Betty A. Riley et al.,
Appellants,
v.
County of Broome, et al.,
Respondents.
John P. Wilson,
Appellant,
v.
State of New York,
Respondent.
2000 NY Int. 124
These appeals call upon us to do what increasingly is
asked of courts in this age of statutes: interpret the words of
a legislative enactment which the contesting parties construe
differently. In particular, we are asked whether Vehicle and
Traffic Law section 1103(b) exempts statutorily defined hazard
vehicles engaged in highway work from the rules of the road,
and whether it limits the liability of their owners and operators
to reckless disregard for the safety of others. We conclude that
defendants correctly read the statute, and we hold -- as did the
courts before us -- that the vehicles here were exempt from the
rules of the road and their liability limited to reckless
Riley v County of Broome
Defendant Garwood A. Young, an employee of the Broome County Highway Division, was operating a street sweeper on West Colesville Road in the Town of Kirkwood. Young was driving two or three miles per hour, with the sweeper straddling the shoulder and the road. Plaintiff Betty Riley was also driving on West Colesville Road, in the same direction as the street sweeper. As Riley reached the top of a hill, she saw a huge patch of fog -- actually a cloud of dirt and dust created by the sweeper -- and collided with the sweeper.
Riley and her husband brought this action against Young and the County, alleging that the sweeper caused the accident. At trial, the court held _- over Riley's objection -_ that, under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b), the applicable standard of care was whether defendants conducted themselves "in such a way so as not to recklessly disregard the safety of others." The court then charged the jury on that standard. The jury returned a verdict in favor of defendants, finding no recklessness in the operation of the sweeper. In a comprehensive opinion by Justice Anthony J. Carpinello, the Appellate Division affirmed, holding that under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b), all vehicles engaged in "highway maintenance" are exempt from the rules of the road and subject only to a recklessness standard.
Wilson v State of New York
Claimant John Wilson was driving west from Canajoharie to Utica on Route 5, traveling at 30 to 35 miles per hour. Moderate to heavy snow was falling, rendering visibility poor. Two snowplows owned by the State were operating near the intersection of Route 5 and Route 167, one behind the other in the eastbound passing lane on Route 5. As Wilson approached the intersection, the first snowplow stopped to make a wide turn, and the second snowplow -- driven by William Hunt -- made a left turn inside the first plow in an attempt to enter Route 167 North. Although Hunt looked, he did not see Wilson's car approaching, and his snowplow collided with Wilson's car.
Wilson then brought the present action against the State of New York. The case proceeded to trial before the Court of Claims. At the close of the evidence, the State moved to dismiss, arguing that Wilson had failed to establish that the accident was the result of recklessness. The court granted the motion, holding that a recklessness standard applied because the snowplow was involved in work on a highway within the meaning of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b), and that the evidence was insufficient to meet that standard. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that since the snowplow qualified as a vehicle "actually engaged in work on a highway" under section 1103(b), the recklessness standard applied, and the evidence failed to establish that Hunt had acted recklessly.
The Hazard Vehicle Exemption
On appeal to this Court, Riley and Wilson ("claimants") contend that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103(b) does not exempt hazard vehicles -- like snowplows and street sweepers -- from the rules of the road.[1] Rather, they assert that section 1103(b) exempts such vehicles only from the stopping, standing and parking regulations of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1202(a). We agree with the trial courts and the Appellate Division that section 1103(b) exempts all vehicles actually engaged in work on a highway -- including the vehicles here -- from the rules of the road.
Some degree of risk, of course, is inherent in travel
on public highways. Certain classes of vehicles -- like
snowplows and street sweepers -- are intended to minimize the
risk by keeping the roadways clean and safe for everyone. While
At common law, all vehicles, including emergency
vehicles, were held to an ordinary negligence standard (see,
e.g., Farley v Mayor, etc., of City of New York, 152 NY 222, 227-
228 [1897]; Garrett v City of Schenectady, 268 NY 219, 223-224
[1935]; Ottmann v Village of Rockville Centre, 275 NY 270, 273
[1937]).[2]
But the common law also recognized that the level of
care owed by emergency and road work vehicles must be tempered by
the nature of their work. Fire trucks, for instance, were
permitted to drive at the greatest practicable speed, since the
safety of property and the protection of life may * * * depend
upon celerity of movement (Farley v Mayor,
In 1957, the Legislature enacted Title VII of the Vehicle and Traffic Law (§§ 1100 et seq.), creating a uniform set of traffic regulations, or the rules of the road (see, L 1957, ch 698). That legislation was intended to update and replace the former traffic regulations, and bring them into conformance with the Uniform Vehicle Code adopted in other states (see, Mem in Support, Bill Jacket, L 1957, ch 698, at 35-38).
