1.11 Rule 1.11 Successive Government and Private Employment
¥ Primary Illinois References:
IL Rule 1.11
¥ Background References: ABA
Model Rule 1.11, Other Jurisdictions
¥ Commentary:
The IRPC Rule is similar to MR 1.11, slightly modified with respect to the language on knowledge by others in the lawyer's firm, and omitting a provision with respect to law clerks which was felt to be superfluous by the Illinois drafters in light of Rule 1.12.
Note that Illinois, in IRPC 1.10, has defined "screening"; the ABA text, in MR 1.11, simply uses the word without definition. The phrase "appropriate government agency" is question-begging.
Although little of IRPC 1.11 has any parallel in the Illinois Code, RulesÊ8-101 and 9-101 thereof touched on the same issues.
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¥ Primary Illinois References:
IL Rule 1.11
¥ Background References: ABA
Model Rule 1.11(a), Other Jurisdictions
¥ Commentary: ABA/BNA ¤ 91:4001, ALI-LGL ¤ 214, Wolfram
¤ 8.10
It is not uncommon for a government lawyer to jump the fence to the private sector. When that happens, conflicts can arise where the lawyer, or her law firm, represents a client whose interests are adverse to those of the lawyer's former client, the People. See People v. Lawson, 644 N.E.2d 1172 (Dec.Ê1, 1994) (surveying the law in this area). In People v. Lawson, a former assistant State's Attorney who participated in the early portion of the prosecution of a first-degree murder case (e.g., by appearing at the defendant's arraignment) moved to the public defender's office, where he was disqualified from representing the defendant in the same case, although there was no showing by the defendant of an actual or potentially adverse effect on his defense. However, this per se rule of disqualification will not be applied to disqualify a fence-jumping attorney in a criminal matter where the attorney did not personally serve in the same criminal proceeding as both the prosecutor and then as the court-appointed defense counsel. See People v. Lawson, 644 N.E.2d at 1185-86; see also People v. Newberry, 302 N.E.2d 34 (1973) (no material adversity where appointed defense counsel had previously served as head of the criminal division of the State's Attorney's office at time client was indicted). The attorney's new firm will not be disqualified so long as the firm effectively timely screens the attorney from the matter. See People v. Lawson, 644 N.E.2d at 1186 (citing cases which discuss screening procedures).
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¥ Primary Illinois References:
IL Rule 1.11
¥ Background References: ABA
Model Rule 1.11(b), Other Jurisdictions
¥ Commentary: ABA/BNA ¤ 91:4001, ALI-LGL ¤ 214, Wolfram
¤ 8.10
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¥ Primary Illinois References:
IL Rule 1.11
¥ Background References: ABA
Model Rule 1.11(c), Other Jurisdictions
¥ Commentary: ABA/BNA ¤ , ALI-LGL ¤ 213, 214, Wolfram
¤ 8.9.4
¥ Primary Illinois References:
IL Rule 1.11
¥ Background References: ABA
Model Rule 1.11(c)(2), Other
Jurisdictions
¥ Commentary: ABA/BNA ¤ 91:4001, ALI-LGL ¤¤ 156, 214,
Wolfram ¤ 9.10