Hammon v. Indiana

Overview

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right…to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Supreme Court has broadly construed “witness” to include not only an individual who testifies under oath at trial or at a formal proceeding but also any person who provides “testimonial” evidence. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). Here, the Court must determine whether an oral accusation made to an investigating officer at the scene of an alleged crime is a testimonial statement and therefore subject to the requirements of the Confrontation Clause.

Petitioner’s Argument

Petitioner contends that Mrs. Hammon’s statements to Officer Mooney at the scene of the alleged crime, stating that Mr. Hammon “shoved her head into the broken glass of the heater and that he had punched her in the chest twice,” were testimonial and therefore subject to the Confrontation Clause. Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 446 (Ind. 2005). Petitioner makes four arguments to support this conclusion: (i) accusatory statements, such as those uttered by Mrs. Hammon, reach the core of the Confrontation Clause; (ii) an individual in Mrs. Hammon’s position could reasonably have anticipated that her statement would be used in a criminal investigation or prosecution; (iii) Mrs. Hammon’s excited condition does not exempt her statement from the requirements of the Confrontation Clause; and (iv) adoption of the Indiana supreme court’s rule regarding testimonial statements would frustrate the Sixth Amendment and undermine core law enforcement functions. Brief for Petitioner at 7-8.

First, Petitioner argues that Mrs. Hammon’s statements should be viewed as “testimonial” because they implicate the “core” concerns animating the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 10. Petitioner notes the short-hand description of the Confrontation clause often encountered in federal judicial opinions to support his contention: “Accusations are so much the core of the Clause’s concern that this Court has often referred to the “right to confront one’s accusers, sometimes explicitly associating that locution – rather than the actual term “the witnesses against him” – with the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 13 . See Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 185 (2004); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969). As discussed earlier, the Confrontation Clause entitles a defendant to cross-examine the “witnesses” against him, testing their sincerity, bias, memory, perception, and the accuracy of their narratives under oath. The right to cross-examine witnesses is not limited to individuals testifying at formal proceedings. Rather, it extends to any person who provides “testimonial” evidence subsequently used at trial. Evidence is testimonial, according the Petitioner, when it serves the same function as statements delivered at trial. Id. at 12. A statement is properly testimonial, therefore, when it “transmits information for use in investigation or prosecution of a crime.” Id. at 13.

In this light, the oral accusation uttered by Mrs. Hammon was certainly testimonial, providing not “merely peripheral or supporting information” but directly asserting that the defendant committed a crime. Id. Indeed, her accusation, which stated all of the elements of battery, was alone sufficient to support Mr. Hammon’s conviction. Id. Further, the intended audience of Mrs. Hammond’s remark, i.e. a law enforcement officer, confirms the statement was uttered “for use in the investigation or prosecution of a crime.” Id. Therefore, Petitioner urges the Court to adopt a clear, bright-line rule, which may not be eroded by subsequent judicial opinions, providing that any “statement made to a known police officer…and accusing another person of a crime is testimonial.” Id. at 10.

Second, Petitioner insists Mrs. Hammon’s accusation was testimonial because a reasonable person in her position could have anticipated that her statement would likely be used in a criminal investigation or prosecution. Id. at 14. Petitioner contends that the critical question is not whether the declarant herself actually intended or believed her statement would be used in a criminal investigation or prosecution but rather whether a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would have anticipated it would be used for these purposes. Id. at 18. The standard, therefore, is an objective rather than subjective one: “In none of these cases does the actual motive of the declarant…diminish the testimonial nature of the statement: Whatever her inner motivations may have been, she has knowingly created evidence that a reasonable person understands will likely be used by the criminal justice system.” Id.

Petitioner simultaneously rejects the Indiana Supreme Court’s focus on the motivation of the questioner to determine the testimonial nature of the response. Id. at 14. Putting primary weight on the objectives of the inquisitor, Petitioner contends, would result in exclusion of highly probative statements obtained by undercover law enforcement dealing with suspects. Id. Because the undercover officer clearly aims to acquire incriminating evidence, any statements obtained from suspects would be subject to the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 14-15. Moreover, the historical origins of the confrontation right, which date back over two millennia, predate the advent of a professional law enforcement system. See Deuteronomy 19:15-18. It is therefore “absurd” to conclude that a questioning officer must necessarily intend to acquire incriminating evidence for a declarant’s response to be testimonial. Brief for Petitioner at 15.

Third, Mrs. Hammon’s excited condition does not assure the sincerity or reliability of her statement, and therefore an exemption from the Confrontation Clause would be unwarranted. Petitioner urges the Court to decline creating an exception to the Confrontation Clause for testimonial statements uttered in an excited state. Id. at 22. Petitioner cites Crawford, in which the Supreme stated in a footnote, “It is questionable whether testimonial statements would ever have been admissible on that ground [“as spontaneous declarations”] in 1791.” 541 U.S. at 58 n. 8. In the same footnote, however, the Court noted that in the 17^th century English case, Thompson v. Trevanion, Skin. 402, 90 Eng. Rep. 179 (K.B.1694), the court admitted an accusation made by a victim “immediat[ely] upon the hurt received, and before [he] had time to devise or contrive any thing for her own advantage” over a confrontation clause objection. Petitioner contends this holding, nevertheless, exclusively applies to civil suits, never gained broad judicial acceptance, and finally, does not govern the instant case because there is no evidence that Mrs. Hammon’s accusation to Officer Mooney “immediately” followed the commission of the crime. Brief for Petitioner at 26-27. Indeed, the time elapsed between the alleged crime and Mrs. Hammon’s statement may have been sufficiently long for her to “create a self-serving falsehood,” raising the very concerns underlying the Confrontation Clause. Id.