The Vehicle and Traffic Law states that the rules of
the road apply to all vehicles unless otherwise provided by law
(see, Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 1101, 1103[a]). Except for the
provisions regarding driving under the influence of drugs or
alcohol, however, the rules of the road explicitly do not apply
to "persons, teams, motor vehicles, and other equipment while
actually engaged in work on a highway" (Vehicle and Traffic Law §
1103[b]).[3]
Section 1103(b) adds that Vehicle and Traffic Law §
The language of these statutes seems clear: all vehicles actually engaged in work on a highway" -- just as all emergency vehicles engaged in emergency operations -- are exempt from the rules of the road. In the cases at hand, the street sweeper and the snowplow were engaged in work on a highway. The street sweeper was cleaning the street; the snowplow was clearing the road during a snowstorm. Thus, the Appellate Division correctly held that section 1103(b) exempts both vehicles from the rules of the road.
We reject defendants' contention that designated
hazard vehicles are exempt only from the stopping, standing and
parking regulations of section 1202(a), even when they are
The legislative history of section 1103(b) confirms this plain language reading.
We note at the outset that it is appropriate to examine
the legislative history even though the language of section
1103(b) is clear. The primary consideration of courts in
interpreting a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the
intention of the Legislature (McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book
1, Statutes § 92[a], at 177). Of course, the words of the
statute are the best evidence of the Legislature's intent. As a
general rule, unambiguous language of a statute is alone
determinative (see, Washington Post Co. v New York State Ins.
Dept., , 61 NY2d 557, 565). Nevertheless, the legislative history
Here, the history of section 1103(b) explicates the
legislative intention to create a broad exemption from the rules
of the road for all vehicles engaged in highway construction,
maintenance or repair, regardless of their classification. In
1954, the Committee that proposed the original version of the
statute stated that the law was intended to exempt from the rules
of the road all teams and vehicles that build highways, repair
or maintain them, paint the pavement markings, remove the snow,
sand the pavement and do similar work (see, 1954 NY Legis Doc
Further, the legislative history shows that the
reference to hazard vehicles in section 1103(b) is wholly
unrelated to the provision excusing vehicles engaged in road work
from the rules of the road. Notably, the original version of
section 1103(b), enacted in 1957, exempted vehicles "engaged in
work on a highway" from the rules of the road, and did not
contain any separate provisions concerning hazard vehicles (see,
L 1957, ch 698, § 4).[5]
In 1970, the Legislature amended the
Vehicle and Traffic Law to create the "hazard class" of vehicles,
enacting section 117-a defining hazard vehicles, and amending
section 1103(b) to exempt hazard vehicles from the standing,
stopping and parking regulations (see, L 1970, ch 197). The
Memorandum in Support of that amendment explained that it was
Thus, we conclude that section 1103(b) exempts from the rules of the road all vehicles actually engaged in work on a highway, including the hazard vehicles in the cases before us.
The Standard of Care
We next turn to the standard of care owed to other drivers by vehicles actually engaged in work on a highway. Originally, section 1103(b) provided such vehicles with an unqualified exemption from the rules of the road (see, L 1957, ch 698 § 4). In a 1974 amendment, the Legislature added the following sentence to that section:
The foregoing provisions of this subdivision shall not relieve any person, or team or any operator of a motor vehicle or other equipment while actually engaged in work on a highway from the duty to proceed at all times during all phases of such work with due
regard for the safety of all persons nor shall the foregoing provisions protect such persons or teams or such operators of motor vehicles or other equipment from the consequences of their reckless disregard for the safety of others"
(L 1974, ch 223 § 1) (emphasis added).
The legislative history explains that this amendment
was designed to soften the outright exemption of vehicles engaged
in road work from the rules of the road, allowing them to drive
at any speed or in any manner which suits their fancy, without
any prohibition from the Vehicle and Traffic Law (see, Mem of
Senator Frank Padavan, Bill Jacket, L 1974, ch 223, at 4). For
example, under the original version of the statute, "a snow plow
could be operated well above the speed limit and through red
lights * * * without regard for the safety of other persons" (Mem
of Dept of Motor Vehicles, Bill Jacket, L 1974, ch 223, at 7).
