32 CFR 320.12 - Exemptions.
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(a) Exempt systems of record. All systems of records maintained by the NGA and its components shall be exempt from the requirements of 5 U.S.C. 552a(d) pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1) to the extent that the system contains any information properly classified under Executive Order 12958 and that is required by Executive Order to be withheld in the interest of national defense or foreign policy. This exemption is applicable to parts of all systems of records, including those not otherwise specifically designated for exemptions herein, which contain isolated items of properly classified information.
(i) Investigative material compiled for law enforcement purposes may be exempt pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2). However, if an individual is denied any right, privilege, or benefit for which he would otherwise be entitled by Federal law or for which he would otherwise be eligible, as a result of the maintenance of such information, the individual will be provided access to such information except to the extent that disclosure would reveal the identity of a confidential source.
(ii) Investigative material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for federal civilian employment, military service, federal contracts, or access to classified information may be exempt pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(5), but only to the extent that such material would reveal the identity of a confidential source.
(iii) Therefore, portions of this system of records may be exempt pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2) and/or (k)(5) from the following subsections of 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1), (e)(4)(G), (H) and (I), and (f).
(2) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2) and (k)(5).
(i) From subsection (c)(3) because to grant access to the accounting for each disclosure as required by the Privacy Act, including the date, nature, and purpose of each disclosure and the identity of the recipient, could alert the subject to the existence of the investigation or prosecutable interest by the NGA or other agencies. This could seriously compromise case preparation by prematurely revealing its existence and nature; compromise or interfere with witnesses or make witnesses reluctant to cooperate; and lead to suppression, alteration, or destruction of evidence.
(ii) From subsections (d) and (f) because providing access to investigative records and the right to contest the contents of those records and force changes to be made to the information contained therein would seriously interfere with and thwart the orderly and unbiased conduct of the investigation and impede case preparation. Providing access rights normally afforded under the Privacy Act would provide the subject with valuable information that would allow interference with or compromise of witnesses or render witnesses reluctant to cooperate; lead to suppression, alteration, or destruction of evidence; enable individuals to conceal their wrongdoing or mislead the course of the investigation; and result in the secreting of or other disposition of assets that would make them difficult or impossible to reach in order to satisfy any Government claim growing out of the investigation or proceeding.
(iii) From subsection (e)(1) because it is not always possible to detect the relevance or necessity of each piece of information in the early stages of an investigation. In some cases, it is only after the information is evaluated in light of other evidence that its relevance and necessity will be clear.
(iv) From subsections (e)(4)(G) and (H) because this system of records is compiled for investigative purposes and is exempt from the access provisions of subsections (d) and (f).
(v) From subsection (e)(4)(I) because to the extent that this provision is construed to require more detailed disclosure than the broad, generic information currently published in the system notice, an exemption from this provision is necessary to protect the confidentiality of sources of information and to protect privacy and physical safety of witnesses and informants. NGA will, nevertheless, continue to publish such a notice in broad generic terms, as is its current practice.
(vi) Consistent with the legislative purpose of the Privacy Act of 1974, NGA will grant access to nonexempt material in the records being maintained. Disclosure will be governed by NGA's Privacy Regulation, but will be limited to the extent that the identity of confidential sources will not be compromised; subjects of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal or civil violation will not be alerted to the investigation; the physical safety of witnesses, informants and law enforcement personnel will not be endangered; the privacy of third parties will not be violated; and that the disclosure would not otherwise impede effective law enforcement. Whenever possible, information of the above nature will be deleted from the requested documents and the balance made available. The controlling principle behind this limited access is to allow disclosures except those indicated in this paragraph. The decisions to release information from these systems will be made on a case-by-case basis.
Effective Date Note:
At 78 FR 32555, May 31, 2013, § 320.12 was amended by adding paragraph (c), effective July 30, 2013. For the convenience of the user, the added text is set forth as follows:
§ 320.12 Exemptions.
(c) System identifier and name: NGA-004, NGA Threat Mitigation Records.
(1) Exemptions: Exempt materials from JUSTICE/FBI-019 Terrorist Screening Records System may become part of the case records in this system of records. To the extent that copies of exempt records from JUSTICE/FBI-019, Terrorist Screening Records System are entered into these Threat Mitigation case records, NGA hereby claims the same exemptions (j)(2) and (k)(2), for the records as claimed in JUSTICE/FBI-019, Terrorist Screening Records system of records of which they are a part.
(2) Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) and (k)(2).
(3) Reasons: (i)Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) and (k)(2), NGA is claiming the following exemptions for certain records within the Threat Mitigation Records system: 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (4); (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4); (e)(1), (2), (3), (4)(G) through (I), (5), and (8); (f), and (g).
