Blake v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of New York City, Inc., 2003 N.Y. Int. 0164 (Dec. 23, 2003).

LABOR LAW — LABOR LAW § 240(1) — ABSOLUTE LIABILITY — STRICT LIABILITY — TORT — PERSONAL INJURY — AGENCY

ISSUE & DISPOSITION

Issue(s)

1. Whether a plaintiff, who was injured while using a ladder on a construction site, may prevail in a Labor Law § 240(1) action when a jury finds the ladder was constructed and operated so as to give the plaintiff proper protection and he was the sole cause of his own injury.

2. Whether entities who provide funding for construction projects are agents under the meaning of Labor Law § 240(1).

Disposition

1. No. Labor Law § 240(1), New York's "scaffold law," does not impose strict liability where there was no statutory violation and where plaintiff's injury was caused entirely by his own negligence.

2. No. Under Labor Law § 240(1), an agency relationship is created only when work is delegated to a third party who has supervisory authority over the job.

SUMMARY

Plaintiff operated his own contracting company and suffered an ankle injury while working alone on a residential renovation job when a portion of his ladder retracted. Plaintiff sued the homeowner and Defendant, a not-for-profit lender who provided low-interest financing to facilitate the renovation, alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1). Plaintiff claimed that Defendant was strictly liable as a statutory agent under Labor Law § 240(1) for having failed to provide a proper workplace. The Supreme Court granted the homeowner’s motion for summary judgment, but denied Defendant’s motion, concluding there were questions of fact as to whether Defendant directed or controlled the work as required by "agents" under Section 240(1). The court also denied Plaintiff’s motion as to liability under Section 240(1). The Appellate Division affirmed and a trial was held to determine the factual questions. At trial, the jury concluded that Defendant had the authority to "direct, supervise, and control" Plaintiff’s work. The jury also concluded that the ladder used by Plaintiff was constructed and operated to give proper protection, thus leading to the conclusion that the accident was solely because of Plaintiff’s own negligence in failing to lock the extension clips of the ladder. The trial court denied Plaintiff’s motion to vacate the jury verdict and direct one in his favor. The Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals both affirmed.

On appeal, Plaintiff alleged that Labor Law § 240(1) is a strict liability statute and the court should have set aside the jury’s verdict. The Court of Appeals examined the legislative history and purpose of Labor Law § 240(1), and concluded that "liability is contingent on a statutory violation and proximate cause." The Court said that a fall from a ladder or scaffold, in and of itself, does not automatically result in a damage award; but, Section 240(1) does create absolute liability once there has been a breach of safety protocol which results in an accident. The Court stated that Plaintiff is obligated to show that a violation of the statute was a contributing cause of the accident, and Plaintiff failed to do so here. The Court thus held that Defendant could not be liable under Labor Law § 240(1) because Plaintiff’s actions were the "sole proximate cause" of the accident. See Weininger v. Hagedorn & Co. 91 N.Y.2d 958 (1998). The Court also concluded that Defendant was not liable as an agent of the homeowner because it only acted as a lender and played a de minimis role in the project. The Court found that an agency relationship exists under Section 240(1) only when a third party is delegated work and has the supervisory authority to control the job. Thus, the Court affirmed the order of the Appellate Division.

Prepared by the liibulletin-ny editorial board.