District of Columbia Legal Ethics
1.16 Rule 1.16 Declining or Terminating Representation
1.16:100 Comparative Analysis of DC Rule
· Primary DC References: DC
Rule 1.16
· Background References: ABA
Model Rule 1.16, Other Jurisdictions
· Commentary:
1.16:101 Model Rule Comparison
Paragraph (a) of DC Rule 1.16, governing mandatory withdrawal, is identical to paragraph (a) of the Model Rule.
Paragraph (b), on permissive withdrawal, is largely the same, but with three substantive differences reflecting decisions of the Jordan Committee and one minor difference of form that was made to the Model Rule in 2002 on recommendation of the Ethics 2000 Commission. To address the latter variance first, the Model Rule's language allowing for withdrawal from a representation if the withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the client was moved from the body of paragraph (b) to a new subparagraph (1), and all the previous subparagraphs renumbered accordingly. The DC Rules Review Committee did not recommend making the same change.
The first of the substantive differences between paragraph (b) in the two rules is that the DC Rule omits what is now the Model Rule's subparagraph (b)(4), allowing a lawyer to withdraw, without regard to its effect on the client, when the client "insists on taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement." The Jordan Committee was of the view that the terms "repugnant" and "imprudent" were "too vague to give any meaningful guidance to the legal community" and "would provide lawyers too much leeway to withdraw when it is personally convenient to do so." The Ethics 2000 Commission's recommendations resulted in a modification of subparagraph (b)(4) to substitute "taking action" for "pursuing an objective," and to replace "imprudent" as defining a client's action that would justify the lawyer's withdrawal with the modifying phrase "with which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement." The DC Rules Review Committee considered but did not recommend adoption of a new subparagraph corresponding to the revised Model Rule provision.
Secondly, the Jordan Committee had similar objections to what is now subparagraph (b)(7) of the Model Rule, allowing withdrawal without regard to effect on the client when "other good cause for withdrawal exists," but the Court of Appeals restored a revised "other good cause" consideration in the corresponding paragraph of the DC Rule, subparagraph (b)(5), allowing a lawyer to withdraw if "the lawyer believes in good faith, in a proceeding before a tribunal, that the tribunal will find the existence of other good cause for withdrawal."
The third substantive difference between paragraph (b) in the two rules results from the Jordan Committee's addition to subparagraph (b)(4) (corresponding to (b)(6) in the Model Rule), allowing withdrawal when the client's conduct renders representation unreasonably difficult a requirement that the conduct must also be "obdurate or vexatious."
Paragraph (c) of the DC Rule, requiring a lawyer to continue a representation despite good cause for withdrawal when ordered to do so by a tribunal, was initially identical to the corresponding paragraph of the Model Rule. The Ethics 2000 Commission's amendments added a first sentence to that paragraph, stating that a lawyer must comply with applicable law requiring notice to or permission of a tribunal in terminating a representation, an identical change was recommended by the DC Rules Review Committee, so the two provisions are now again identical.
Paragraph (d) of the DC Rule, regarding steps to be taken to protect a client's interests upon termination of representation, adds to the Model Rule a requirement that the steps be "timely." That paragraph also says retention of papers relating to the client is subject to DC Rule 1.8(i) rather than "other law" as in the Model Rule. The Model Rule provision was modified in 2002 to add, to the requirement that fees that had not yet been earned be returned to the client on withdrawal, a requirement that advance payments of expenses that had not yet been incurred also be returned. The same modification was added to the DC Rule in 2006.
The Comments to the two versions of Rule 1.16 are largely parallel and present only minor differences of substance or phraseology, except that the DC version has two Comments, now numbered [10] and [11], respectively addressing compliance with requirements of a tribunal, and return of a client's property or money, that are not found under the Model Rule.
1.16:102 Model Code Comparison
DC Rule 1.16, like the Model Rule, is substantially different from its Model Code counterpart, DR 2-110. In general, these differences reflect an intent to place greater restrictions than the Model Code upon a lawyer's ability to withdraw from representing a client.
