(vi)(B) and (C) of this section to appropriate decision makers at the covered clearing agency, including but not limited to, its risk management committee or board of directors, and using these results to evaluate the adequacy of and adjust its liquidity risk management methodology, model parameters, and any other relevant aspects of its liquidity risk management framework;
(vii) Performing a model validation of its liquidity risk models not less than annually or more frequently as may be contemplated by the covered clearing agency's risk management framework established pursuant to paragraph (e)(3) of this section;
(viii) Addressing foreseeable liquidity shortfalls that would not be covered by the covered clearing agency's liquid resources and seek to avoid unwinding, revoking, or delaying the same-day settlement of payment obligations;
(ix) Describing the covered clearing agency's process to replenish any liquid resources that the clearing agency may employ during a stress event; and
(x) Undertaking an analysis at least once a year that evaluates the feasibility of maintaining sufficient liquid resources at a minimum in all relevant currencies to effect same-day and, where appropriate, intraday and multiday settlement of payment obligations with a high degree of confidence under a wide range of foreseeable stress scenarios that includes, but is not limited to, the default of the two participant families that would potentially cause the largest aggregate payment obligation for the covered clearing agency in extreme but plausible market conditions if the covered clearing agency provides central counterparty services and is either systemically important in multiple jurisdictions or a clearing agency involved in activities with a more complex risk profile.
(8) Define the point at which settlement is final to be no later than the end of the day on which the payment or obligation is due and, where necessary or appropriate, intraday or in real time.
(9) Conduct its money settlements in central bank money, where available and determined to be practical by the board of directors of the covered clearing agency, and minimize and manage credit and liquidity risk arising from conducting its money settlements in commercial bank money if central bank money is not used by the covered clearing agency.
(10) Establish and maintain transparent written standards that state its obligations with respect to the delivery of physical instruments, and establish and maintain operational practices that identify, monitor, and manage the risks associated with such physical deliveries.
(11) When the covered clearing agency provides central securities depository services:
(i) Maintain securities in an immobilized or dematerialized form for their transfer by book entry, ensure the integrity of securities issues, and minimize and manage the risks associated with the safekeeping and transfer of securities;
(ii) Implement internal auditing and other controls to safeguard the rights of securities issuers and holders and prevent the unauthorized creation or deletion of securities, and conduct periodic and at least daily reconciliation of securities issues it maintains; and
(iii) Protect assets against custody risk through appropriate rules and procedures consistent with relevant laws, rules, and regulations in jurisdictions where it operates.
(12) Eliminate principal risk by conditioning the final settlement of one obligation upon the final settlement of the other, regardless of whether the covered clearing agency settles on a gross or net basis and when finality occurs if the covered clearing agency settles transactions that involve the settlement of two linked obligations.
(13) Ensure the covered clearing agency has the authority and operational capacity to take timely action to contain losses and liquidity demands and continue to meet its obligations by, at a minimum, requiring the covered clearing agency's participants and, when practicable, other stakeholders to participate in the testing and review of its default procedures, including any close-out procedures, at least annually and following material changes thereto.
(14) Enable, when the covered clearing agency provides central counterparty services for security-based swaps or engages in activities that the Commission has determined to have a more complex risk profile, the segregation and portability of positions of a participant's customers and the collateral provided to the covered clearing agency with respect to those positions and effectively protect such positions and related collateral from the default or insolvency of that participant.
(15) Identify, monitor, and manage the covered clearing agency's general business risk and hold sufficient liquid net assets funded by equity to cover potential general business losses so that the covered clearing agency can continue operations and services as a going concern if those losses materialize, including by:
(i) Determining the amount of liquid net assets funded by equity based upon its general business risk profile and the length of time required to achieve a recovery or orderly wind-down, as appropriate, of its critical operations and services if such action is taken;
(ii) Holding liquid net assets funded by equity equal to the greater of either (x) six months of the covered clearing agency's current operating expenses, or (y) the amount determined by the board of directors to be sufficient to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-down of critical operations and services of the covered clearing agency, as contemplated by the plans established under paragraph (e)(3)(ii) of this section, and which:
(A) Shall be in addition to resources held to cover participant defaults or other risks covered under the credit risk standard in paragraph (b)(3) or paragraphs (e)(4)(i) through (iii) of this section, as applicable, and the liquidity risk standard in paragraphs (e)(7)(i) and (ii) of this section; and
(B) Shall be of high quality and sufficiently liquid to allow the covered clearing agency to meet its current and projected operating expenses under a range of scenarios, including in adverse market conditions; and
(iii) Maintaining a viable plan, approved by the board of directors and updated at least annually, for raising additional equity should its equity fall close to or below the amount required under paragraph (e)(15)(ii) of this section.
