Defendant Daniel Edwards was indicted on one count each of first-degree murder, second-degree murder, second-degree conspiracy, and second-degree criminal possession of a weapon. The prosecution filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty, in accordance with N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 250.40. Prior to trial, Defendant plea bargained with the prosecution. The County Court accepted the plea agreement after conducting a detailed allocution to determine whether Defendant "offered the plea freely, voluntarily and with full awareness of the rights he was forfeiting." Consequent to Defendant's guilty plea to first-degree murder and his cooperation with the prosecution of his codefendants, Defendant was to receive a sentence of no less than 25 years imprisonment and a withdrawal of the notice of intent. Defendant pled guilty, the prosecution withdrew the notice of intent, and the County Court accepted and entered the plea.

Prior to Defendant's sentencing, but subsequent to his guilty plea, the Court of Appeals decided Matter of Hynes v. Tomei, 92 N.Y.2nd 613 (N.Y. 1998). In Hynes, the Court found the plea bargaining provisions of New York's death penalty statute to be unconstitutional because the provisions forced defendants to either waive their right to a jury trail or face the death penalty. The Court in Hynes invalidated the defendant's plea of guilty to first-degree murder because it was made while the prosecutor's notice of intent to seek the death penalty was pending. Because the plea in Edwards was delivered with a notice of intent pending, and administered pursuant to the invalid statutory provisions, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw the plea, arguing that his plea was invalid under the new standard announced in Hynes. The County Court denied the motion after determining that Defendant's plea was voluntary and intelligent, and had been entered "after . . . or in conjunction with" the notice's removal. Defendant appealed after receiving a sentence of 25 years to life in prison. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction on the grounds that Hynes stands for the unconstitutionality of making a defendant choose "between pleading guilty to murder in the first-degree or opting for trial while a death notice is pending." The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded.

Whether a defendant's guilty plea to first-degree murder, made while a notice of intent to seek the death penalty was pending, was invalid as an impermissible burden on the defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, in light of the intervening case of Hynes v. Tomei..

No. Although the plea bargaining provisions of New York's death penalty statute were declared unconstitutional in Hynes v. Tomei, a voluntary, knowing, intelligent and fully counseled guilty plea nevertheless waives a defendant's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury, even if the defendant makes the plea while a notice of intent to seek the death penalty is pending.

State of the Law Before Edwards

In 1968 the Supreme Court established that a statute is unconstitutional if it unnecessarily burdens a defendant's exercise of Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. Such a burden is created when a defendant can avoid facing a potential death sentence only by pleading guilty and waiving the right to jury trial. See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 582 (1968) (finding the death penalty provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act unconstitutional). The Jackson decision rested on 1897 precedent that a confession of guilt is admissible only if it is "free and voluntary" and not "obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence." Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897). At the time of the Jackson decision, New York had a death penalty statute. However, in 1973 the New York Court of Appeals found New York's death penalty statute unconstitutional. People v. Fitzpatrick, 32 N.Y.2d 499 (N.Y.1973).

In 1995, after a twenty-two year moratorium, New York reinstated the death penalty. In 1998, the New York Court of Appeals, citing Jackson, found unconstitutional the plea bargain provisions of New York's 1995 Death Penalty Statute, N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §§ 220.10(5)(e) and 220.30(3)(b)(vii). See Matter of Hynes v. Tomei, 92 N.Y.2nd 613, 623 (N.Y. 1998). The plea bargaining provisions, the Court reasoned, forced a first-degree murder defendant to choose either to face a potential death sentence, or to plead guilty and sacrifice his/her Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights - precisely the choice declared unconstitutional in Jackson. The Court upheld the constitutionality of guilty pleas generally, pointing out that plea bargains serve to help court's efficiency and economy. According to the Court, the statute's infirmity was the reservation of the maximum punishment for defendants who insisted on a jury trial. The Court in Hynes, similar to the opinion of the Supreme Court in Jackson, held that the plea bargaining provisions were severable from the statute and did not invalidate the death penalty statute itself.

The Hynes opinion refers to an important post-Jackson Supreme Court decision, Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), in a footnote that seems to anticipate the issue faced in Edwards. Hynes v. Tomei, 92 N.Y.2nd 613, 620 n.3. In Brady, the defendant sought relief from a 1959 sentence under the Federal Kidnaping Act. The defendant argued that the 1968 Jackson ruling changed the circumstances of his nine year-old plea because, under the intervening Jackson ruling, his plea was coerced by the now-unconstitutional portions of the Act. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, rejected this argument, holding that even though the plea bargaining provisions had been found unconstitutional, Jackson did not extend so far as to make unconstitutional all plea bargains made in the face of a potential death sentence. Brady v. Unites States, 397 U.S. 742, 747. Rather, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that a guilty plea is valid so long as the defendant makes the plea voluntary and intelligently, and under the advisement of competent counsel. The Brady decision was the first of a contemporaneous trilogy that underscored the same position. See Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970); North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).

