Issues
Does the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), which requires that prisoners first exhaust all available administrative remedies prior to filing a civil rights suit in federal court, mandates that a prisoner's entire civil suit be dismissed from federal court if the prisoner has failed to totally exhaust all available administrative remedies for each claim prior to filing suit? Additionally, does a prisoner, who proceeds to file suit in federal court but fails to attach to his complaint proof and documentation of how he exhausted all available administrative remedies, must have his entire case dismissed from federal court? Finally, does a prisoner's entire civil rights case must be dismissed from federal court if, during the process of exhausting available administrative remedies, he failed to specifically name the parties whom he later named as defendants in his federal court case?
Lorenzo Jones and Timothy Williams both filed suit against the Michigan Department of Corrections on the grounds that the treatment they received in jail violated their Constitutional civil rights. The Circuit Court held that neither plaintiff fulfilled their requirements to totally exhaust available administrative remedies under 42. U.S.C. § 1997e of the PLRA. The Circuit Court held that Jones failed the exhaustion requirement because he failed to either describe or attach proof of how he exhausted administrative remedies in his complaint. See Jones v. Bock, 135 Fed at 839. Although Williams did attach proof of exhaustion to his complaint, the Circuit Court held that he still failed the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement because he did not specifically name the defendant in his initial grievance filings with prison officials. See Williams v. Overton, 136 Fed at 862. In these consolidated cases, Petitioners argue that the Circuit Court's holdings amount to judicially-created pleading requirements that are inconsistent with the PLRA’s text, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and judicial norms. Respondents maintain that the PLRA instituted a “new regime” for inmate Civil Rights Act suits and that the text and structure of the PLRA require the Circuit Court’s heightened pleading requirements. See Brief for Respondents at 27-28. How the Supreme Court decides these condensed cases will reflect its view of the correct balance of burden between inmate plaintiffs and the judiciary. These cases will either require prisoners to be more vigilant in asserting their own civil rights or require the judiciary to be more active in defending prisoners’ rights.
Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties
Jones v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections:
1. Whether satisfaction of the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement is a prerequisite to a prisoner's federal civil rights suit such that the prisoner must allege in his complaint how he exhausted his administrative remedies (or attach proof of exhaustion to the complaint), or instead, whether non-exhaustion is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded and proven by the defense.
2. Whether the PLRA prescribes a “total exhaustion” rule that requires a federal district court to dismiss a prisoner's federal civil rights complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies whenever there is a single unexhausted claim, despite the presence of other exhausted claims.
Williams v. Overton:
1. Whether the PLRA requires a prisoner to name a particular defendant in his or her administrative grievance in order to exhaust his or her administrative remedies as to that defendant and to preserve his or her right to sue them.
2. Whether the PLRA prescribes a “total exhaustion” rule that requires a federal district court to dismiss a prisoner's federal civil rights complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies whenever there is a single unexhausted claim, despite the presence of other exhausted claims.
Facts
Purpose and Effect of the PLRA
If a prisoner feels that his civil rights have been violated during his incarceration, he has a right to file a civil rights claim in federal court. Each year, thousands of prisoners commence actions on these grounds. The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”), which was passed by Congress in 1996, was designed in response to an influx of prisoner civil rights litigation. In order to reduce the quantity of new prisoner civil rights cases filed in the federal court system, the PLRA imposed stricter jurisdictional requirements which prisoners must satisfy in order to effectively file suit. Specifically, the PLRA maintained that no prisoner may sue the department of corrections or its agents until he has first exhausted all other available administrative remedies. See 42. U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
The PLRA has resulted directly in effective yet controversial results. First, the intended goals of the PLRA to reduce the quantity of prisoner litigation have been realized: the federal court system has experienced a dramatic decrease in prisoner cases (from 42,000 inmate civil rights petitions in 1995 to 26,000 petitions in 2000). See http://docket.medill.northwestern.edu/archives/003440.php However, critics of the PLRA express concern that the exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement is too strict. For example, many prisoners with valid civil rights claims have been barred from federal court for failing to properly exhaust all administrative remedies prior to filing suit. See Id .