(16) Safeguard the covered clearing agency's own and its participants' assets, minimize the risk of loss and delay in access to these assets, and invest such assets in instruments with minimal credit, market, and liquidity risks.
(17) Manage the covered clearing agency's operational risks by:
(i) Identifying the plausible sources of operational risk, both internal and external, and mitigating their impact through the use of appropriate systems, policies, procedures, and controls;
(ii) Ensuring that systems have a high degree of security, resiliency, operational reliability, and adequate, scalable capacity; and
(iii) Establishing and maintaining a business continuity plan that addresses events posing a significant risk of disrupting operations.
(18) Establish objective, risk-based, and publicly disclosed criteria for participation, which permit fair and open access by direct and, where relevant, indirect participants and other financial market utilities, require participants to have sufficient financial resources and robust operational capacity to meet obligations arising from participation in the clearing agency, and monitor compliance with such participation requirements on an ongoing basis.
(19) Identify, monitor, and manage the material risks to the covered clearing agency arising from arrangements in which firms that are indirect participants in the covered clearing agency rely on the services provided by direct participants to access the covered clearing agency's payment, clearing, or settlement facilities.
(20) Identify, monitor, and manage risks related to any link the covered clearing agency establishes with one or more other clearing agencies, financial market utilities, or trading markets.
(21) Be efficient and effective in meeting the requirements of its participants and the markets it serves, and have the covered clearing agency's management regularly review the efficiency and effectiveness of its:
(i) Clearing and settlement arrangements;
(ii) Operating structure, including risk management policies, procedures, and systems;
(iii) Scope of products cleared or settled; and
(iv) Use of technology and communication procedures.
(22) Use, or at a minimum accommodate, relevant internationally accepted communication procedures and standards in order to facilitate efficient payment, clearing, and settlement.
(23) Provide for the following:
(i) Publicly disclosing all relevant rules and material procedures, including key aspects of its default rules and procedures;
(ii) Providing sufficient information to enable participants to identify and evaluate the risks, fees, and other material costs they incur by participating in the covered clearing agency;
(iii) Publicly disclosing relevant basic data on transaction volume and values;
(iv) A comprehensive public disclosure that describes its material rules, policies, and procedures regarding its legal, governance, risk management, and operating framework, accurate in all material respects at the time of publication, that includes:
(A) Executive summary. An executive summary of the key points from paragraphs (e)(23)(iv)(B), (C), and (D) of this section;
(B) Summary of material changes since the last update of the disclosure. A summary of the material changes since the last update of paragraph (e)(23)(iv)(C) or (D) of this section;
(C) General background on the covered clearing agency. A description of:
(1) The covered clearing agency's function and the markets it serves;
(2) Basic data and performance statistics on the covered clearing agency's services and operations, such as basic volume and value statistics by product type, average aggregate intraday exposures to its participants, and statistics on the covered clearing agency's operational reliability; and
(3) The covered clearing agency's general organization, legal and regulatory framework, and system design and operations; and
(D) Standard-by-standard summary narrative. A comprehensive narrative disclosure for each applicable standard set forth in paragraphs (e)(1) through (23) of this section with sufficient detail and context to enable a reader to understand the covered clearing agency's approach to controlling the risks and addressing the requirements in each standard; and
(v) Updating the public disclosure under paragraph (e)(23)(iv) of this section every two years, or more frequently following changes to its system or the environment in which it operates to the extent necessary to ensure statements previously provided under paragraph (e)(23)(iv) of this section remain accurate in all material respects.
(f) For purposes of enforcing the Payment, Clearing, and Settlement Supervision Act of 2010 (12 U.S.C. 5461 et seq.), a designated clearing agency for which the Commission acts as supervisory agency shall be subject to, and the Commission shall have the authority under, the provisions of paragraphs (b) through (n) of Section 8 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1818) in the same manner and to the same extent as if such designated clearing agency were an insured depository institution and the Commission were the appropriate Federal banking agency for such insured depository institution.