---------------------------------------------------------------- liibulletin-ny A SERVICE OF THE LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE CORNELL LAW SCHOOL SPONSORED BY THE NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOC. Editor in Chief: Mike Galligan '01 Executive Editor - lii-bulletin-patent, lii-bulletin-internet: Devon Zastrow '01 Special Projects Managing Editor: Eric Sprague '01 Managing Editor - lii-bulletin-ny: Rebecca Whitcombe '01 ---------------------------------------------------------------- This issue of the liibulletin-ny reports on the three recent decisions of the New York Court of Appeals on criminal law and criminal procedure cases. The cases reported in this issue concern: * search warrant severability and plain view doctrine, * disclosure of victims' information to convicted sex criminals, and * suppression of evidence from wrongful arrest. Note: All summaries are preceded by a bar of equal signs (===). This allows use of the find or search function on a word processor or mail reader to move quickly from one summary to the next. Directions on how to subscribe to liibulletin-ny are set forth at this bulletin's end. Feel free redistribute this issue. ================================================================ CRIMINAL LAW - FOURTH AMENDMENT - SEARCH AND SEIZURE - SEARCH WARRANT - SEVERABILITY - PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE [People v. Brown, 2001 N.Y. Int. 0029 (Mar. 27, 2001).] < http://www.law.cornell.edu/ny/ctap/I01_0029.htm > ISSUE & DISPOSITION Issue(s) 1. Whether overbroad language can be severed from an otherwise valid search warrant. 2. Whether the seizure of items in plain view not specified in a search warrant is valid if such warrant is found to be partially overbroad. Disposition 1. Yes. Unconstitutionally overbroad portions of a search warrant can be severed, and the remaining particularized portions upheld. 2. Yes. Plain view seizure will be upheld if police discover the items in a location they would reasonably search under the valid portion of the warrant. SUMMARY Suspecting Defendant had stolen a tractor, police searched his home under a warrant authorizing a search for four enumerated items relating to the tractor and "any other property, the possession of which would be considered contraband." The police seized two unregistered guns and blasting caps from Defendant's home. After indictment, Defendant moved to suppress the guns and blasting caps on the grounds that the warrant was unconstitutionally overbroad and that the plain view doctrine was therefore inapplicable as a matter of law. Following a suppression hearing in which the police testified that at all times during the search they were looking for the enumerated items, the Supreme Court denied Defendant's motion. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals also affirmed. While general directives such as "any other contraband" have no valid place in search warrants, the overbroad authorization can be severed since the remaining portion of the warrant is sufficiently specific as to leave no discretion to the executing officer. The severability approach strikes the proper balance between deterring overbroad searches and allowing for validly seized evidence to be used in a prosecution. Similarly, allowing the plain view doctrine to be applied to the valid portion of the warrant accommodates both the needs of law enforcement and the privacy interests underlying the Fourth Amendment. ================================================================ CRIMINAL LAW - SEX CRIMES - DISCLOSURE - GOVERNMENT RECORDS - CIVIL RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-b(2)(1) & 50-b(2)(a) [Fappiano v. N.Y.C. Police Dept., 2001 N.Y. Int. 0030 (Mar. 27, 2001).] < http://www.law.cornell.edu/ny/ctap/I01_0030.htm > ISSUE & DISPOSITION Issue(s) Whether the Civil Rights Law § 50-b(2)(a) exception to the § 50- b(2)(1) bar on disclosure of information that tends to identify the victim of a sex crime, which allows disclosure to parties "charged" with that crime, allows disclosure of such records to parties convicted of the crime. Disposition No. A person convicted of a sex crime cannot access the records that identify the victim of the crime under the Civil Rights Law § 50-b exception. SUMMARY The Court consolidated three appeals, Matter of Fappiano, Matter of Stapleton, and Matter of Doyen. In each appeal, Petitioners, convicted sex criminals, sought to compel the respondent police departments to comply with their Freedom of Information Law ("FOIL") requests for records pertaining their crimes for use in collateral reviews and appeals. Respondents refused these requests, relying on the Civil Rights Law bar on disclosure of information that tends to identify the victim of a sex crime from public inspection. Petitioners then commenced CPLR article 78 proceeding to force the police departments to comply with their requests, arguing that the Civil Rights Law § 50-b(2)(a) exception allowing disclosure to persons "charged" with a sex offense, allowed disclosure to them. In Fappiano, the trial court ordered the disclosure and the Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the Petitioner was similarly situated to a person charged with a crime. Likewise in Stapleton, the trial court ordered disclosure and the Appellate Division affirmed, citing its decision in Fappiano. In Doyen, the trial court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but the Appellate