Prosecutors and defendants in New York have both faced difficulties adapting to the restrictions the Hynes decision imposed on plea bargaining, often resorting to court-approved plea bargains or complicated procedural sequences that narrowly avoid constitutional infirmities. For a detailed analysis of the post-Hynes plea bargaining process, see Joseph L. Hoffman, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of Death, 69 FORDHAM LAW REV. 2313 (May 2001).

Effect of Edwards on Current Law

In Edwards, the Court of Appeals definitively stated that, "As to the effect of the handing down of Matter of Hynes v. Tomei subsequent to defendant's guilty plea, Brady is directly on point and conclusively contrary to defendant's position." (internal citations omitted). Therefore, as Jackson did not stand for the invalidation of all similarly situated guilty pleas, neither did Hynes stand for the constitutional invalidation of all guilty pleas made under the plea bargaining provisions of New York State's death penalty statute. Rather, in Edwards, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed the standard that a defendant's interim guilty plea remaines valid if the plea was made voluntarily and intelligently. The Court remanded the matter for the Appellate Division to review the record specifically in order to determine whether Defendant's guilty plea was made in a voluntary and knowing manner.

The Court cited Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) and Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969) for the proposition that a "voluntary, knowing, intelligent and fully counseled guilty plea waives, among other rights, a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury." The Court's decision explicitly allows a defendant's guilty plea to stand if made voluntarily and knowingly, even if that plea was taken while a prosecutor's notice of intent to seek the death penalty was pending.

The dissent reasoned that Defendant should enjoy the benefit of the Hynes holding, arguing that such plea provisions are unconstitutional since Defendant's case was still on appeal while Hynes was decided. In order to bolster its argument, the dissent cited a number of U.S. Supreme Court and New York precedents standing for the proposition that "[w]hen an applicable provision of the law changes while a case is still on appeal, the new standard applies to that case." Citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322-323 (1987); People v. Walker, 81 N.Y.2d 661, 667 (N.Y. 1993); People v. Catalanotte, 72 N.Y.2d 645 (N.Y. 1988). The dissent further reasoned that the Court's "clear statement" in Hynes was a per se restriction of guilty pleas to murder in the first degree while a notice of intent was still pending.

Unanswered Questions

Does the scope of Edwards apply only to those defendants who have guilty pleas entered under the New York Death Penalty Statute before Hynes, or does Edwards stand for the broader proposition that all guilty pleas made knowingly and voluntarily are constitutionally valid?

If all knowing and voluntary guilty pleas are to be considered constitutionally valid in the light of Edwards, what is the tangible effect of striking down the plea bargain provisions of the New York Death Penalty statute if non-statutorily based pleas can still force the "unconstitutional choice?"

If the unconstitutional choice can be avoided simply by having the defendant make a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent decision to waive his/her rights prior to plea bargaining, what are the standards for determining whether the defendant's decision is in fact knowing and voluntary, and are there any procedural safeguards to the waiver process?

Will this decision obviate the need for the complicated procedural sequences used in the past that technically avoid the Hynes problem while allowing for an effective plea bargaining process in the face of the death penalty?

Survey of the Law in Other Jurisdictions

The U.S. Supreme Court, in Jackson, held that forcing a first degree murder defendant to choose between facing the death penalty or pleading guilty and sacrificing Fifth and Six Amendment rights is unconstitutional. However, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Brady, held that a Jackson infirmity in a death penalty statute does not render a guilty plea invalid if the plea was made voluntary, knowingly, and intelligently. When the New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division's decision in Edwards and adopted the Brady-Jackson principle, New York law became consistent with the law in virtually every other state. See Joseph L. Hoffman, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of Death, 69 FORDHAM LAW REV. 2313, 2316 (May 2001) (discussion of the impact of the Appellate Division's decision in Edwards on the then current law). However, New York is the only state that imposes the death penalty solely on those who claim innocence and proceed to trial - it is the only state with two levels of punishment for the same offense. In other states, a person who enters a guilty plea may still be subject to the death penalty. See Hynes v. Tomei, 92 N.Y.2nd 613, 620 n.1.