Indiana v. Edwards

The State of Indiana and the five amici in this case agree that trial courts should be able to apply a higher standard for determining a defendant's competence to represent himself than for judging competency to stand trial. Edwards disputes the need for and the constitutionality of such a higher standard.

A New Standard for Self-Representation Competence?

Indiana's brief to the United States Supreme Court proposes a standard for pro se representation that considers whether the defendant in a criminal trial has a minimal ability to communicate to the court and jury. Indiana argues that such ability is necessary to subject the government's case to meaningful adversarial testing, which is essential to a fair trial. Indiana contends that allowing the higher competency standard will protect the defendant's interest in a fair trial, the integrity of the legal system, and the public's interest in just verdicts.

In Edwards' case, Indiana argues, the trial court properly denied Edwards' request to represent himself because Edwards lacked a minimal ability to communicate with the court and jury. Representing oneself at trial requires the ability to tell one's side of the story through opening and closing arguments and examination of witnesses. When a defendant cannot perform these basic functions, Indiana argues, he effectively waives his right to a fair trial. According to Indiana, Edwards lacked this minimal capacity. Indiana notes that Edwards' private doctor described serious, intractable focus and memory problems, and Edwards' correspondence with the court exhibited confusion and an inability to present cogent thoughts.

Edwards argues in his response brief that Faretta specifically rejected basing the Sixth Amendment right of self-representation on a defendant's effectiveness in presenting his case.He says the court chose, with its eyes open, to allow defendants to represent themselves as long as they make this choice with their eyes open (i.e., knowingly and voluntarily). at 24. Edwards contends that Indiana's position allows courts to substitute their preferences-and prejudices-for the defendant's constitutionally recognized right. Finally, Edwards says the Supreme Court has already provided adequate protections for the integrity of the judicial process through less restrictive qualifications of the Faretta right (e.g., allowing courts to impose standby counsel).

In this case, Edwards argues that he was not nearly as impaired as Indiana says he was. For one thing, both Indiana's portrayal and the trial court's denial of Edwards's request to proceed pro se were skewed by reliance on communications that occurred before Edwards had received any meaningful treatment or medication. Denying Edwards's request also deprived him of his chosen defense, since he and his counsel had disagreed on defense strategy. Finally, Edwards contends that regardless of the Supreme Court's view of Indiana's proposed new standard, the trial court did not rely on this criterion but applied only its own standardless discretion to deny Edwards's request.

Four of the five amicus briefs in the case suggest several new standards for evaluating the competence of defendants who wish to represent themselves at trial. The American Psychiatric Association ("APA"), like Indiana, argues that in order to safeguard the fairness of the judicial process, trial courts must acknowledge that defendant competency is not an "all or nothing" or unitary concept, as defendants may have a range of competencies. APA suggests that courts use the existing competency evaluation process to assess a defendant's ability to represent himself. It further recommends considering availability of standby counsel and treatment to restore a defendant's own competency when deciding whether to deny a defendant the right to self-representation.

The United States and the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation argue for letting courts deny a defendant the right to represent himself if appropriate analysis shows the exercise of the right would frustrate an important state interest. The United States emphasizes that it would leave specific standard-setting to the individual states. State standards would be subject to Supreme Court review.

The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers ("NACDL") argues in its brief that courts should consider self-representation issues when assessing a defendant's basic competency to stand trial. Thus, a defendant who is competent to stand trial with counsel but incompetent to represent himself should be judged competent if he has counsel and incompetent if he doesn't. NACDL concedes this could create concerns about defendants manipulating the system. NACDL's fallback position is to provide counsel whenever a court judges a defendant competent to go to trial and incompetent to represent himself.

The American Bar Association ("ABA") would have courts focus on whether the defendant's waiver of counsel was knowing and voluntary. The ABA indicates that states should be able to craft their own inquiries in this assessment, but provides model standards as guidelines.

Legal Rationales for Standards

Indiana and the amici have attempted to fit their proposed standards into the legal framework already established by the court. This includes, principally, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 833-34 (1975), which first established the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation, and Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 398 (1993), which said the standard for competence to waive one's right to counsel was no higher than that for standing trial.