DC Rule 1.16(a)(1)-(3) set forth the three circumstances in which a lawyer's withdrawal from representation is mandatory. The Model Code contained three analogous provisions in DR 2-110(B)(2)-(4). Although the language of these corresponding Code sections differed from the wording of the DC Rule, the underlying substance of the provisions is functionally indistinguishable, with the exception of DR 2-110(B)(2). That provision required withdrawal only in those cases in which a lawyer's representation would lead to a violation of a disciplinary rule, whereas DC Rule 1.16(a)(2) requires withdrawal when continued representation would result in a violation either of a rule of professional conduct or of any "other law." Another difference between the mandatory withdrawal requirements of the DC Rule and its Model Code counterpart is that DR 2-110(B)(1) included a provision not explicitly contained in the DC Rule, mandating withdrawal when the lawyer knows or it is obvious that the client's motive is to harass or maliciously injure another person.
The provisions of the DC Rule applying to permissive withdrawal differ more substantially from the Model Code provisions. DC Rule 1.16(b) starts with a general provision, not found in DR 2-110, that a lawyer may choose to withdraw from representing a client if doing so will not have a materially adverse effect upon the client's interests. DC Rule 1.16(b)(1)-(5) then sets forth five situations in which a lawyer has the discretion to withdraw from representing a client regardless of the effect of the withdrawal on the client. These, with some language variations, were largely reflected in DR 2-110(C)(1)-(6) of the Model Code, with two noteworthy exceptions. First, DC Rule 1.16(b)(2), which permits withdrawal if the lawyer discovers that the client has used -- emphasis on past tense -- his or her services to further a crime or fraud, does not have a corresponding provision in the Model Code. Second, the initial portion of DC Rule 1.16(b)(4), allowing for withdrawal if continued representation will be an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer, does not have an equivalent in the Model Code. Although most of the substantive elements of the permissive withdrawal provisions of the DC Rule are reflected in the Model Code, the opposite is not true. That is, under the Model Code there were six circumstances in which a lawyer might voluntarily withdraw from a representation (regardless of the effect on the client) that are not explicitly included in the DC Rule: they are found in DR 2-110(C)(1)(a) (client insists on presenting an unsustainable claim or defense); DR 2-110(C)(1)(e) (client insists on conduct contrary to the lawyer's judgment and advice); DR 2-110(C)(2) (continued employment is likely to violate a disciplinary rule); DR 2-110(C)(3) (lawyer is unable to work with co-counsel); DR 2-110(C)(4) (mental or physical condition makes it difficult for the lawyer to be effective); and DR 2-110(C)(5) (client knowingly and freely assents).
Both DC Rule 1.16 and DR 2-110 have provisions recognizing the inherent power of courts to place limits on withdrawal from the representation of a client. Under DC Rule 1.16(c) a lawyer must continue his or her representation if ordered to do so by a court; DR 2-110(A)(1) states that, if a tribunal's rules require it, a lawyer must obtain permission from that tribunal before withdrawing from a representation.
Both DC Rule 1.16 and DR 2-110 contain substantially similar provisions -- Rule 1.16(c) and DR 2-110(A)(2) and (3), respectively -- governing a lawyer's responsibilities once withdrawal, whether mandatory or permissive, has occurred. The only noteworthy differences between the language of the DC Rule and the Code provision are that the former includes a requirement that the lawyer act in a "timely" manner in carrying out his or her responsibilities and places a limit, grounded in DC Rule 1.8(i), on a lawyer's ability to retain documents relating to the representation of a former client.
