Constitutional Court of South Africa (Konstitusionele Hof van Suid Afrika)

The applicant was sexually assaulted by a man who was awaiting trial for the attempted rape of another woman. Despite the seriousness of the alleged crime and the fact that the man had a prior rape conviction, the police and prosecutor had recommended that the man be released pending trial. The applicant sued the Minister for damages, arguing that the police and prosecutors had negligently failed to comply with a legal duty they owed to her to take steps to prevent the man from causing her harm.

After a Methodist Church minister (applicant) announced to her congregation her intention to marry her same-sex partner, the Methodist Church (respondent) suspended and subsequently discontinued her role as an ordained minister in early 2010. In March 2010, the applicant referred the matter to arbitration according to the Laws and Discipline of the Church. The parties could not agree on the applicant’s procedural rights and the arbitration convener proceeded with the process as provided by the Laws and Discipline of the Church.

Two men convicted of child rape challenged the constitutionality of the Sexual Offenses Act's amendments to the existing Criminal Procedure Act (CPA).  The amendments permit child victims and witnesses of sexual offenses to participate in modified court proceedings to facilitate testimony.  The lower court declared the amendments to the CPA constitutionally invalid.  The Constitutional Court reversed the ruling, holding  that (1) courts must inquire into the need to appoint  an intermediary in sexual offense trials whenever children  are expected to testify, re

K. sued to recover damages from the Minister of Safety and Security from being raped and assaulted by three uniformed and on-duty police sergeants.  The High Court held that the actions of the police officers fell out of the scope of their employment and that the Minister could not be held vicariously liable for their conduct.  The Court held that although the police officers' actions were obviously a clear deviation from their duty, there was a sufficiently close relationship between their employment and the wrongful conduct to hold the Minister liable. 

The issue in this case was whether the fact that no provision was made for same-sex couples to marry denied those parties equal protection of the law and was thus unfairly discriminating against them because of their sexual orientation, contrary to the Constitution’s protection of sexual orientation. The common law and the Marriage Act 25 of 1961 defined marriage as between man and woman.

The case was initially brought to the High Court by individuals who had suffered childhood sexual molestation by the deceased, a prominent financier and philanthropist, in the 1970s and ‘80s. The applicants were unable to pursue criminal charges due of the effect of s18(f) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1997, which imposed a 20-year statute of limitations for most sexual offences (excluding rape, sexual trafficking, and using a child or a mentally disabled person for pornographic purposes). However, the High Court found s18(f) to be unconstitutional.

The appellant was charged with the rape of a nine-year-old girl. At trial, evidence demonstrated that he had penetrated the girl anally, which required a conviction for indecent assault rather than rape.  The High Court, however, amended the common law definition of rape to include anal penetration as well and made the definition gender-neutral.  The appellant appealed.

The issue in this case was to what extent, in Xitsonga customary law, the absence of a first wife’s consent to her husband’s subsequent polygamous marriages affects the validity of those marriages. In this case, the applicant entered into a customary marriage with the deceased in 1984. The applicant objected to the respondent’s claim that she entered a valid customary polygamous marriage to the deceased in 2008, 13 months before the deceased’s death.

The case concerned a referral for confirmation to the Constitutional Court of an order made by the Witwatersrand High Court. The referral sought to affirm that the following laws are unconstitutional and invalid (a) the common law offence of sodomy, and (b) the inclusion of sodomy in schedules to, inter alia, the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, which prohibits sexual conduct between men in certain circumstances.

In this case, the Constitutional Court declared §2(1) of the Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act (Upgrading Act) unconstitutional. §2(1) of the Upgrading Act automatically turned land tenure rights into rights of property ownership, without providing other occupants or affected parties an opportunity to make submissions. The Court held §2(1) unconstitutional because it had a discriminatory effect on women’s property rights. During apartheid, only men could be the head of the family and hold Certificates of Deed and Grant.