Fourth, Petitioner urges against adoption of the Indian supreme court rule, which would exempt from the Confrontation Clause oral accusations made while police are securing a scene or attempting to determine whether a crime has been committed. Id. at 33. Such a test, according to Petitioner, is susceptible to police manipulation. Id. at 38. Law enforcement could delay securing of a scene or ask vague, open-ended questions to lend the impression that interrogation is directed at determining whether a crime has been committed, rather than locking in incriminating statements by the suspect. Id. Both of these outcomes would undermine officers’ ability to protect the public and effectively investigate crimes. Id. at 40.

Respondent’s Argument

Respondent advocates a different standard for determining whether an individual’s statement is “testimonial” that is more closely linked to the historical roots of the Confrontation Clause. Respondent insists the critical issue is neither the intent of the declarant and questioner nor the accusatory content of the statement. Rather, the controlling question is whether the statement in question was “produced by the abusive inquisitorial practices that gave rise to the Confrontation Clause.” Brief for Respondent at 8. Other relevant considerations include: (i) whether statements possess the formality and solemnity attendant testimonial statements at the time of the Founding, and (ii) whether the declarant’s statements are in response to police actions or questions related to a “reasonable concern for the immediate safety of any persons or property.” Id. at 9.

Respondent contends that the historical origins of the Confrontation Clause govern its present scope. The Framers, according to the Respondent, were especially preoccupied with the accusations delivered under the “abusive inquisitorial” characteristic of the Star Chamber and other 17^th century English criminal tribunals. Id. at 13. Indeed, the Star Chamber, which aimed to “trap the accused into a confession,” employed manipulative interrogation tactics, often supplemented by torture. Id. at 19. The most notable case was the 1603 trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, who was convicted by a confession extorted from Lord Cobham by the Privy Council. Raleigh’s Case, 2 How. St. Tr. 1, 15-16 (1603). The accusatory system adopted by the Framers also consciously repudiated the “highly formal” continental civil law procedures for producing testimony, whereby judges would secretly interrogate witnesses, who could not be cross-examined by the accused. John H. Langbein, Prosecuting Crime in the Renaissance 233-34 (1974). These inquisitorial methods, according to Respondent, define the modern contours of the confrontation clause.

Equally worrisome for the Founders were “formal, deliberate, carefully crafted processes” for extracting incriminating evidence from a witness, who would subsequently be excluded from trial. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43-47. These included tactically structured questions or interrogation purposefully aimed at obtaining formalized inculpatory statements, such as affidavits, deposition transcripts, prior-hearing and trial transcripts, grand-jury testimony, and responses to police interrogation. Supreme Court precedent, according to Respondent, is consistent with the historical roots of the Confrontation Clause. In Crawford, the leading case, the Court excluded the stationhouse statements of the victim, Sylvia Crawford, which were provided “[i]n response to often leading questions from police detectives.” Id. at 65. Indeed, the Court concluded Crawford’s statement was testimonial because it was “knowingly given in response to structured police questioning.” Id. at 53 n.4. Similarly, the Court concluded that statements delivered after the police questioned the accomplice multiple times and threatened a life sentence were testimonial. Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 121 (1999).

Amy Hammon’s statements survive the Confrontation Clause because they arose from emergency assistance rather than abusive inquisitorial practices. Officer Mooney did not utilize veiled threats, arms-twisting or clandestine interrogation methods when he interviewed a frightened Mrs. Hammon in her living room. Brief for Respondent at 3. Moreover, the purpose of the exchange was not to obtain formalized testimonial evidence or coerce a reluctant witness into providing inculpatory statements but rather to assess whether the situation was secure, the victim was safe, and to determine whether a crime had been committed. Id. Questions were not tactically structured to ensnare the declarant but rather were open-ended. Id. at 4. Mooney was sensitive to Mrs. Hammon’s apparent reluctance to speak. Id. Indeed, “the transcript relates no additional prompting of Amy’s oral statements to Officer Mooney. Id.

Respondent also proposes the corollary rule that statements are not testimonial when provided in response to police actions or questions related to a “reasonable concern for the immediate safety of any persons or property.” Police questions aimed at ensuring the immediate safety of the victim simply did not concern the Framers. Brief for Respondent at 27. Indeed, a modern police force that would respond to domestic disturbances or other emergencies simply did not exist in the 18^th century. Id. at 27. Questions aimed at “uncovering and addressing immediate threats” are not “crafted or manipulated to fit a predetermined narrative” and therefore do not resemble the structured questioning offensive to the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 28. Here, Officer Mooney’s questions, intended to ascertain whether a violent altercation had occurred and whether the victim was safe and secure, fall squarely within the corollary rule proposed by the Respondent.

Finally, exclusion of a victim’s statements to emergency first-responders, often the most probative evidence in domestic violence and child abuse cases, would frustrate the prosecution of violent offenders. Id. at 39. Fear of spousal retaliation or a sense of loyalty compels many victims of domestic abuse to abstain from testifying a trial. Id. Thus, there is no deliberate state effort to develop “evidence for criminal prosecution in secret and then shield that evidence from attack,” a core concern underlying the 6^th Amendment. Id. at 40. Because of victims’ reluctance to testify against their spouses, application of the Confrontation Clause would result in exclusion of victims’ oral statements to first-responders, depriving the prosecution of its key evidence. The high rate of same-victim recidivism -- abusive spouses repeatedly engage in domestic violence, perpetuating cycles of violence – makes successful prosecution especially important. Id. at 39. Indeed, 47% of husbands who batter their wives do so three or more times per year. See Am. Med. Ass’n, Diagnostic and Treatment Guidelines on Domestic Violence 6 (1992), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/amal/pub/upload/mm/386/domesticviolence.pdf.