1.16:200 Mandatory Withdrawal
· Primary DC References: DC
Rule 1.16(a) There appear to be no pertinent DC court decisions or ethics
opinions on this subject. Under DC
Rule 1.16(a)(3), a lawyer must withdraw from representation when he or she
is discharged by a client. See Comment
[4], acknowledging a client's right to discharge a lawyer at any time with
or without cause; see also DC Ethics Opinion 173 (1986)
(withdrawal is mandatory under DR
2-110(B)(4) where a law firm has been discharged by the client). If a lawyer is suffering from a physical or mental incapacity
that materially impairs his or her ability to provide legal representation,
that lawyer is required to withdraw under DC
Rule 1.16(a)(2). The predecessor provision, DR
2-110(B)(3), imposed the same requirement. See In re
Larsen, 589 A.2d 400 (DC 1991) (affirming a finding that a lawyer's mental
condition was severe enough to warrant mandatory withdrawal pursuant to DR
2-110(B)(3)). See also In re Robertson, 608 A.2d 756
(DC 1992) (rejecting a lawyer's claim that his deteriorating physical
condition accounted for his professional misconduct). Rule 1.16(a)(1)
requires a lawyer to cease representation when to continue it would lead to
a violation of a rule of professional conduct or other law. See Comment
[2]; DC Ethics Opinion 219 n.3 (1991) (noting
that withdrawal is required to avoid assisting an ongoing fraud). DR
2-110(B), the predecessor provision, was to the same effect. In
re Austern, 524 A.2d 680 (DC 1987) (imposing sanctions upon a lawyer
for, among other things, failing to withdraw upon becoming aware that a settlement-related
escrow account was funded with worthless checks). In In re Ponds, 888 A.2d 234 (DC 2005), the Court approved a thirty-day suspension of a lawyer who had been found by the Board on Professional Responsibility to have violated provisions of the Maryland Rules corresponding to DC Rule 1.7(b)(4) and, derivatively, Rule 1.16(a)(1). The respondent had been retained to represent the defendant on a charge of conspiracy to import and distribute cocaine, in the Federal District Court in Maryland. His client pled guilty, and the court after due inquiry accepted the plea, but before the sentencing hearing, the defendant wrote a letter to the respondent accusing him of having coercing him into the guilty plea but also asking respondent to assist him in withdrawing the guilty plea; and the defendant sent a copy of this letter to the judge, along with a request for a hearing on his request to withdraw the guilty plea. At the sentencing hearing, the judge first heard the defendant on his request to withdraw the guilty plea, and denied the request, and although the respondent did not participate in that exchange, he did represent the defendant in the sentencing hearing. This was found by the Board to have violated Rule 1.7 because the defendant’s charge that he had coerced the guilty plea gave respondent a personal interest that conflicted with the interests of his client; and since the continued representation violated that Rule, Rule 1.16(a)(1) required his withdrawal. One of the numerous ethical transgressions found in In
re Hager, 812 A.2d 904 (DC 2002) [which is more fully discussed under
1.7:500, above] was a violation of Rule
1.16:(a)(1)'s requirement that a lawyer withdraw from an engagement when
continuing it will result in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
In the underlying case the lawyers representing the plaintiffs in a potential
class action had made a side deal with the defendant, unknown to their clients,
under which the defendant paid them $225,000 as attorneys fees and expenses,
the lawyers agreed never to represent anyone with related claims against the
defendant and to keep totally confidential and not to disclose to anyone all
information learned during their investigation relating to the case, and all
the parties agreed not to disclose most of the terms of the settlement, even
to the lawyers' clients. The Rule violation that was held to bring the withdrawal
