liibulletin: The LII Supreme Court Bulletin
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contents and context
The liibulletin is a Cornell Law School electronic journal. Its editorial board comprises second- and third-year law students, who are responsible for every aspect of the journal's management, from selecting decisions for commentary to researching, writing, editing, and producing the journal content in HTML. From 1995-2004, it covered the New York Court of Appeals. Since 2004-05, the bulletin has covered cases currently before the US Supreme Court. Bulletin content is available on this site and by (free) email subscription. See the Cornell Chronicle's 2004 article and 2007 article on this liibulletin project.
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Former Detroit police officer Burt Lancaster shot and killed his girlfriend, Toni King, in 1993. As a result, the State of Michigan charged Burt Lancaster with first-degree murder and possession of a firearm while committing a felony. Although Lancaster, who has a history of mental illness, asserted both defenses of insanity and diminished capacity during his initial trial in 1994, a Michigan jury convicted Lancaster on both counts. Lancaster's conviction was subsequently overturned, however, because of an error made by the State during jury selection. The State of Michigan retried Lancaster in 2005. Although Lancaster planned to rely completely on his diminished capacity defense during his second trial, the Michigan trial court prohibited Lancaster from doing so on the grounds that the Michigan Supreme Court abolished the defense in 2001. As Lancaster was unable to assert the diminished capacity defense at his second trial, the Michigan state court convicted Lancaster once again and sentenced him to life plus two years in prison. Lancaster petitioned the federal courts for a writ of habeas corpus. While the District Court denied Lancaster's petition, the Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the retroactive application of the Michigan Supreme Court's abolishment of the diminished capacity defense violated federal due process. On appeal, the State of Michigan argues that the Michigan state court's decision to prohibit the diminished capacity defense was not an "unexpected and indefensible" abrogation of Michigan law because the diminished capacity defense has never been expressly provided by Michigan statute nor has it been a part of settled Michigan common law. Lancaster responds that he has the constitutional right to present the diminished capacity defense because the defense was well-settled under Michigan law and available to him at the time he committed the murder. The State of Indiana and others argue in support of Michigan, asserting that diminished capacity is a state law issue and federal courts should defer to a state court's analysis. Lancaster responds that the Michigan state court's decision was unreasonable and that a federal court should independently review the Michigan state court's determination. This decision will further outline the prohibition on changes in state judge-made law by determining when the retroactivity prohibition can be used to justify granting habeas corpus relief and by further defining what constitutes an "unexpected and indefensible" change to the common law.
Petitioner Giridhar C. Sekhar was convicted of extortion under federal law for threatening to expose an extramarital affair unless the General Counsel for the State Comptroller recommended that the state pension fund invest in a fund managed by Sekhar’s company. The Court will determine the limits of the meaning of the word “property” under federal extortion law, and whether the General Counsel's recommendation was "property" that could be subject to extortion. The Court’s decision will have implications for the scope of federal extortion law and, more generally, for the balance between enforcement of federal and state criminal law when the two overlap. Petitioner argues for a narrow definition of property, limited to something of value that is transferable. Respondent calls for a broader view of property to include the legal advice given by lawyers.
Eradicating unlawful discrimination and retaliation in the workplace is one of core purposes of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Respondent Dr. Naiel Nassar, a former faculty member of the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center (UTSW), alleges that his employer denied him a job in retaliation for a prior resignation letter alleging race discrimination in the workplace. Specifically, Nassar's resignation letter stated that his supervisor made derogatory comments about his Middle Eastern descent. Petitioner UTSW argues that Nassar needs to prove that retaliation was the sole motivating factor for the negative employment action. In contrast, Nassar argues that he need only show that retaliation was a motivating factor, but not necessarily the only one, for the negative employment action. A holding for UTSW may make it more difficult for victims of retaliation under Title VII to sue their employers, whereas a holding for Nassar may increase the costs borne by employers in defending against potentially meritless litigation.
Petitioners, Adoptive Couple, decided to adopt a baby girl from a single mother. After Baby Girl's birth, Adoptive Couple began the official adoption process and Birth Father, a member of the Cherokee Nation, signed a form relinquishing his rights to Baby Girl. Later, however, Birth Father claimed that he did not intend to relinquish his rights and sought to invoke the Indian Child Welfare Act ("ICWA") because Baby Girl is of Indian heritage. Both the Charleston County Family Court and the Supreme Court of South Carolina held that Birth Father should have custody of Baby Girl. Adoptive Couple argues that Birth Father does not qualify as a “parent” under the ICWA and, thus, does not have parental rights to stop Baby Girl’s adoption. Furthermore, Adoptive Couple asserts that given the intent of the ICWA and the fact that Baby Girl has no parental relationship to Birth Father or other ties to the Cherokee Nation, the ICWA cannot be applied to oppose her adoption. Respondents Birth Father and the Cherokee Nation claim that Birth Father does meet the “parent” definition of ICWA because he has proven his biological link to Baby Girl and also acknowledged her as his child. The Supreme Court's decision in this case will have an impact on the adoption process and system for children of Indian heritage, their biological parents, and prospective adoptive parents.
While serving in the Air Force in 1999, a military tribunal convicted twenty-one-year-old Anthony Kebodeaux of statutory rape for having consensual sex with a fifteen-year-old girl. Following a three-month sentence and bad-conduct discharge, Kebodeaux moved to Texas, where he became subject to strict lifetime registration requirements that include annual in-person registration and registration updates upon intrastate movement. Seven years later, in 2006, Congress enacted the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”), which imposes registration requirements on sex offenders convicted under state or federal law, and additionally prescribes penalties for failure to register. After failing to update his registration following an intrastate move in 2008, Kebodeaux was convicted under SORNA in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas and sentenced to one year and one day in prison, plus five years of supervised release. Kebodeaux appealed this conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, arguing that Congress did not have jurisdiction to criminalize his intrastate movements. The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed the District Court’s conviction, holding that as applied to Kebodeaux, SORNA’s registration requirements were unconstitutional as exceeding Congress’s Article I powers. On appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, the United States argues that SORNA did not constitute overreaching by the federal government because Kebodeaux was consistently subject to federal jurisdiction, having committed a federal offense under military law. In response, Kebodeaux contends that his release from prison pre-SORNA was unconditional, meaning that he is bound only by state registration requirements and any reassertion of federal jurisdiction over him through SORNA would be unconstitutional. This case will also examine the balance between the benefits of uniformity in a comprehensive registration system against considerations of state sovereignty.
Tarrant Regional Water District ("Tarrant") seeks to export water to Texas from multiple sources within Oklahoma which are covered by the Red River Compact ("Compact"), a congressionally approved water apportionment agreement between Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas. In 2007, Tarrant sued members of the Oklahoma Water Resources Board ("OWRB"), including Herrmann, in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. Tarrant sought a declaratory judgment that certain Oklahoma statutes dealing with water apportionment are unconstitutional and an injunction preventing the OWRB from applying the statutes to Tarrant's application for water. Tarrant argued that the Oklahoma statutes violate the dormant Commerce Clause by burdening interstate commerce and that the statutes are preempted insofar as they conflict with the Compact's language. Tarrant argues that the Compact provides Texas with cross-border rights to access water located in Oklahoma and that Oklahoma’s water permitting statutes violate the dormant Commerce Clause by discriminating against out-of-state water users. OWRB argues that the signatory states to the Compact did not surrender their sovereignty by signing the Compact and that the Commerce Clause does not apply in this case because the Compact shelters Oklahoma’s water laws from scrutiny under the Commerce Clause. Both parties fear that this decision, if decided for the opposing party, will cause severe social, economic, and environmental harm to their states.
