United States v. Ressam (07-455)
Oral argument: March 26, 2008
Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit (Jan. 16, 2007)
EXPLOSIVES, TERRORISM, MANDATORY SENTENCE, RELATION, UNDERLYING FELONY
Ahmed Ressam was convicted of numerous crimes in relation to his participation in an al Quaeda plot to bomb the Los Angeles International Airport during the travel rush leading up to the turn of the millennium. He challenges one of the laws he was convicted under, 18 U.S.C. § 844 (h)(2), which provides for a mandatory minimum ten-year term for anyone who “carries an explosive during the commission of any felony which may be prosecuted in a court of the United States.” Ressam was carrying explosives in his car when he signed a customs declaration with a false name, a felonious act. The question in this case is whether the language of the statute merely requires the defendant to be carrying the explosives during the commission of a federal felony, or whether the explosives must have some relation to the underlying felony. The Ninth Circuit held that there must be a relation between the felony and the explosives, and it vacated that portion of Ressam's sentence. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review that determination.
- [Question presented]
- [Issue]
- [Facts]
- [Discussion]
- [Analysis]
Question presented
Section 844(h)(2) of Title 18, United States Code, prescribes a mandatory ten-year term of imprisonment for any person who “carries an explosive during the commission of any felony which may be prosecuted in a court of the United States.” The question presented is whether Section 844(h)(2) requires that the explosives be carried “in relation to” the underlying felony.
Issue
Does Section 844(h)(2) implicitly require that the defendant must have carried explosives “in relation to” the underlying felony, or is the statute’s mandatory ten-year sentence triggered so long as the facial requirements of the statute—the carrying of explosives during a federal felony— are satisfied?
Facts
Ahmed Ressam, the defendant, is an Algerian citizen who trained with al Qaeda in Afghanistan, and was convicted of numerous crimes in connection with a plot to bomb the Los Angles International Airport in the days leading up to the turn of the Millennium. U.S. v. Ressam, 474 F.3d 597, 598-99 (9th Cir. 2007). After training in Afghanistan, Ressam traveled to Canada, where he plotted the airport attack. Id. at 600. He had previously used a forged baptismal certificate to obtain a Canadian passport that bore the false name Benni Antoine Noris. Id. at 599.
On December 14th, 1999, Ressam concealed bomb making supplies in the trunk of a rental car and boarded a ferry traveling from Tswassen, British Columbia, to Port Angeles, Washington. Id. at 600. Upon reaching the United States, Ressam drove his car off the ferry and proceeded to a U.S. Customs checkpoint. Id. The Customs agent noticed that Ressam looked nervous and asked him to fill out a declaration form, which he signed with his assumed name. Ressam then was directed to a secondary inspection, where a search of the car revealed the bomb-making supplies and he was arrested. Id.
Ressam was charged with and convicted of nine crimes, two of which directly related to his interaction with U.S. Customs. Id. at 600-601. The first crime was carrying explosives during the commission of a felony. The second crime, which underlies the first, was the crime of falsely identifying himself on a customs declaration form. The government argued that because he had the explosives in his car when he signed the form, he was guilty of possessing explosives while committing a felony. Id. Ressam challenged his conviction on the first of these charges, stating that the crime of carrying an explosive during the commission of a felony requires more than merely possessing explosives while the underling felony is committed, but the explosives must be carried “in relation to” the felony. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed and vacated that portion of Ressam’s sentence. Id. The Supreme Court granted Certiorari to review the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation. Supreme Court Question Presented.
Discussion
The Supreme Court will determine whether 18 U.S.C. 844(h)(2) can be used to incarcerate anyone who carries explosives coincident to committing a federal felony, regardless of whether that person intended to use the explosives. The Court’s resolution of the issue is important because under the statute, courts lack discretion to modify the ten year minimum sentence based on the facts of the case. U.S. v. Ressam, 474 F.3d 597, 601 (9th Cir. 2007). The Supreme Court thus faces the problem of choosing between an interpretation that either over-criminalizes or under-criminalizes the act of carrying explosives during the commission of a felony.
Ressam argues that eliminating any relational requirement would make the statute overly broad, since “explosives” include many common substances, while federal felonies include crimes ranging from counterfeiting money to murder. Brief for Respondent at 9-10. Arguably, Congress did not target nonviolent felons when it enacted the statute, so the judiciary may have overstepped its bounds by interpreting the statute as broadly as it did. See Brief for Respondent at 16-17.