obligation into play was the lawyers' negotiating the secret fee agreement while
representing the clients. DC Ethics Opinion 296 (2000) [which
is more fully described under 1.7:330, above]
addressed a situation where a law firm jointly represented an employer and its
alien employee in seeking a visa for the employee, without any advance understanding
as to whether client confidences with respect that the representation would
be shared, and where the firm's consequent inability to disclose fraudulent
conduct by the employee to the employer required withdrawal from both representations,
under Rule 1.16(a)(1). · Primary DC References: DC
Rule 1.16(b) There appear to be no DC court decisions or ethics opinions applying DC Rule 1.16 on this subject. See, however, the discussion of the authorities under DC Rule 1.9, including the "hot potato" issue, under 1.9:300, above. In Byrd v. District of Columbia, 271
F. Supp. 2d 174 (DDC 2003), the Court, on reconsideration of an initial
ruling to the contrary, denied a lawyer's motion for leave to withdraw that
rested on the assertion that the plaintiff he was representing hadn't paid his
fees (evidently invoking Rule
1.16(b)(3)). The Court pointed out that since the lawyer's compensation
arrangement provided for a contingency fee, his client hadn't yet failed to
fulfill any financial obligation to him, and continued representation wouldn't
impose any unreasonable or unanticipated burden on him. A lawyer is allowed to withdraw pursuant to DC
Rules 1.16(b)(3) and (b)(4)
if the "client refuses to communicate with his attorney and makes no arrangements
to pay the attorney for past services." Crane v. Crane, 657
A.2d 312, 318 (DC 1995). Under DR
2-110(C)(1)(d) of the Model Code, which was similar in substance to DC Rule
1.16(b)(4), withdrawal has been permitted where the client had a history of
leaving "telephone calls and letters unanswered, thus refusing to communicate
with his attorney, and had made no arrangements to pay the attorney for past
services." Hancock v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 472 A.2d
867, 869 (DC 1984). See also Esteves v. Esteves, 680
A.2d 398 (DC 1996), and Atlantic Petroleum Corp. v.
Jackson Oil Co., 572 A.2d 469 (1990), addressing the circumstances in
which a court should grant a motion to withdraw on the ground that "there has
been a complete breakdown in the attorney-client relationship," 572
A.2d at 473. See also D.C Ethics Opinion 108 (1981)
(allowing withdrawal where a client moved without leaving a forwarding address
or telephone number and the lawyer was unable, despite diligent efforts, to
locate the client in order to proceed in a matter before the applicable statute
of limitations expired); DC Ethics Opinion 89 (1980)
(allowing a firm to withdraw based upon the client's "deliberate disregard"
of its responsibility to pay for legal services rendered); DC
Ethics Opinion 85 (1980) (allowing withdrawal based upon the dilatoriness
of a client); DC Ethics Opinion 21 (1976) (recognizing
that withdrawal may be appropriate where a client refuses to pay expenses needed
to bring an important witness to court). But see DC Ethics
Opinion 139 (1984), ruling that in a criminal case where client contact
was not essential in order for the lawyer effectively to proceed on behalf of
the client, the lawyer could not withdraw for want of client cooperation. DC Ethics Opinion 317 (2002)
(discussed more fully under 1.7:240, above)
looks at the permissive withdrawal provisions of Rule
1.16(b)(3), (4) and (5) in connection with the situation where a client
who had given advance consent to a conflict of interest revokes that consent. · Primary DC References: DC
Rule 1.16(c) All of the provisions governing mandatory and permissive
withdrawal under DC Rule 1.16(a)
and (b) are effectively limited
by Rule 1.16(c), which recognizes
the power of a tribunal to order a lawyer to continue representing a client
even though withdrawal is required or permitted under paragraph (a) or (b).