Currently, the United States Courts of Appeals circuit courts are divided on the issue of total exhaustion. Some circuit courts, including the Sixth Circuit, maintain that a plaintiff’s entire suit must automatically be dismissed from court if he has not totally exhausted all administrative remedies with respect to each aspect of his claim. Other circuits, however, maintain that any individual claims that have satisfied the exhaustion requirement may proceed in court even if the plaintiff needs to amend other related claims that have not yet satisfied the exhaustion requirement.
Jones’s and Williams’s Claims
Lorenzo L. Jones and Timothy Williams both filed suit against the Michigan Department of Corrections on the grounds that the treatment they received in jail violates their Constitutional civil rights. On November 14, 2000, while being transported and in the custody of the Michigan Department of Corrections, Jones received serious injuries resulting from a motor vehicle accident. Jones v. Bock 135 Fed. Appx. 837, 838 (6th Cir. 2005). Jones alleges that although the prison officials knew of his injuries, they nonetheless forced him to engage in strenuous tasks which worsened his physical condition. Id. He claims this to be a cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Like Jones, Williams claims that his jailhouse conditions violate his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, as well as the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act. Williams suffers from noninvoluting cavernous hemangiomas, a condition which causes tumors to grow in his right arm and results in disfigurement. Williams v. Overton 136 Fed. Appx. 859, 860 (6th Cir. 2005). Williams claims that the Department of Corrections violated his civil rights when it prevented him from obtaining a necessary surgical operation on his arm, despite authorization from doctors to proceed with the surgery.
Both Williams and Jones pursued administrative remedies for their grievances prior to filing suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan but they did not “totally exhaust” all available remedies to the court’s satisfaction. Jones, for example, stated in his complaint that he exhausted every administrative remedy available, but he failed to describe which remedies he pursued and did not attach copies of grievance forms to his complaint as proof. Jones v. Bock 135 Fed at 839. Hence, the trial court dismissed his claim, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Williams, on the other hand, did attach grievance forms to his complaint. Thus, he was able to show that he had actually pursued and exhausted all administrative remedies available. However, the medical grievances that he filed during the administrative remedy process did not specifically name the parties who he later named as defendants in his federal court claim. Williams v. Overton 136 Fed at 862. Hence, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan dismissed his entire claim for failure to exhaust all remedies under the PLRA. That decision was also affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
Both Williams and Jones successfully petitioned a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States to determine which specific measures a prisoner must take before filing a civil rights action in federal court, and whether failure to take such measures means that the prisoner's entire suit must be dismissed under the PLRA. The Supreme Court will hear both cases together on October 30, 2006 and will allow one hour for oral argument.
Analysis
Provisions at Issue
Congress enacted the PLRA in 1996 with the intent that it would “reduce the quantity and improve the quality of prisoner suits.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). As such, the first provision of the PLRA in question, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, directs the court to review, as soon as feasible (even before docketing), a prisoner's civil action complaint against the government or its employee and to either identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted. Also, the second provision of the PLRA in question, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, states that no action shall be brought by a prisoner with regard to prison conditions until the available administrative remedies are exhausted. In these consolidated cases, the Court of Appeals held that to satisfy the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, prisoners must (1) either allege how they exhausted the administrative remedies in their complaints or attach to their complaints proof of exhaustion, (2) have named each individual whom they name as defendants in their subsequent civil rights complaints at the first stage of administrative resolution, and (3) exhaust all claims that are part of the action. See Brief for Petitioners at 3. Petitioners challenge these three holdings from the Court of Appeals. See id.
Heightened Pleading Requirement
Petitioners’ challenge to the Court of Appeals’ holding, that prisoners must either allege that they exhausted administrative remedies in their complaints or attach proof of exhaustion to their complaints, depends largely on Congressional intent as interpreted in the text and structure of the relevant provisions of the PLRA. In justifying its stance, the Court of Appeals held that a PLRA complaint that fails to allege exhaustion of remedies is no different than one that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Brief for Petitioners at 39. Petitioners argue that such an interpretation seems illogical from the text of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). See id at 39. Paragraph (1) of § 1997e(c) states that the court “shall” dismiss actions that are “frivolous, malicious, [or] fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Paragraph (2) of § 1997e(c) states that courts “may” dismiss claims for the same reasons but adds that a court may do so “without first requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies.” Petitioners argue that Congress could not have equated “failure to exhaust administrative remedies” and “failure to state a claim upon which relief maybe granted” because such an interpretation would give paragraph (2) the illogical meaning that “courts may dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies without first requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies.” Brief for Petitioners at 39.
