1.2 Rule 1.2 Scope of Representation
The Arkansas Rule is the same as the Model Rule.
The comparison accepted by the Arkansas Supreme Court is identical to the comparison in the Model Rules.
See 1.1:320.
Arkansas has no case law or authority on this topic.
See 1.16:200.
See 1.1:380.
See 1.1:300.
See 1.4:200.
See 1.16:210.
The essence of AR Rule 1.2(a) is that the client should decide the objectives of representation, issues involving substantial matters, issues of particular concern to the individual client, and the ultimate resolution of the representation.
Without an express grant of authority by the client, the attorney can not alter the terms of a contract, grant an extension of time under the contract, waive a forfeiture, or act beyond the scope of his actual or apparent authority. Ashworth v. Hankins, 248 Ark. 567, 452 S.W.2d 838 (1970).
As to procedural matters, the attorney's contract of employment constitutes sufficient authority for him to take the procedural steps that he deems necessary and proper to pursue or defend the claim. Walker v. Stephens, 3 Ark. App. 205, 626 S.W.2d 200 (1981). The attorney's authority to act outside procedural bounds is controlled by the facts of each case. Rowland v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., 13 Ark. App. 139, 680 S.W.2d 726 (1984). For example, although an attorney has no implied authority to enter into a compromise agreement of a dispute, when the client gives the attorney specific authority to enter into a compromise, such an agreement is valid and binding on the client. Veasey v. Joshlin, 257 Ark. 422, 516 S.W.2d 596 (1974).
An attorney who directs his client to disregard a court order may be held in contempt. Davis v. Goodson, 276 Ark. 337, 635 S.W.2d 226 (1982). The attorney may, however, challenge the order if done openly and in good faith.
For a discussion of ethically advising a client in bankruptcy matters, see Robert Laurence, In re Holt and the Re-making of Arkansas Exemption Law: Commentary after the Rout, 43 ARK. L. REV. 235, 243-247 (1990); J. Thomas Hardin, Conversion of Nonexempt Property to Exempt Property on the Eve of Bankruptcy in Arkansas, 10 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 719, 746-752 (1988). See generally Richard K. Burke, "Truth in Lawyering": An Essay on Lying and Deceit in the Practice of the law, 38 ARK. L. REV. 1 (1984).
The rules of agency apply to the relationship of attorney and client. Henry v. Gaines-Derden Enterprises, Inc., 314 Ark. 542, 863 S.W. 2d 828 (1993). In the absence of fraud, the client is bound by the acts or omissions of the attorney acting within the scope of his authority, whether express or implied, apparent or ostensible. Peterson v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., 296 Ark. 201, 753 S. W. 2d 278 (1988). Likewise, a client is bound by the actions of the attorney in matters in which the attorney is the spokesman for the client. Barnes v. Barnes, 311 Ark. 287, 843 S.W.2d 835 (1992) (attorney agreed that blood test would be admissible in evidence). The authority of the attorney to bind the client is typically a question of fact. Henry v. Gaines-Derden Enterprises, Inc., 314 Ark. 542, 863 S.W. 2d 828 (1993) (issue as to periodic payments made to attorney).
The negligent acts of the attorney are treated as the negligent act of the client. Self v. Self, 319 Ark. 632, 893 S.W. 2d 775 (1995) (attorney's failure to challenge voidable divorce decree barred client's challenge 24 years later). The client is bound by the failure of the attorney to file pleadings or take a timely appeal. For example, Allen v. Routon, 57 Ark. App. 137, 943 S.W. 2d 605 (1997) (attorney's blatant refusal to comply with appellate rules was Òa flagrant abuse of the trust that her clients have shown herÓ). Springdale Memorial Hospital v. Director of Labor, 34 Ark. App. 266, 809 S.W.2d 828 (1991); Meisch v. Brady, 270 Ark. 652, 607 S.W. 2d 112 (Ark. App. 1980) (failure of attorney to file an answer). The client's remedy may lie in a malpractice action against the attorney. Florence v. Taylor, 325 Ark. 445, 928 S.W. 2d 330 (1996) (action dismissed with prejudice for failure to appeal on two occasions for trial; Òpetitioner voluntarily chose this attorney as his representative in the action, and he cannot now avoid the consequences of the acts or omissions of this freely selected agent,Óquoting Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
If the attorney engages in acts that are injurious to a third party, the client may be liable to that third party under the rules of agency. Peterson v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., 296 Ark. 201, 753 S.W.2d 278 (1988) (creditor's attorney allegedly engaged in abuse of process in collecting judgment).
In some instances the special relationship between the attorney and the client overrides the general rules of agency. Although an agent is not usually personally liable for acts taken on behalf of the principal, an attorney who requests services from a court reporter for a client is personally liable. McCullough v. Johnson, 307 Ark. 9, 816 S.W.2d 886 (1991). The attorney retains the option of informing the reporter initially that only the client will be responsible for the charges.
One significant exception to the general rule binding the client is in the matter of belated criminal appeals. If the attorney files a tardy appeal, the appellate court will hear the case, rather than require the criminal defendant to seek a new trial or other relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel. But the Court will also notify the Committee on Professional Conduct of the attorney's error. See Per Curiam of February 5, 1979, 265 Ark. 964.
Arkansas has no case law or authority on this topic.
Arkansas has no case law or authority on this topic.
An attorney who appears in court is presumed to represent the client. Mobley v. Harmon, 313 Ark. 361, 854 S.W.2d 348 (1993); Pender v. McKee, 266 Ark. 18, 582 S.W.2d 929 (1979) (answer filed by attorney). The law does not definitively clarify whether an opposing party has standing to challenge the authority of the attorney. Potter v. First National Bank, 292 Ark. 74, 728 S.W.2d 167 (1987) (ward authorized minister to hire a lawyer to represent the ward's interests).
Arkansas has no case law or authority on this topic.
See 1.2:300.
See 1.2:300.
See 1.6:370.
See 1.6:370.
Arkansas has no case law or authority on this topic.
Arkansas has no case law or authority on this topic.
Arkansas has no case law or authority on this topic.
Arkansas has no case law or authority on this topic.
Arkansas has no case law or authority on this topic.
Arkansas has no case law or authority on this topic.
Arkansas has no case law or authority on this topic.