Even where this power of a tribunal has been exercised, however, Comment
[11] notes that a lawyer retains the option, while continuing his or her
representation, to challenge the jurisdictional authority for or merit of the
tribunal's order preventing withdrawal. DC Ethics Opinion 266 (1996)
ruled that where the rules of a tribunal require a lawyer to seek leave of the
tribunal before withdrawing from a representation, the Rules of Professional
Conduct also require the lawyer to seek such approval: it is not sufficient
for the withdrawing lawyer merely to inform the client of upcoming proceedings
and advise the client to secure new counsel. The Opinion
addressed an inquiry from a lawyer who had been representing a client in a proceeding
before the Immigration and Naturalization Service, asking what his ethical obligations
were when he received notice of a hearing after he no longer represented the
client but before he had formally withdrawn as counsel. The inquirer noted that
INS rules require a lawyer who seeks to withdraw from a case to obtain leave
from the immigration judge and provide that unconditional leave to withdraw
will be granted only if the lawyer provides the client's last known address
to the immigration judge and shows that he attempted to advise the client, at
the client's last known address, about the scheduled hearing. If the lawyer
fails to provide that information, then the lawyer's withdrawal will be granted
only on condition that the lawyer remain responsible for acceptance of service
for the client. The Opinion assumed that the inquirer
was reluctant to file a notice of withdrawal out of concern that the notice
would trigger a hearing, which would not be in the interests of the client,
but ruled that the obligation under Rule
1.16(d) to take "steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect the
client's interests" did not trump what the opinion treated as a requirement
of Rule 1.16(c), and in addition
Rule 3.4(c), that the lawyer,
in withdrawing from the representation, first seek leave of the tribunal as
required by its rules. The Opinion went on to say
that, if a lawyer did not know the location of her client, there would be no
harm to the client in so representing to the immigration judge; but that a more
difficult issue would arise if a lawyer did know
the client's whereabouts, since that information might well be a "secret" that
the lawyer would be forbidden by Rule
1.6(b) to disclose. In those circumstances, the Opinion
stated, the lawyer's obligation to protect the client's secret would govern;
but the effect of this would not be to prevent the lawyer's withdrawal, but
only to prevent an unconditional withdrawal, thus leaving the lawyer under a
requirement to continue to accept service on her former client's behalf. · Primary DC References: DC
Rule 1.16(d) The most frequently addressed issue relating to a lawyer's
duty to mitigate harm upon withdrawal concerns the propriety of the lawyer's
asserting a lien on client files or attorney work-product documents. As a general
rule, a lawyer has an affirmative duty under DC
Rule 1.16(d) to return to the client all papers and property to which that
client is entitled. See In re Ryan, 670 A.2d 375, 380 (DC
1996) ("a client's right to documents exists when the client has a plausible
ownership interest in them and there is no competing claim to their ownership");
DC Ethics Opinion 209 (1990) (recommending that a
lawyer contact all former clients before destroying files relating to a prior
representation, even if there was no legal or contractual duty to keep such
documents); DC Ethics Opinion 168 (1986) (interpreting
DR 2-110(A)(2)'s requirement
of avoiding prejudice to the client to mean that upon withdrawal a lawyer must
provide to the client or the client's new counsel all material "likely to be
useful to the client or the substitute counsel's representation of that client's
interests"); DC Ethics Opinion 333 (2005) (holding that law firm was required to provide former client’s successor with all materials in the client’s files substantively related to the representation, including such opinion work product as lawyer notes and internal memoranda reflecting lawyers’ thoughts, impressions and strategy ideas). One of the numerous ethical transgressions found in In
re Hager, 812 A.2d 904 (DC 2002) [which is more fully discussed under
1.7:500, above] was a violation of Rule
1.16(d)'s requirement that a lawyer withdrawing from an engagement take
steps to protect the client's interests. In the underlying case the lawyers
representing the plaintiffs in a potential class action had made a side deal
with the defendant, unknown to their clients, under which the defendant paid