The Legislature therefore amended section 1103(b) to impose a
minimum standard of care on operators of such vehicles (Padavan
Mem,
In Saarinen v Kerr (, 84 NY2d 494), we held that Vehicle
and Traffic Law § 1104(e) -- which contains identical language
requiring emergency vehicles to act with due regard for the
safety of all persons and holding drivers responsible for the
consequences of [their] reckless disregard for the safety of
others" -- imposes a standard of recklessness. Specifically,
this Court held that, under section 1104(e), a plaintiff seeking
to recover for injuries caused by an emergency vehicle must show
Section 1103(b) imposes the same recklessness standard
on vehicles actually engaged in work on a highway. The language
here is the same language that we held in Saarinen to impose a
recklessness standard. To be sure, as claimants point out, the
statute uses the phrase due regard as well as reckless
disregard to describe the standard. But as we stated in
Saarinen, the Legislature's specific reference to * * * reckless
disregard * * * would be unnecessary and, in fact, inexplicable
if the conventional criterion for negligence -- reasonable care
under the circumstances -- were the intended standard (Saarinen
v Kerr,
We decline claimants' invitation to read the due
regard and reckless disregard language in section 1103(b)
differently from our reading of those very words in section
1104(e). As a general principle of statutory construction,
whenever a word is used in a statute in one sense and with one
Nor is there anything in the context or history of the
statutes indicating that different meanings were intended. In
fact, the history of section 1103(b) confirms that the
Legislature intended to subject vehicles engaged in road work to
the same standard of care as emergency vehicles. The Attorney
General's memorandum in support of the 1974 amendment states that
the bill extends the standard of care presently applicable to
drivers of authorized emergency vehicles under § 1104 * * * to
persons engaged in maintenance and hazardous operations
(Lefkowitz Mem, Bill Jacket, L 1974, ch 223, at 2). In addition,
Senator Padavan's supporting memorandum states that the amendment
imposes a standard similar to that imposed on operators of
authorized emergency vehicles (Padavan Mem,
Claimants urge that, as a matter of logic and fairness,
vehicles engaged in road work should not enjoy the same level of
protection as emergency vehicles, like police cars, fire trucks
and ambulances. As we stated in Saarinen, the protection given
to emergency vehicles under section 1104(e) represents a
recognition that the duties of police officers and other
emergency personnel often bring them into conflict with the rules
and laws that are intended to regulate citizens' daily conduct,
and that emergency personnel require a qualified privilege to
disregard those laws where necessary to carry about their
important responsibilities (Saarinen v Kerr,
As claimants point out, it is unclear that the
increased risk to the public is similarly justified for all
vehicles engaged in road work. Indeed, criticizing protections
given to non-emergency vehicles under pre-1957 law, the Joint
Legislative Committee that was convened to revise the Vehicle and
Why, for example, should rural letter carriers or tow truck drivers be permitted, in the course of their work, to speed, drive on the wrong side of the road, ignore pedestrian rights and vehicular rights-of- way, and disregard traffic signs and signals -- all without sirens or lights being employed -- while the driver of an ambulance or civil defense vehicle must employ both lights and bells or sirens in order to be exempt from any rules of the road?
(id., at 584; see also, Cottingham v State, 182 Misc 2d 928, 942 [Ct Claims]).
Apt as those concerns may be, the Legislature has spoken clearly, giving vehicles engaged in road work the benefit of the same lesser standard of care as emergency vehicles. Any change in that standard, therefore, must come from the Legislature, not the courts.
Work Area
Finally, there is no merit to claimants' argument that
the protections of section 1103(b) apply solely to vehicles
Claimants' remaining arguments are without merit.
Accordingly, in each case the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs.
Footnotes
1 Vehicle and Traffic Law § 117-a defines "hazard vehicle" as follows:
"Every vehicle owned and operated or leased by a utility, whether public or private, used in the construction, maintenance and repair of its facilities, every vehicle specially equipped or designed for the towing or pushing of disabled vehicles, every vehicle engaged in highway maintenance, or in ice and snow removal where such operation involves the use of a public highway and vehicles driven by rural letter carriers while in the performance of their official duties." Hazardous operation is defined as the operation, or parking, of a vehicle on or immediately adjacent to a public highway while such vehicle is actually engaged in an operation which would restrict, impede or interfere with the normal flow of traffic (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 117-b).
2 This accorded with the common law rule in other jurisdictions (see, Annotation, Liability for Injury or Damage Caused by Snowplowing or Snow Removal Operations and Equipment, 83 ALR 4th 5).
3 Section 1103(b) states in its entirety:
"Unless specifically made applicable, the provisions of this title, except the provisions of sections eleven hundred ninety-two through eleven hundred ninety-six of this chapter, shall not apply to persons, teams, motor vehicles, and other equipment while actually engaged in work on a highway nor shall the provisions of subsection (a) of section twelve hundred two apply to hazard vehicles while actually engaged in hazardous operation on or adjacent to a highway but shall apply to such persons and vehicles when traveling to or from such hazardous operation. The foregoing provisions of this subdivision shall not relieve any person, or team or any operator of a motor vehicle or other equipment while actually engaged in work on a highway from the duty to proceed at all times during all phases of such work with due regard for the safety of all persons nor shall the foregoing provisions protect such persons or teams or such operators of motor vehicles or other equipment from the consequences of their reckless disregard for the safety of others."
4 To the extent that Somersall v New York Tel. Co. (74 2 302, 307-309, revd on other grounds , 52 NY2d 157) holds otherwise, that decision is not to be followed.
5 The original version of section 1103(b) stated in its entirety:
Unless specifically made applicable, the provisions of this title shall not apply to persons, teams, motor vehicles, and other equipment while actually engaged in work on a highway nor shall the provisions of subsection (a) of section twelve hundred two apply to vehicles operated by public service corporations while actually engaged in work on the installation or maintenance of public service facilities on or adjacent to a highway but shall apply to such persons or vehicles when traveling to or from such work.