Florida v. Powell

The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution prohibits a criminal suspect’s compelled self-incrimination. In order to prevent this the Supreme Court has held that, before being questioned, suspects must be informed, through “Miranda warnings,” of certain rights, including the right of a suspect to counsel during questioning. At issue in the present case is whether the warning that “you have the right to talk to a lawyer before answering any of our questions” and “the right to use any of these rights at any time you want during this interview” sufficed to inform Respondent, Kevin Powell, of this right.

Petitioner, the State of Florida, argues that the warning is sufficient, disagreeing with the holding of the Florida Supreme Court that “a suspect must be expressly advised of his right to counsel during questioning”. Powell contends that the warning was misleading and did not convey that he had the right to counsel during questioning.

Powell also argues that the case is improperly before the Supreme Court and that as a consequence, the Court should dismiss the case without reaching the merits. However, that argument is not on review before the Supreme Court.

Sufficiency of the Warning

Regarding the sufficiency of the warnings, Florida contends that Miranda only requires that the given warning “reasonably convey” the criminal defendant’s rights. According to Florida, the Miranda warning itself is not a constitutionally protected right, but simply a means to protect against self-incrimination. Thus, Florida maintains that the Constitution does not require a verbatim recitation of the Miranda warning, so long as police procedure adequately protects against compelled self-incrimination.

Powell agrees with Florida that the warning does not have to follow “a single script.” However, Powell argues that the federal Constitution sets a threshold for protecting individual rights. Powell contends that state constitutions may surpass the federal Constitution in providing more stringent protection of individual rights. Powell argues that the warning itself was misleading, pointing to the phrase “before answering any questions” to suggest that the suspect can only speak with an attorney before questioning begins, not that an attorney can also be present during questioning. Powell maintains that the limitation in the warning’s language was misleading, because nothing in the warning suggested an attorney could be there at the questioning. Thus, Powell contends that the warning does not comply with Miranda. Powell further contends that advising a suspect of his right to counsel before questioning is an incomplete and narrower warning than required by Miranda. Thus, Powell argues that while no particular words need be used, Miranda and the Florida Constitution require a suspect to be “clearly informed” of his right to counsel during questioning, which the warning at issue fails to do.

The Warning: The Language at Issue

Florida argues that the warning’s failure to expressly state the suspect’s right to counsel during questioning does not render the warning unconstitutional. Florida contends that by failing to view the warning in its entirety, Powell and the lower court concentrate on a technical parsing of individual words instead of looking to their overall meaning. Florida insists that when looked at in this broader context, the warning only needs to convey to an average person: the importance of statements to the police, the fact that the defendant does not have to speak to police and may consult with an attorney, and if the defendant cannot afford his own attorney, the State will provide legal counsel. Florida maintains that if a person of average intelligence read the warning given to Powell, that person would have concluded that the rights were adequately conveyed.

Powell argues that the last sentence of the warning does not cure its earlier deficiency. Powell contends that the statement, “You have a right to use any of these rights at any time you want during this interview” is useless when the police never mentioned the right to have counsel present during questioning. Thus, Powell maintains that while the “catch-all phrase” reiterated the rights included in the warning, it could not supply a warning that had never been expressed Powell claims that if a suspect does not know when he is entitled to counsel, he will not know that he is able to request counsel during questioning. Powell argues that this situation would circumvent the fundamental privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.

Coerced vs. Voluntary Confessions

Florida further argues that there was no error for the Florida Supreme Court to reverse. Florida contends that Powell did not allege any form of coercion by the police, nor did he exercise his right to counsel; in fact, he testified that he understood and waived his rights. Therefore, since Powell affirmatively waived his right to counsel, Florida maintains that failing specifically to inform him that he had a right to counsel during questioning would not have made a difference. Powell, however, argues that warnings are necessary to ensure an environment free from undue pressure, and a warning is necessary to make the defendant aware of his ability to exercise his constitutional rights freely. The United States argues that the main goal of the Miranda warning is to ensure that a suspect is aware of his rights and able to make a conscious choice whether to use them or not. The Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers ("FACDL") says that the Miranda warning serves as a "procedural safeguard" ensuring that custodial interrogations do not compel the defendant to unknowingly or unwillingly incriminate himself or herself. However, FACDL argues that interrogation techniques have become so effective over the years that the line between a coerced and a voluntary confession has blurred, and a clearer warning must be issued if defendants are to sincerely understand it.

Circuit Split in the Specificity of Warnings

Both parties rely on splits between the Federal Circuit Courts to bolster their arguments. Florida argues that the Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have gone beyond the Court’s application of Miranda by requiring more specific warnings. Florida turns to decisions in the Second, Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits that have all held warnings that did not specifically tell the defendant of his right to counsel during questioning to be sufficient, so long as they informed the defendant of his right to an attorney. Powell counters that while a Circuit split does exist regarding whether a general or a specific warning satisfies Miranda, all of the Circuit Courts has held misleading warnings to violate Miranda. Powell notes that even those courts that allow general warnings have held warnings that “[suggest] a limitation on access to counsel” to fail the Miranda requirements.