them $225,000 as attorneys fees and expenses, the lawyers agreed never to represent
anyone with related claims against the defendant and to keep totally confidential
and not to disclose to anyone all information learned during their investigation
relating to the case, and all the parties agreed not to disclose most of the
terms of the settlement, even to the lawyers' clients. The Rule 1.16(d) violation
found in this case lay in the lawyers' promise to the defendant, in connection
with the secret settlement agreement, not to disclose any information learned
in the investigation of the matter, which would mean the clients' files could
not be returned to them, and this would prevent the clients from pursuing their
claims against the defendant. In re Arneja, 790 A.2d 552 (DC 2002)
involved, inter alia, a violation of Rule
1.16(d) by reason of a lawyer's foot-dragging in turning over the client's
files to successor counsel despite repeated and urgent requests. DC Ethics Opinion 270 (1997)
addressed an inquiry by a lawyer who had been briefly employed by a sole practitioner
to work on a particular matter. The client in that matter had recently insisted
that the employing lawyer write an aggressive letter to a third party, despite
the lawyer's advice that sending such a letter was imprudent, and the employing
lawyer had responded by what he told the inquirer was his usual practice --
namely, drafting a letter satisfying the client's demand and sending a copy
to the client, but not sending the letter itself to the addressee. The inquirer,
disturbed by this practice, quit the employment and asked the Legal Ethics Committee
(1) whether, after leaving the employment, she had a duty to ensure that the
client was informed of the employing lawyer's misrepresentations, and (2) whether,
having left, she had a duty to report the lawyer's misconduct to disciplinary
authorities. The Opinion answered both questions affirmatively. As to disclosure
to the client, the Opinion pointed out that if the employment had continued,
the inquirer would have had an obligation under DC
Rules 1.4 and 5.2 to inform the
client about the fictitious letter, and indeed to take action to see to it that
no further fictitious letters were sent. Since the inquirer had left the employment,
she no longer had a duty under DC Rule 1.4, but did have a duty, under DC
Rule 1.16, upon her withdrawal to "take timely steps to the extent practicable
to protect the client's interest," a duty that the Opinion said applied despite
the fact that she was a subordinate and not the lawyer responsible for the representation.
This obligation under DC Rule 1.16(d)
had in this instance been discharged in what the Committee noted was the manner
least disruptive to the existing lawyer-client relationship -- namely, by telling
the former employer that he should make disclosure to the client, which she
had done. As to whether the inquirer had an obligation to report the employer's
conduct to the disciplinary authorities under DC
Rule 8.3, the Opinion held that she did, for "the conduct of the employing
lawyer destroyed the heart of the lawyer-client relationship," and constituted
dishonesty and deceit under DC Rule
8.4(c) and a violation of DC Rule
1.4. Comment
[12] to DC Rule 1.16, which was added effective November 1, 1996 [see 1.16:101
above], spells out a lawyer's obligation, when holding property or funds as
to which a portion is in dispute, to distribute promptly any portion that is
not in dispute. Although DR
2-110(A)(2) of the DC Code, which was identical to its counterpart in the
Model Code, on its face put no limits on a lawyer's right to assert a retaining
lien upon a client's files or that lawyer's own work-product in order to ensure
payment of an outstanding fee, opinions of the DC Bar Legal Ethics Committee
took a dubious view of retaining liens. Thus, DC Ethics Opinion
59 (undated) stated that a lawyer could assert a lien on a client's file
even if the file was "necessary" for new counsel, except when "(a) the client
is financially unable to pay the fees; (b) the client gives other security for
payment of the fees; or (c) the file is necessary to the defense of a serious
criminal charge or the protection of the client's personal liberty." The Opinion
also stated that "[t]he lawyer should assume the initiative . . . in seeking
to avoid the need for actual invocation of the lien, and should ordinarily renounce
the lien unless his legitimate financial interests clearly outweigh the adversely
affected interests of his former client." Although the Opinion
thus recognized that retaining liens were allowed under the Code provision,
it expressed "serious doubts" as to whether they should continue to be permitted.
