. . . .
¶3. At the time of injury, claimant's average weekly wage was $ 475, and her resulting weekly workers' compensation benefit was $ 317. During the period between her injury and the Commissioner's compensation decision, she received a cost of living adjustment to her temporary benefits every July 1 as mandated by 21 V.S.A. § 650(d). As a result, she was receiving weekly compensation of $ 469 from July 1, 2001 through June 30, 2002. In July 2002, the annual cost of living adjustment would have increased her benefit to $ 489, an amount in excess of her $ 475 average weekly wage at the time of her injury. Defendant's insurance carrier refused to increase claimant's benefit. Claimant submitted the question to the Commissioner in a motion for summary judgment, arguing that she was entitled to continuedyearly increases under 21 V.S.A. § 650(d) irrespective of whether her benefit amount exceeded her average weekly wage at the time of her injury. The Commissioner denied the motion, and claimant appealed. On appeal, the Commissioner submitted the following certified question: "Did the Department of Labor and Industry err in its interpretation of 21 V.S.A. § 650(d) in concluding that a permanent total disability claimant's weekly compensation rate could not exceed her average weekly wage?" We answer this question in the affirmative.
¶4. This appeal involves a question of law, and "if the Commissioner's conclusions are supported by the findings and reflect the correct interpretation of the law, we will affirm the Commissioner's decision." Butler v. Huttig Bldg. Prods., 2003 VT 48, ¶ 9, 175 Vt. 323, 830 A.2d 44. Further, we will defer to the Commissioner's construction of the Workers' Compensation Act, "absent a compelling indication of error." Wood v. Fletcher Allen Health Care, 169 Vt. 419, 422, 739 A.2d 1201, 1204 (1999). Even under our deferential standard, we conclude that the Commissioner's decision in this case is not supported by the findings and reflects an unjust and unreasonable interpretation of the law. See Clodgo v. Rentavision, Inc., 166 Vt. 548, 550, 701 A.2d 1044, 1045 (1997) (noting that we will not affirm an unjust interpretation).
. . . .
¶9. Defendant relies upon 21 V.S.A. § 601(19), arguing that "under the plain meaning of [that section] the claimant's workers' compensation benefit is capped at the full amount of her average weekly wage." . . . . Defendant's plain meaning argument is apparently based on the second sentence of the section. That sentence applies, however, only "where the employee's average weekly wage computed under section 650 of this title is lower than the minimum weekly compensation." At the time of injury, claimant's average weekly wage was $ 475 per week and, as conceded by defendant's counsel at oral argument, was above the minimum weekly compensation then in effect. Indeed, even if this statute were construed to apply beyond initial calculation of the compensation rate, claimant's average weekly wage of $ 475 continues to be higher than the current minimum of $ 305. Workers' Compensation Rule 16.1000, 3 Code of Vermont Rules 24 010 003-17 to -18 (2004), available at http://www.state.vt.us/labind/wcomp/Rule16.rates.htm (last modified Nov. 18, 2004) [hereinafter Workers' Compensation Rule].
. . . .
CITATIONS
(a) Form of Opinions. All opinions issued by the Supreme Court on or after January 1, 2003, will be sequentially numbered within the year of issuance, beginning with the number "1". Within each opinion, each paragraph will be numbered, beginning with the number "1". Any official or unofficial publication of an opinion issued after January 1, 2003, must include the sequential number of the opinion in the caption of the opinion and the paragraph numbers in the body of the text.
(b) Citation of Vermont Opinions. The citation of any opinion of the Vermont Supreme Court issued on or after January 1, 2003, must, immediately after the title of the case, indicate the year of issuance in four digits followed by the abbreviation "VT" and must include the sequential opinion number, followed by citations to the official and unofficial print reporters. Pinpoint citations may be made only by reference to the paragraph numbers in the body of the text. Citations must be made in the following style: Smith v. Jones, 2001 VT 1, ¶ 12, 169 Vt. 203, 850 A.2d 421.
(c) Citation of Other Opinions. An opinion of any other court that has been published with sequential and paragraph numbering similar to that required by subdivision (a) of this rule must be cited in a form similar to that provided in subdivision (b).
(d) Citation of Unpublished Judicial Dispositions Permitted. A party may cite any unpublished judicial opinion, order, judgment, or other written disposition notwithstanding that it may have been designated as "unpublished," "not for publication," "non-precedential," "not precedent," or the like. If a party cites such an unpublished judicial opinion, order, judgment, or other written disposition, the party must file and serve a copy of that opinion, order, judgment, or disposition with the brief or other paper in which it is cited.