Aside from concerns about exceeding congressional intent, an expansive reading of 18 U.S.C. § 844 (h)(2) implicates concerns about fairness and statutory purpose. Without a relational requirement, the statute could penalize defendants engaged in conduct outside of the statute’s intended reach. An overly broad interpretation could result in unjustifiably long sentences for individuals who do not pose a significant threat to society, weakening the statute’s deterrence effect. Brief for Respondent at 12. A person who merely happened to be carrying “explosives,” without any intent to use them, receives the same punishment as a person who did intend to use explosives to commit a felony. Brief for Respondent at 15. Without any distinction, felons might take a “nothing to lose” attitude towards carrying explosives.
Reading the relational requirement out of the statute also creates the danger of abuse. Prosecutors who want to ensure that defendants receive jail time would have an incentive to find substances qualifying as explosives solely to obtain a longer prison term. Brief for Respondent at 22. Relying on “prosecutorial discretion” rather than the court’s judgment to ensure that the statute is applied selectively puts the rights of defendants at risk, since prosecutors have a clear conflict of interest. See Id. In many cases, the question of whether the defendant is dangerous enough to merit the application of 844(h)(2) will be a close one, and prosecutorial zeal could outweigh objective consideration.
On the other hand, if the Supreme Court does find a relational requirement, the difficulty of proving a relationship between the explosives and the felony might render 844(h)(2) toothless. This is especially problematic because at least one of Congress’s goals was to ensure stringent punishment for felons who heightened the risk of their crimes by carrying explosives. Brief for Petitioner at 30. A relational requirement would undercut a primary goal of the statute: guaranteeing significant sentences for felons who choose to carry explosives while carrying out their crimes. In reality, carrying explosives, whether intended for use or not, is behavior worth deterring. Additionally, prosecutors might lose a significant bargaining tool, since the sure prospect of a prison term is more likely to incentivize cooperation from felons. Id. at 30.
A relational requirement also raises issues of how close of a relationship between the explosives and the felony, the prosecution must prove. Brief for Petitioner at 33. In cases where the underlying felony is different from what the defendant intended to commit with explosives, prosecutors may find it difficult to prove a connection because they would need to prove the existence of intent. This is far more difficult of a feat than it is to prove than the simple fact that the defendant carried explosives while committing a felony. The result could lead to disproportionately light sentences for felons who are arrested while carrying explosives for an unrelated felony, even though they did not intend to use the explosives in the later felony. Id. at 14-15. In particular, a relational requirement may hinder terrorist prosecutions. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9-10. The earlier in a conspiracy that the government arrests a terrorist, the harder it would be to invoke the statute due to the lack of nexus between the felony and the explosives. This would undermine a key goal of criminal law: deterrence of future crimes.
The U.S. Department of Justice argues that “innocent conduct” hypotheticals are unrealistic. Following this line of reasoning, such situations would rarely arise because explosives are not an everyday item and it is unlikely that individuals would carry explosives for innocent purposes. Brief for Petitioner at 30. Undercriminalizing the act of carrying explosives during a felony could result in too many dangerous felons receiving comparatively light sentences with little commensurate benefit in preventing harsh terms for innocent carriers, since so few carriers of explosives are actually innocent.
Analysis
This case presents a question of statutory interpretation. Hence, it turns on the meaning of the statutory text, the intent of the legislature in passing the statute, and whether either side’s interpretation of the statute would lead to absurd or undesirable results.
Statutory Text
18 U.S.C. § 844 (h)(2) provides for a mandatory 10-year sentence for anyone who “carries an explosive during the commission of any felony which may be prosecuted in a court of the United States.” The United States argues that the plain meaning of this text does not include a requirement that the explosives be carried “in relation to” the felony, merely that they be carried “during the commission of” the felony. Brief for Petitioner at 11-12. The government further argues that when the plain language of the statute is clear, the courts should defer to the legislature, especially concerning the elements of federal crimes. Id. at 11 (citing Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 604 (1994)).