Indiana's argument concentrates on Faretta. It first says that allowing a higher standard for self-representation is not inconsistent with Faretta. But it argues that if the Court finds the new standard incompatible with Faretta, it should consider overturning that decision. Indiana says its new rule is compatible with Faretta, in part, because Faretta assumed the kind of competence Indiana's new rule would let courts require. In Faretta, for example, the Court had found the defendant to be "literate, competent, and understanding." Thus, the Court did not have to confront the question raised by Indiana in Edwards' case concerning the defendant's ability to communicate intelligibly.

In addition, Indiana notes that the Court has never held the Faretta right to be absolute, but has allowed balancing where the integrity of the system might be compromised by self-representation. Courts are permitted to impose standby counsel against a defendant's wishes and to withdraw permission for self-representation if the defendant is disruptive or does not follow court rules. The Court has also let trial courts limit the exercise of other, arguably similar, rights, such as the right to paid counsel of choice and waiver of conflict-free counsel, in the interest of providing a fair trial. Thus, limiting defendants' right to self-representation where fairness requires is simply another example of the balancing with which courts are already engaged.

Indiana's alternative argument is that the Court should overrule Faretta. Indiana notes that the Faretta right is not explicitly stated in the Sixth Amendment text. Instead, the right was inferred by the Court from the amendment's structure and historic context. The Court relied in large part on English common law views of self-representation. Indiana argues that the Court's conclusions concerning this history were incorrect or are now outmoded. First, Indiana disputes the Court's view of self-representation as a cherished common law right. It argues self-representation was the norm mainly because defendants had no right to counsel. In addition, Indiana says defendants faced a prohibition against testifying on their own behalf. Thus, representing oneself at trial was the only way to be heard. Indiana argues that the modern developments of the right to representation by counsel and a defendant's right to testify greatly diminished the need for self-representation.

Indiana also argues that support for Faretta has eroded. It notes that the Court has not extended the right to appeals and that it has allowed trial courts to appoint standby counsel against a defendant's wishes. Indiana further claims that opinions of individual justices have shown a weakening allegiance to the Faretta doctrine.

The amici present their own rationales for revising or clarifying the pro se competence standard. The APA and the United States, like Indiana, argue that Faretta is not absolute. ; APA also claims that Godinez is not controlling, because it concerned a guilty plea rather than self-representation. The United States argues that Godinez set a floor for competence to waive the right to counsel, but provide a ceiling for state standards.

NACDL focuses mainly on Godinez, which it says erred in conflating common law and modern standards for competence to stand trial. Godinez said self-representation was the norm at common law, and thus competency to stand trial was competency to represent oneself. NACDL notes, however, that this common law standard has been replaced by the standard the Supreme Court set in Dusky v. United States. The Dusky standard judges a defendant's competence specifically based upon his ability to consult with counsel. Godinez, therefore, puts courts in an odd position: They are to judge mentally ill or compromised pro se applicants by a standard that does not apply, in order to permit them to do something they may not be competent to do. NACDL calls for shifting such defendants conceptually into one or the other category by either declaring incompetent pro se applicants incompetent to stand trial or imposing a lawyer on a defendant who is competent only by Dusky standards.

CJLF makes two central points about Faretta. CJLF first argues that Faretta's right to self-representation is implicit, not stated, in the Constitution; therefore, the Court should apply it more narrowly and carefully than it would an explicitly stated right. For that reason, CJLF then says the Court should look at the state-federal court consensus that the Faretta court looked to in support of its decision and should define the right in accordance with that consensus view. CJLF's conclusion is that the state-federal consensus upon which the Faretta decision relied was that the right applied only in usual circumstances and would give way where concerns about fairness and other important interests rendered it problematic. CJLF's view supports for allowing state courts considerable discretion in assessing defendants with borderline mental competence.

The ABA chooses the broadest legal road in basing its distinction between competence to stand trial and competence to represent oneself at trial on the knowing and intelligent character of the waiver of counsel. This distinction is already recognized in Godinez, and thus sidesteps the Godinez equation of the two types of competencies. Nevertheless, ABA's rationale may simply pull the plain meaning of its phrase too far afield-and away from the question the Court itself prepared.