In response, Respondents argue that an interpretation of § 1997e that equates “failure to exhaust administrative remedies” with “failure to state a claim upon which relief maybe granted” does not render paragraph (2) of § 1997e(c) illogical or superfluous because it merely allows for dismissal of meritless claims, regardless of exhaustion. See Brief for Respondents at 65. Respondents argue that the text of PLRA establishes heightened screening provisions that demand heightened pleading requirements including alleging or proving exhaustion in the prisoner's complaint. See id at 17. Respondents highlight that 28 U.S.C. § 1915A requires the court to review prisoners’ cases and dismiss those which are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and to do so before discovery and even docketing. See id at 18. Thus, Respondents argue that the court must determine from the complaint alone, without discovery, whether the available administrative remedies have been exhausted and thus whether the prisoner has stated a claim upon which relief maybe granted. See id at 20.
Petitioners further argue that even if PLRA plaintiffs are required to allege or prove exhaustion in their complaints, such a holding would violate the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP). See Brief for Petitioners at 41. Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals’ heightened pleading requirement for exhaustion violates FRCP 8(a) which simply requires that a plaintiff plead “a short plain statement” of “the grounds on which jurisdiction depends” and a “statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See id. Petitioners elaborate that in both Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit and Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., the Supreme Court prohibited federal courts from imposing pleading standards that are not explicitly authorized by the FRCP. See id.
In response to this second argument, Respondents claim that the Supreme Court’s rulings rejecting judicially-created heightened pleadings standards do not control in this case. See Brief for Respondents at 34. Respondents distinguish Swierkiewicz from the current case by emphasizing that the heightened pleading requirements that the Supreme Court struck down in Swierkiewicz were not inherent in a statute, nor were they needed for a pre-docketing review, as they are in the present case. See id. Respondents distinguish Leathermen from the current case, stating that Leathermen did not take into consideration the “new regime” brought about by the PLRA that requires the court to sort out meritless claims prior to docketing. See id. at 36. Respondents further argue that the Supreme Court’s holdings in Crawford Fitt Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc. and Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co. stand for the proposition that the FRCP should not be interpreted as invalidating the provisions of more specific statutes. See id at 31-32. However, Respondents argue that because the PLRA is a more specific statute, the FRCP should not be interpreted as invalidating the PLRA’s provisions. See id.
Finally, Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals’ heightened pleading requirement does not advance the policies of the PLRA: to improve the quality and reduce the quantity of prisoner suits. See Brief for Petitioners at 52. Petitioners argue that the heightened pleading requirement will fall equally on meritorious and non-meritorious claims and will merely present a trap for the unwary pro se prisoner. See id at 53. Petitioners also argue that the heightened pleading requirement will not necessarily reduce the quantity of prisoner suits because it requires a prisoner to re-file a new complaint, forcing the court to re-familiarize itself with a case that has already undergone judicial scrutiny. See id at 54.
Respondents counter that the heightened pleading requirement both improves the quality and decreases the quantity of prisoner suits. See Brief for Respondents at 27. Respondents argue that the heightened pleading requirement requires prisoners to at least give enough thought to the complaint to assure that exhaustion is complete, thus saving scarce judicial resources from having to sort through voluminous records just to discover that exhaustion is not complete and go through the process all over again. See id.
Identification of All Defendants Requirement
Petitioners’ argument against the Court of Appeals’ holding, that prisoners must have named each individual whom they name as defendants in their subsequent civil rights complaints at the first stage of administrative resolution, focuses on the intent of Congress as interpreted in the purpose of the PLRA. Petitioners argue that one of Congress’s primary objectives with PLRA exhaustion is to provide prison officials with notice of and the opportunity to address the prisoner's concerns that eventually become the topic of lawsuits. See Brief for Petitioners at 58. Thus, Petitioners reason that all that is needed for prison officials to address the prisoner's concerns is knowledge of the problem, not specific names of individuals against whom future suits might be brought. See id. Petitioners explain that although the MDOC procedures, at the time that Petitioners started their grievance, required details of the problem, the procedures did not specifically require the prisoners to identify individuals. See id at 60. Further, Petitioners explain that in Sims v. Apfel, the Supreme Court rejected an attempt by the judiciary to impose technical requirements on an informal administrative process from which the judiciary is absent. See id.
