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liibulletin: The LII Supreme Court Bulletin

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contents and context

The liibulletin is a Cornell Law School electronic journal. Its editorial board comprises second- and third-year law students, who are responsible for every aspect of the journal's management, from selecting decisions for commentary to researching, writing, editing, and producing the journal content in HTML. Since 2004-05, the bulletin has covered cases currently before the US Supreme Court. Bulletin content is available on this site and by (free) email subscription. See the Cornell Chronicle's 2004 article and 2007 article on this liibulletin project.

Congratulations to the 2011-2012 editorial board!

(See all 2011-12 oral argument previews; term highlights)

Recent previews

Filarsky v. Delia (10-1018)

Oral argument: Jan. 17, 2012

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Sep. 9, 2010)

QUALIFIED IMMUNITY, CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIMS, PRIVATE ATTORNEY

After petitioner Steve Filarsky, a private attorney retained by the City of Rialto to conduct an internal affairs investigation, prompted City officials to order respondent Nicholas Delia, a local firefighter, to consent to a warrantless search of his home, Delia brought a civil rights claim against both Filarsky and the City, alleging, among other things, a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. The district court granted a motion by Filarsky and the officials to dismiss the case on qualified immunity grounds, but the Ninth Circuit reversed in part, ruling that Filarsky, as a private attorney, could not enjoy immunity. Other circuit courts, however, have granted qualified immunity to private lawyers retained by the government. The Supreme Court must resolve the circuit split.

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United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC (11-139)

Oral argument: January 17, 2012

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (Feb. 7, 2011)

TAX, BASIS, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, CHEVRON DEFERENCE

In 2006, the IRS adjusted Respondent Home Concrete’s 1999 tax return, claiming that Home Concrete overstated its basis in sold assets. The Fourth Circuit found that this adjustment was untimely under the general three year statute of limitations for IRS actions, concluding that overstatements of basis are not omissions that would trigger an extended six year statute of limitations. Petitioner, the United States, argues that the language and purpose behind the statute clarify that overstating a sold asset’s basis triggers the extended period, and that the Fourth Circuit should have deferred to the IRS's statutory interpretation contained within a Treasury Department regulation finalized during the appeal. Home Concrete argues that Supreme Court precedent applies here, eliminating ambiguity in the statutory interpretation. The Supreme Court’s decision will resolve a circuit split over the proper limitations period; the decision will also address the degree of deference due to a Treasury regulation that may be interpreted as conflicting with Supreme Court precedent, and that may be viewed as applying retroactively. The Court’s decision may affect the IRS’s timeframe to detect certain complex tax schemes, and the time period within which taxpayers are subject to audits.

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Holder v. Gutierrez (10-1542) & Holder v. Sawyers (10-1543)

Oral argument: January 18, 2012

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Jan. 24, 2011)

IMMIGRATION, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, SECTION 1229b, CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL

In Holder v. Gutierrez and Holder v. Sawyers, the Supreme Court will determine whether aliens may impute their parents’ time spent lawfully residing in the United States to satisfy residency requirements for cancellation of removal under Section 1229b. In both cases, the individuals entered the United States as children, lived with their legal permanent resident parents, and later became inadmissible due to violations of the law. Attorney General Eric Holder argues that the plain language of 1229b does not allow imputation, and that allowing imputation would be contrary to congressional intent. On the other hand, Respondents Gutierrez and Sawyers contend that Congress intended the Immigration and Nationality Act to preserve family unity. They argue that interpreting the statute to disallow imputation would be unreasonable and contrary to congressional intent. If the Supreme Court upholds the imputation rule, aliens who resided with their legal permanent resident parents as minors would be able to impute the their parents’ residency period to satisfy the requirements for cancellation of removal under 1229(b).

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Vartelas v. Holder (10-1211)

Oral argument: Jan. 18, 2012

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Sept. 9, 2010)

IMMIGRATION, DEPORTATION, ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION REFORM AND IMMIGRANT RESPONSIBILITY ACT, LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENT, RETROACTIVITY

Petitioner Panagis Vartelas, a Greek citizen and lawful permanent resident of the United States, pleaded guilty to counterfeiting and was convicted in 1994. In 2003, following a brief trip to Greece, Vartelas received notice to appear for removal proceedings. The immigration judge ordered Vartelas’s deportation, after deeming Vartelas inadmissible under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. Vartelas argues that application of this 1996 Act to his 1994 crime violates the presumption against retroactivity and the reasonable expectations he had when entering his guilty plea. Respondent Attorney General Eric Holder argues that Vartelas’s case does not have a retroactive effect because it penalizes acts conducted after the statute’s enactment: Vartelas’s decision to leave and re-enter the United States. This case affects lawful permanent residents who were convicted of crimes prior to the Act’s enactment. The Supreme Court’s decision could restrict their ability to travel internationally, which in turn could damage their ability to maintain family ties or fulfill religious obligations.

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Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland (10-1016)

Oral argument:  Jan. 11, 2012

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (Nov. 10, 2010)

Eleventh Amendment, sovereign immunity, Fourteenth Amendment, Family and Medical Leave Act

After respondent Maryland Court of Appeals denied petitioner Daniel Coleman’s request for medical leave and terminated his employment, Coleman filed this suit against the State of Maryland under the self-care provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), which provides that “an eligible employee shall be entitled to a total of 12 workweeks of leave during any 12-month period . . . [b]ecause of a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position,” 29 U. S. C. §2612(a)(1) (D). Coleman argues that the Act’s medical leave provisions should be considered as a unified effort against gender discrimination that permits state employees to sue state employers under the self-care provision, and that the purpose of preventing gender discrimination abrogates state immunity. The state responds that the FMLA’s provisions address discrete forms of discrimination that should be examined individually and that the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity bars lawsuits against a state employer under the self-care provision. By deciding whether a state employee has legal recourse for a violation of the self-care provision, this case will clarify the scope of state exposure to employment lawsuits seeking money damages under the FMLA.

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Roberts v. Sea-Land Services (10-1399)

Oral argument: Jan. 11, 2012

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Nov. 10, 2010)

DISABILITY, EMPLOYMENT, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, MARITIME, ADMIRALTY

In 2002, Petitioner Dana Roberts slipped on a patch of ice while working for his employer, Respondent Sea-Land Services. After the fall, Roberts claimed disability and sought compensation under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. Initially, Sea-Land paid Roberts, but, in May 2005, Sea-Land discontinued payments. An administrative law judge ordered Sea-Land to resume payments, but a dispute arose concerning the proper method for calculating payment. In this case, the Supreme Court will decide when Petitioner Roberts was “newly awarded compensation” under the Act. Roberts argues that this occurred in 2007, when the administrative law judge entered the compensation order. However, Sea-Land Services argues that the judge correctly determined that this occurred in 2002, the year Roberts became entitled to compensation. The Court’s decision will determine which fiscal year is used to calculate the maximum compensation owed. The result could substantially increase Roberts’s compensation under the Act, and will determine how such calculations are performed in similar federal compensation programs.

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