Petitioner Elias Rodriguez was receiving $1,800 in housing assistance from the Westchester County Department of Social Services (DSS). Further, Petitioner was receiving $564 in federal entitlements. Thus, Petitioner was receiving a monthly total of $2,364 in government assistance.
DSS determined, pursuant to Social Services Law § 131-a(2), that Petitioner's standard of monthly need was $1,937. Thus, Petitioner's actual monthly assistance exceeded his standard of need by $427. DSS, therefore, required Petitioner to sign a "Voluntary Assignment of Income" agreement, under which Petitioner would pay DSS $427 per month from his federal assistance in order to defray the costs of the DSS housing assistance. The penalty for failing to make this payment would be forfeiture of the DSS entitlement for that month. Petitioner requested a fair hearing from Respondent State DSS Commissioner; the administrative judge presiding over the hearing found for Respondent. Pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R 78, Petitioner brought this suit to annul the fair hearing decision. The Supreme Court confirmed the administrative judge's decision and dismissed the petition. The Appellate Division also affirmed.
As a threshold matter, it is important to note that the Court of Appeals found that this case was an exception to the mootness doctrine and therefore saw fit to hear the appeal. The DSS had contended that since the petitioner was no longer receiving temporary housing assistance, had never actually given the DSS any of his Federal benefits and had no property from which DSS could recover the value of the assistance rendered, the appeal was moot. The Court insisted upon hearing the appeal nonetheless for three reasons. First, the issue would likely recur whenever DSS requires future recipients of housing assistance to sign the "Voluntary Assignment of Income." Second, this issue would typically evade future review because of the relatively short period of time in which a person would normally be expected to receive temporary emergency shelter. Finally, the issue is novel and substantial and has significance for the administration of temporary housing assistance. Thus, the Court found that the exception to the mootness doctrine was applicable.
"Safety net assistance" is a type of public assistance. Respondent contended that the DSS housing assistance provided was "safety net assistance" and therefore, the expense could be defrayed by Petitioner's available resources, pursuant to Social Services Law § 131-a(1). Petitioner contended, however, that Social Services Law § 131-v created or described a separate and independent source of entitlement to "temporary emergency shelter" that was not part of "safety net assistance." The Court found the housing assistance to be "safety net assistance," not "temporary emergency shelter," and hence the assistance could be offset by the Petitioner's other available resources.
Prepared by the liibulletin-ny Editorial Board.