Ressam argues a careful examination of the words in the statute reveals that the government’s interpretation is untenable. Brief for Respondent at 8. He claims that the words “carries” “explosives” and “felony” are all so broad that the statute cannot be interpreted without a requirement that they be related. Id. at 9-11. Specifically, “carries” has been interpreted by lower courts to include holding the explosives in a locked compartment of a vehicle, “explosives” is defined broadly by the statute to include a number of legal substances, including gasoline and fertilizer, and “felony” is a legal term that encompasses a wide variety of crimes. Id. Ressam argues that under the government’s interpretation, a farmer driving a truck full of fertilizer who is unknowingly carrying a forged twenty-dollar bill is in violation of the statute. Thus, he would receive a mandatory ten-year prison term. Id. at 12. Ressam believes the court can avoid this result by looking to 18 U.S.C. § 844 (h), the broader statute. Ressam argues because the rest of the laws in this section of statute deal with illegal uses of explosives, the subsection at issue should be read as dealing with the same subject matter, specifically the use of explosives in relation to a felony. Id. at 14.
Legislative Intent
The argument about Congress’s intent while framing 18 U.S.C. § 844 (h)(2) centers around a closely related statute, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A), which provides for a mandatory sentence for anyone who “during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime…uses or carries a firearm.” Both sides agree that the gun statute was the model for the explosives statute at issue, and that the gun statute has the explicit relation requirement that the explosives statute lacks (the “and in relation to” language), but they disagree profoundly on the implications of this difference. Brief for Petitioner at 17-18; Brief for Respondent at 20-21.
The government argues that Congress made a reasoned decision to depart from its model when it chose not to include the relation requirement in 18 U.S.C. § 844 (h)(2), and reading in a “relation” requirement would, therefore, contrast with Congress’s intent. Brief for Petitioner at 18. Ressam, on the other hand, points out that the gun statute was originally framed in 1968 without the “in relation to” language. Further, he argues that when the statute was amended to include that language in 1983, the congressional intent was not to change the scope of the statute, but rather to make explicit the relation requirement that it thought had always been there. Brief for Respondent at 21. Therefore, Ressam argues that when Congress passed the explosives statute at issue in 1985, using the same language as the original 1968 gun statute, it intended it to have the same meaning, and therefore to include an implied relation requirement. Id. In the case below, the Ninth Circuit endorsed this view of the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 844 (h)(2), and ruled that there was an implied relation requirement. U.S. v. Ressam, 474 F.3d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 2007).
The Possibility of Absurd Results
Ressam argues that adopting the government’s interpretation to the statute will lead to absurd results, such as the farmer example above, which could not have been Congress’ intent in passing the statute. Brief for Respondent at 12 and 20. He asserts that this argument is bolstered by the fact that the statute calls for a mandatory ten-year sentence for its violation, which means that judges and juries have no discretion to mitigate extreme penalties. Id. at 20-21. The government responds by arguing that prosecutorial discretion can check absurd results, and that in fact, Ressam can point to no cases where the statute in question has clearly been misapplied. Brief for Petitioner at 31. In addition, the government argues that Congress might have written the statue with the intent of vesting a lot of discretion in prosecutors in order to give them a powerful tool against crimes involving explosives, trusting that prosecutors would not misuse their powers. Id. In that case, the government argues, the Supreme Court would be upholding Congress’ intent by upholding the application of the law to Ressam’s case. Id. Additionally, the government argues that the Court should not invalidate a law based on hypothetical absurd results, but should instead look to the results of the statue’s application in this case. Id. at 32. The government argues that the result in this case was fair, and that the statute should be judged by that result. Id.
Conclusion
This case addresses the statutory interpretation 18 U.S.C. 844(h)(2), a federal statute mandating 10 years’ imprisonment for carrying explosives during a federal felony. The Supreme Court will determine whether the statute is only applicable if a defendant carried weapons “in relation to” the felony he committed. The decision will resolve a circuit split between the Ninth Circuit, which found an implicit relational requirement, and the Third and Fifth Circuits, which refused to go beyond the face of the statute. Ressam’s outcome will clarify what burden prosecutors face when seeking longer prison terms for felons who choose to carry explosives during felonies, and will determine whether 18 U.S.C. 844(h)(2) is more akin to a strict liability statute for such felons.
Authors
Prepared by: Deepa Sarkar and Joe Hashmall
Edited by: Timothy Birnbaum