Id., n.13. See also DC Ethics
Opinion 90 (1980) (reiterating the formulation of Opinion
59); DC Ethics Opinion 100 (1981) (where the
lawyer and client have agreed on termination of the lawyer's services the lawyer
may properly assert a retaining lien against money held in an escrow account
but the lien does not give rise to a right of set-off: i.e.,
the lawyer may not use the escrowed funds to satisfy his claim for fees); DC
Ethics Opinion 107 (1981) (a lawyer retained by out-of-state counsel
to participate as co-counsel in litigation who has a fee dispute with counsel
but not with the client may not assert a retaining lien); DC
Ethics Opinion 119 (1983) (describing the retaining lien as "an unattractive
and potentially quite harmful tool"); DC Ethics Opinion 191
(1988) (asserting that "the ethical right to assert a lawyer's lien,
and then withhold client papers, during a fee dispute is a narrow one and must
be used sparingly"). See also DC Ethics Opinion 195 (1988),
which explained the difference between "retaining" or "general" liens (which
allow the lawyer to withhold property of the client to compel payment of fees)
and "charging" or "special" liens (which attach only to a cause of action or
the proceeds thereof), and ruled that an agreement between a patent lawyer and
his client assigning to the lawyer rights in a patent to secure payment of the
lawyer's fee created neither kind of lien. DC Rule 1.8(i)'s
prohibition on a lawyer's imposing a lien on any part of a client's files except
the lawyer's own work product, and then only in strictly limited circumstances
[discussed in 1.8:1140, above], which has
no parallel in the corresponding Model Rule, and which is reinforced by DC
Rule 1.16(d)'s statement that "[t]he lawyer may retain papers relating to
the client to the extent permitted by Rule 1.8(i)," reflects the hostility to
retaining liens expressed in these ethics opinions. Thus, as stated in DC
Ethics Opinion 250 (1994), [I]t seems clear . . . that retaining liens on client files
are now strongly disfavored in the District of Columbia, that the work product
exception permitting such liens should be construed narrowly, and that a lawyer
should assert a retaining lien on work product relating to a former client only
where the exception is clearly applicable and where the lawyer's financial interests
. . . "clearly outweigh the adversely affected interests of his former client." See also DC Ethics Opinion 230 (1992)
(a retaining lien that was properly asserted against client's files prior to
January 1, 1991, when the DC Rules came into effect, became no longer permissible
as of that date by reason of Rules
1.16(a) and 1.8(i)). Accordingly, it seems clear that under the current rule
a lawyer upon withdrawal should rarely be allowed to retain a lien on files
as a means of ensuring the payment of an outstanding fee. [See also 1.15:230,
above.] DC Ethics Opinion 283 (1998),
which is discussed more fully under 1.15:230
above, addresses a lawyer's obligation regarding disposition of files relating
to representation of a former client. · Primary DC References: DC
Rule 1.16(d) Upon withdrawal from a representation, a lawyer is required
under Rule 1.16(d), among other
things, to refund to the client any advanced fee that has not been earned. In
re Sumner, 665 A.2d 986 (DC 1995). See also DC Ethics
Opinion 37 (1977) (addressing the issue of whether the lawyer or the
client should bear the cost associated with "duplicative fees" that sometimes
result from the withdrawal of a lawyer). There appear to be no pertinent DC court decisions or ethics
opinions on this subject.
· Background References: ABA
Model Rule 1.16(a), Other Jurisdictions
· Commentary: ABA/BNA § 31:1001, 1.16:210 Discharge
by Client
1.16:220 Incapacity
of Lawyer
1.16:230 Withdrawal
to Avoid Unlawful Conduct
1.16:300 Permissive
Withdrawal
· Background References: ABA
Model Rule 1.16(b), Other Jurisdictions
· Commentary: ABA/BNA § 31:1101, ALI-LGL § 32, Wolfram
§ 9.5.3
1.16:310 Withdrawal
to Undertake Adverse Representation
1.16:320 Circumstances
Justifying Discretionary Withdrawal
1.16:400 Order by Tribunal
to Continue Representation
· Background References: ABA
Model Rule 1.16(c), Other Jurisdictions
· Commentary: ABA/BNA § 31:1101, ALI-LGL § 321.16:500 Mitigating
Harm to Client Upon Withdrawal
· Background References: ABA
Model Rule 1.16(d), Other Jurisdictions
· Commentary: ABA/BNA § 31:1201, ALI-LGL § 321.16:600 Fees on Termination
· Background References: ABA
Model Rule 1.16(d), Other Jurisdictions
· Commentary: ABA/BNA §§ 31:701, 31:1001, 31:1101,
ALI-LGL § 401.16:610 Termination
of Lawyer's Authority [see 1.2:270]