Respondents reject Petitioners’ assertion that prison officials do not require names of those wronging the prisoner to address the problem. See Brief for Respondents at 44. Rather, Respondents maintain that prison officials cannot possibly address the prisoner's concerns unless a specific wrongdoer and potential defendant are named. See id. Indeed, Respondents note that in 2003, the MDOC changed its policy to require prisoners to specifically name prison officials by whom they have been grieved. See id at 48. Respondents maintain that a holding that invalidates the Court of Appeals’ requirement for naming defendants would invalidate the MDOC policy changes. See id at 49. Respondents also explained that Sims regarded procedures for Social Security Appeals hearings, and that the case of Woodford v. Ngo, which specifically dealt with the PLRA, controls in this case. See id at 50. Respondents explain that in Woodford, the Supreme Court held that PLRA exhaustion requires compliance with an agency’s critical procedural rules. See id.
Finally, Petitioners argue that this second requirement from the Court of Appeals also violates the FRCP. See Brief for Petitioners at 56. Petitioners explain that FRCP 15(a) states that courts can freely give leave to the parties to amend their pleadings when justice requires it, that FRCP 20 provides for the joinder of additional defendants at trial, and that FRCP 15(c)(3) permits parties to name misnamed parties. See id. Petitioners argue that any rule requiring prisoners to name defendants before submitting their complaint and prohibiting prisoners from filing complaint against any defendants not named during the administrative grievance process would clearly violate FRCP 15(a), 20, and 15(c)(3). See id at 57. In response, Respondents reference the lower court holding in Baxter v. Rose which maintained that where there is conflict between the FRCP and the PLRA, the PLRA takes precedent because it was enacted after the Rules Enabling Act. See id at 40.
Dismissal of an Entire Action with Any Unexhausted Claims Requirement
Petitioners’ challenge of the Court of Appeals’ requirement that any actions with one or more unexhausted claims must be dismissed in their entirety hinges on the text of the PLRA in the context of the relevant case law. Petitioners argue that there is a fundamental procedural norm that when a complaint has both good and bad claims, only the bad claims are dismissed. See Brief for Petitioners at 64. Petitioners cite Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc. as rejecting theories under which jurisdictional defect for one claim would require an entire action to be dismissed. See id. Petitioners argue that one cannot depart from this procedural norm without an express command from Congress, and maintain that the PLRA contains no such express provision. See id.
Respondents counter that the PLRA does expressly require dismissal of an entire action that contains any unexhausted claims. See Brief for Respondents at 53. Respondent notes that 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) provides that “No action shall be brought … until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” See id. Respondents argue that when an action contains both exhausted and unexhausted claims, that action cannot be said to be “exhausted.” See id at 54. Respondents elaborate that Congress certainly knew the difference between a “claim” and an “action” as is evidenced by its use of “claim” elsewhere in the PLRA, thus in using “action” instead of “claim” in 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), Congress wanted the entire action to be dismissed. Additionally, Respondents point out the similarities between their interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) ’s requirements and the requirements of the habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A), which provides that the court cannot grant a petition unless the petitioner has exhausted the administrative remedies available in the courts of the state. See id at 67. Respondents note that in Rose v. Lundy, the Supreme Court determined that required dismissal of petitions containing both exhausted and unexhausted habeas corpus claims would relieve courts of the difficult task of deciding when claims are related. See id at 68. Respondents argue that the same policy considerations support the required dismissal by the court of any action with unexhausted PLRA claims. See id.
Finally, Petitioners respond to Respondents’ analogy to habeas corpus exhaustion requirements by noting that habeas corpus proceedings are fundamentally different from PLRA proceedings. See Brief for Petitioners at 74. Petitioners explain that there is no statute of limitations on habeas corpus petitions, that habeas corpus petitioners have the ability to amend their petitions, and that in habeas corpus proceedings, the state courts produce detailed factual records that are not produced with administrative proceedings. See id at 73-76. Petitioners argue that these differences provide justification for dismissal of entire habeas corpus actions, but do not justify dismissal of entire PLRA actions. See id at 72.