Court reinstated the petition and concluded that Petitioner was similarly situated to a person charged with a crime and that the legislative history of Civil Rights Law § 50-b revealed an intent to treat post- conviction litigants the same as charged litigants. The Court of Appeals reversed in all three cases, concluding that the term "charged" in § 50-b(2)(a) did not apply to Petitioners, and finding that a person charged with a crime cannot be equated with a convicted person for purposes of Civil Rights Law § 50-b. The Court applied the plain meaning rule of statutory interpretation and examined the legislative history. The Court gave no weight to the argument that the Petitioners already "knew" their victims, and thus there was no protection of the victim's identity by barring disclosure of the records. ================================================================ CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - MOTION HEARING - MOTION COURT - MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE - PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION - "BUY AND BUST" OPERATION [People v. Jones, 2001 N.Y. Int. 0034 (March 29, 2001).] < http://www.law.cornell.edu/ny/ctap/I01_0034.htm > ISSUE & DISPOSITION Issue(s) 1. Whether a Defendant can challenge the sufficiency of the description of Defendant used as probable cause to arrest, without also denying participation in the underlying criminal offense. 2. Whether a Defendant, moving to suppress physical evidence resulting from his or her arrest, must allege specific facts pertinent to the grounds upon which he or she challenges probable cause to arrest, when such facts are unavailable. Disposition 1. Yes. A party may prove the unlawfulness of an arrest based solely upon the inadequacy of a description transmitted to an arresting officer. 2. No. A defendant is not required to allege pertinent facts about which he or she has no knowledge in a motion hearing for suppression of evidence. However, during such hearing, he or she must supply the court with any relevant facts that he or she does possess. SUMMARY Pursuant to a "buy and bust" drug operation in which Defendant allegedly sold cocaine to an undercover police officer, he was arrested. Prior to trial, Defendant moved to suppress physical evidence resulting from his arrest on the grounds that he was not engaged in any criminal activity at the time of the arrest. In his affidavit accompanying the motion papers, Defendant alleged that he was not provided with the physical description the arresting officer received from the undercover officer in the operation, and that the description could have fit any one of a number of people in the area at the time of his arrest. The State opposed the motion on the ground that Defendant did not deny engaging in any criminal activity prior to his arrest, but rather focused the motion on his appearance and actions immediately preceding his arrest. The motion court summarily denied Defendant's motion, finding that he "failed to controvert specifically the acts which the People alleged he committed...and, which, if true, would constitute probable cause for his arrest." The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals first found that the motion court erred in holding that the Defendant's failure to specifically deny his role in the drug sale justified summary denial of his application. The Court reasoned that since a party may prove the unlawfulness of an arrest based solely on the inadequacy of a description transmitted to the arresting officer, Defendant should be able to successfully challenge the sufficiency of the description used to detain and arrest him, without denying participation in the sale. The Court then considered whether or not Defendant's factual allegations triggered the need for a suppression hearing. The Defendant was not required to allege specific facts that he could not possibly access (such as facts regarding the description) even though these facts were pertinent to the grounds upon which he was seeking relief. Nevertheless, the Defendant was required to provide the motion court with any relevant facts that he possessed at the time of the motion hearing. Specifically, Defendant could have given the motion court a general description of himself at the time of the arrest, as well as facts and a general description of others at the scene. This would have bolstered his claim that the description used by the officers was too general to be valid. Since Defendant did not provide such pertinent facts, he did not meet his statutory burden to set forth factual averments which, if established, would justify suppression. ---------------------------------------------------------------- HOW TO ACCESS ITEMS REPORTED IN THIS BULLETIN ---------------------------------------------------------------- The full text of any of these decisions can be accessed via the Internet, at the LII's World Wide Web site http://www.law.cornell.edu/ny/ctap/ ---------------------------------------------------------------- HOW TO SUBSCRIBE TO THE liibulletin-ny ---------------------------------------------------------------- To subscribe to the liibulletin-ny: (1) Send an e-mail message to listserv@listserv.law.cornell.edu The message needs to read: subscribe liibulletin-ny [followed by the subscriber's name -- all on one line] (2) Or use the subscription form at: http://www3.law.cornell.edu/lii/ ----------------------------------------------------------------