(ii) In addition to records under the control of NGA, the Threat Mitigation system of records may include records originating from systems of records of other law enforcement and intelligence agencies which may be exempt from certain provisions of the Privacy Act. However, NGA does not assert exemption to any provisions of the Privacy Act with respect to information submitted by or on behalf of individuals.
(iii) To the extent the Threat Mitigation system contains records originating from other systems of records, NGA will rely on the exemptions claimed for those records in the originating system of records. Exemptions for certain records within the Threat Mitigation system from particular subsections of the Privacy Act are justified for the following reasons:
(A) From subsection (c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosures) because giving a record subject access to the accounting of disclosures from records concerning him or her could reveal investigative interest on the part of the recipient agency that obtained the record pursuant to a routine use. Disclosure of the accounting could therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts on the part of the recipient agency because the individual who is the subject of the record would learn of third agency investigative interests and could take steps to evade detection or apprehension. Disclosure of the accounting also could reveal the details of watch list matching measures under the Threat Mitigation system, as well as capabilities and vulnerabilities of the watch list matching process, the release of which could permit an individual to evade future detection and thereby impede efforts to ensure security.
(B) From subsection (c)(4) because portions of this system are exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d).
(C) From subsections (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4) because these provisions concern individual access to and amendment of certain records contained in this system, including law enforcement counterterrorism, investigatory and intelligence records. Compliance with these provisions could alert the subject of an investigation of the fact and nature of the investigation, and/or the investigative interest of intelligence or law enforcement agencies; compromise sensitive information related to national security; interfere with the overall law enforcement process by leading to the destruction of evidence, improper influencing of witnesses, fabrication of testimony, and/or flight of the subject; identify a confidential source or disclose information which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of another's personal privacy; reveal a sensitive investigative or intelligence technique; or constitute a potential danger to the health or safety of law enforcement personnel, confidential informants, and witnesses. Amendment of these records would interfere with ongoing counterterrorism, law enforcement, or intelligence investigations and analysis activities and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring investigations, analyses, and reports to be continuously reinvestigated and revised.
(D) From subsection (e)(1) because it is not always possible for NGA or other agencies to know in advance what information is both relevant and necessary for it to complete an identity comparison between individuals and a known or suspected terrorist. In addition, because NGA and other agencies may not always know what information about an encounter with a known or suspected terrorist will be relevant to law enforcement for the purpose of conducting an operational response.
(E) From subsection (e)(2) because application of this provision could present a serious impediment to counterterrorism, law enforcement, or intelligence efforts in that it would put the subject of an investigation, study or analysis on notice of that fact, thereby permitting the subject to engage in conduct designed to frustrate or impede that activity. The nature of counterterrorism, law enforcement, or intelligence investigations is such that vital information about an individual frequently can be obtained only from other persons who are familiar with such individual and his/her activities. In such investigations, it is not feasible to rely upon information furnished by the individual concerning his own activities.
(F) From subsection (e)(3), to the extent that this subsection is interpreted to require NGA to provide notice to an individual if NGA or another agency receives or collects information about that individual during an investigation or from a third party. Should the subsection be so interpreted, exemption from this provision is necessary to avoid impeding counterterrorism, law enforcement, or intelligence efforts by putting the subject of an investigation, study or analysis on notice of that fact, thereby permitting the subject to engage in conduct intended to frustrate or impede that activity.
(G) From subsections (e)(4)(G) and (H) (Agency Requirements) and (f) (Agency Rules), because this system is exempt from the access provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(d).
(H) From subsection (e)(5) because many of the records in this system coming from other system of records are derived from other agency record systems and therefore it is not possible for NGA to ensure their compliance with this provision, however, NGA has implemented internal quality assurance procedures to ensure that data used in the matching process is as thorough, accurate, and current as possible. In addition, in the collection of information for law enforcement, counterterrorism, and intelligence purposes, it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely, and complete. With the passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may acquire new significance as further investigation brings new details to light. The restrictions imposed by (e)(5) would limit the ability of those agencies' trained investigators and intelligence analysts to exercise their judgment in conducting investigations and impede the development of intelligence necessary for effective law enforcement and counterterrorism efforts. However, NGA has implemented internal quality assurance procedures to ensure that the data used in the matching process is as thorough, accurate, and current as possible.
(I) From subsection (e)(8) because to require individual notice of disclosure of information due to compulsory legal process would pose an impossible administrative burden on NGA and other agencies and could alert the subjects of counterterrorism, law enforcement, or intelligence investigations to the fact of those investigations when not previously known.
(J) From subsection (f) (Agency Rules) because portions of this system are exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d).
(K) From subsection (g) to the extent that the system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act.
Title 32 published on 2014-07-01
no entries appear in the Federal Register after this date.