Whether, in each of these cases, plain clothes police officers committed unreasonable seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, when, in the absence of probable cause or illegal activity, and without following any written procedures, the officers pulled over a predetermined number of occupied livery vehicles for the purpose of performing "safety checks."

Yes. Adopting the U.S. Supreme Court's balancing test of reasonableness in Brown v. Texas and a general arbitrariness standard, the Court determined that the forced stops of the livery vehicles in both cases constituted unreasonable, invalid seizures under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

These appeals arose out of motions to suppress incriminating evidence against a juvenile taxi passenger and an adult taxi passenger, each of whom were arrested during the course of two separate livery vehicle "safety checks," conducted by plain clothes New York City police officers driving unmarked police cars. In both cases, the officers were at the time acting in their capacity as agents of the New York City Taxi-Livery Task Force ("Task Force"), a violent crime prevention program created in 1992 in response to an unprecedented wave of violent crimes against New York City cab drivers.

The customary procedure for Task Force agents was to establish a location in a high crime area and stop a percentage of cabs in order to hand out safety information to the drivers, as well as to inquire as to the cab driver's safety. According to the record, police officers working on the Taxi-Livery Task Force did not follow any written guidelines when performing "safety checks." Rather, the officers were merely given oral instructions to target certain high crime neighborhoods after dark and to stop a certain percentage of livery vehicles "in a set basis and not just arbitrarily." (Opinion, paragraph 4).

In Muhammad F. two Task Force officers, in an unmarked police car, conducted a safety check on the driver of the non-medallion livery vehicle occupied by Plaintiff. The officers arrested Plaintiff after they found a bag of crack cocaine under the cab's front seat during their search of the vehicle. Supreme Court denied Plaintiff's motion to suppress the evidence procured during the stop and adjudicated Plaintiff a juvenile delinquent for committing acts which, if committed by an adult, would constitute criminal possession of a controlled substance. With one justice dissenting, Appellate Division reversed, finding that that the evidence resulted from an unconstitutional seizure and granting the Defendant Presentment Agency leave to appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed Appellate Division's order without costs.

In Boswell, under facts similar to Muhammad F., two Task Force officers pulled over the non-medallion taxi occupied by Defendant in order to perform a safety check. Following their search of the vehicle, the officers arrested Defendant on charges of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree. Supreme Court suppressed the evidence against Defendant. Appellate Division reversed, with one justice dissenting, and leave to appeal was granted. The Court of Appeals reversed Appellate Division's order and reinstated the order of Supreme Court.

The Court held the seizures in both cases to be unreasonable and invalid under a general, arbitrariness standard and under the balancing analysis developed by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47. The reasonableness of a seizure from a brief, suspicionless stop of an automobile is determined by balancing the public interest against the individual's right to personal security without arbitrary interference by law enforcement. Under the first prong of the Brown v. Texas test, the Court acknowledged the state's formidable interest in protecting late night cab drivers from a high incidence of violent robberies and homicides. However, under the second prong, the Court found no evidence that roving, as opposed to fixed checkpoint, stops were a reasonably effective means of furthering the State's interest. Additionally, the Court found no evidence of the unavailability of less intrusive or discretionary means of ensuring cab driver safety. Finally, under the third prong, the severity of the interference with individual liberty, and the arbitrariness standard, the Court concluded that the stops in both of these cases were made in absence of a systematized non-arbitrary method. As such, the method of engaging plain clothes officers in a suspicionless, roving patrol was unjustifiably and excessively intrusive; unnecessarily involved the unmitigated discretion of police enforcement; and encroached upon the right of taxi passengers to enjoy personal security without being subject to the arbitrary interference of law officers.