Discussion
Jones v. Bock and Williams v. Overton require the Supreme Court to determine whether the PLRA mandates that when a prisoner feels that the conditions he has received in jail violate his civil rights, he must “totally exhaust” all available administrative remedies before he has jurisdiction to file a constitutional civil rights claim in federal court. In addition, the Supreme Court will address what, specifically, constitutes a “total exhaustion” of the available administrative remedies. For example, if a prisoner forgets to specifically name the defendants in his administrative grievance form, or if he forgets to attach proof of how he exhausted all administrative remedies, does the PLRA require that the federal court dismiss his entire complaint, regardless of whether he has a legitimate civil rights complaint?
Jones, Williams, and their supporters, on the one hand, argue that a mandatory dismissal of a prisoner's entire complaint based on a technicality is a violation of the prisoner's civil rights, contrary to the plain language and legislative intent of the PLRA. Brief of Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union, Jones v. Bock and Williams v. Overton, Nos. 05-7058 and 05-7142 at 1. Petitioners, in conjunction with prisoner rights advocate groups, argue that the Sixth Circuit’s requirement that each prisoner include specific documentation of how he exhausted administrative remedies is a result of baseless judicial activism. See id. Furthermore, Petitioners and their supporters argue that the “total exhaustion” rule, which requires that a prisoner's entire case be dismissed, even if he failed only to exhaust administrative remedies with regard to some aspects of his claim, results in an unreasonably harsh result that would prevent an unsophisticated prisoner from presenting a valid claim in federal court. See id. This effect, they argue, was not the outcome that Congress intended when passing the PLRA.
The Michigan Department of Corrections, on the other hand, argues that the Sixth Circuit’s adherence to the total exhaustion rule accords with the legislative intent and plain meaning of the PLRA. See e.g.,Brief for Respondent Michigan Department of Corrections, et. al., at 8, Jones v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, No. 05-7058 (February, 2006). Their argument follows that by drafting the PLRA, Congress used specific language to signify that an entire suit must be dismissed from court if all administrative remedies had not been pursued prior to the commencement of the action. See id at 10. In addition, Respondents claim that the policy initiative behind the PLRA was to curb prisoner litigation and to facilitate efficiency within the judicial process. See id at 11. Therefore, they argue that automatic dismissal of an insufficiently exhausted complaint is in line with that purpose. Id at 12. The Department of Corrections also argues that the total exhaustion rule does not impose any undue hardship on prisoners because cases dismissed on PLRA grounds are dismissed without prejudice, which allows prisoners to re-file their complaints in federal court once they have exhausted all remedies. See id at 1.
The Supreme Court’s decision on whether the PLRA mandates that a prisoner totally exhaust all administrative remedies, or have his entire case dismissed from court, should greatly impact the quantity of prisoner civil rights cases pending before the federal courts. If, for example, the Supreme Court upholds a broad application of the total exhaustion rule, less litigation will likely reach the courts because some prisoners may address their grievances during the administrative remedy process and discontinue their claims. See Brief for Respondent, Jones v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections at 13. In addition, the Supreme Court’s decision will affect the role that a federal court must take in evaluating a prisoner's complaint. If the Supreme Court decides that the total exhaustion rule should be applied narrowly, a court will take a more active role in investigating each claim in order to ascertain which parts of the claim must be entertained, and which must be dismissed. See Id at 12.
On the other hand, if the Supreme Court upholds a broad interpretation of the total exhaustion rule, a court will more readily dismiss the entire complaint once it finds that an aspect of the administrative remedy process has not yet been satisfied. Id. The Supreme Court’s decision will also set clear guidelines as to what steps a prisoner must take prior to obtaining jurisdiction in federal court. Not only are the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals currently divided on the issue of total exhaustion, but many prisoners and attorneys are confused as to what steps must be completed before a prisoner may successfully present his case before a federal court. The Supreme Court’s decision should lift the cloud of confusion currently hanging over prisoner civil rights adjudication and set forth clearer guidelines as to what specific actions a prisoner must take prior to filing his civil rights complaint. See Brief of Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union, at 26.
Conclusion
Jones v. Block and Williams v. Overton are important cases not only for determining the rights and obligations of prisoners filing claims under the PLRA, but also for determining the role of the judiciary in reviewing prisoner claims. To decide this case, the Supreme Court must determine the extent to which Congress intended to have the PLRA alter the FRCP and procedural norms in prisoner lawsuits. Regardless of the outcome, this case will clarify how the PLRA is to be put into practice by the judiciary.
Written by:
Tim Birnbaum
Peter Milligan